THE

HISTORY

OF

THE POLITICKS

OF

GREAT BRITAIN AND FRANCE,

FROM THE TIME OF

THE CONFERENCE AT PILLNITZ,

TO THE

DECLARATION OF WAR AGAINST GREAT BRITAIN.

WITH AN

APPENDIX,

CONTAINING

A NARRATIVE OF THE ATTEMPTS MADE BY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO RESTORE PEACE.

IN TWO VOLUMES.

VOL. II.

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CHAPTER XIII.

Diplomatic communications between Great Britain and France, in December 1792 and January 1793, relative to the danger, with which the former was threatened by the latter, and to the measures of defence, which had been taken in consequence. Willingness of the British ministry, to negotiate with the agents of the French government. Mr. Pitt's conference with Mr. Maret: and its want of effect.

occaſioned by the circumſtance, that Mr. Maret had received no inſtructions whatſoever from the French government. Mr. Pitt's declaration to Mr. Maret, that "it would give him great pleaſure, to treat with him as a confidential perſon from the French executive council,,. Refuſal of the executive council to let Mr. Maret negotiate, or even converſe on political ſubjects with the Britiſh miniſtry. Order ſent to him by the executive council to depart immediately from London, and to return to Paris. Negotiation carried on by Lord Grenville and Mr. Chauvelin. Reſult of this negotiation: and proof, that it was not in the power of the Britiſh government to prevent a rupture with France.

Though the diplomatic relations between Great Britain and France, had been ſo far interrupted, that the credentials of the Britiſh ambaſſador at Paris, which the depoſition of Louis XVI rendered uſeleſs, had not ben renewed [1], and even in December 1792, when Great Britain had ſo many grounds of complaint, no Britiſh ambaſſador was ſent to Paris [2], yet on the

1. On this ſubject ſee the ninth chapter.

2. The reaſons, why no Britiſh ambaſſador was ſent to Paris in December 1792, have been aſſigned in the eleventh chapter.

other hand they were ſo far continued, that the Britiſh government not only permitted both the French miniſter Chauvelin, and other agents of the executive council to reſide in London, but likewiſe conſented to negotiate with them. It is true, that Mr. Chauvelin had delivered no other letters of credence, than thoſe, which he had received from the late king of France [3], and therefore, according to diplomatic ſtrictneſs, he could not be conſidered as a perſon veſted with an official employment. However, ſince he ſtill retained the title of French miniſter, ſince he received regular communications from the new, as he had done from the old government of France, and ſince theſe communications were both accepted and anſwered by the Britiſh miniſtry, he ſo far ſupplied the place of a regularly accredited ambaſſador, that if the French government had been deſirous of removing the grievances, of which the Britiſh government complained, they might have been as eaſily removed by the agency of a perſon in the ſituation of Mr. Chauvelin, as by the agency of an ambaſſador, who had received letters of

3. It was not before the 17 of January 1793 that the Britiſh cabinet was deſired to accept of letters of credence for Mr. Chauvelin in the name of the executive council: and Mr. Chauvelin's negotiation with Lord Grenville began on the 27. of December 1792.

credence in due form from the executive council: Further Lord Grenville assured Mr. Chauvelin, "*that "outward forms would be no hindrance to his Britannic "majesty, whenever the question related to explanations, "which might be satisfactory and advantageous to both "parties*,,: and Mr. Pitt himself declared in like manner to Mr. Chauvelin, "*that it was his desire to avoid a "war, and to receive a proof of the same sentiments "from the French ministry*,,. This was acknowledged even by Brissot, in his report to the Convention of the 12 of January [4]: and he further admitted, not only "that the British ministry had both given and ,,courted explanations,, [5], but that "they had pointed "out the very terms of the interpretation, which "would satisfy them in regard to the decree of the 19.

4. Brissot's own words were: "Lord Grenville attestait à votre ambassadeur, *que les formes n'arrêteraient jamais le Roi d'Angleterre, lorsqu'il s'agiroit d'obtenir des declarations rassurantes et profitables pour les deux partis.* Pitt de son côté ne témoignait au commencement de Decembre, que *le desir d'éviter la guerre, et d'en avoir le témoignage du ministere Français.*,, Moniteur 15. Janv. 1793.

5. "On provoquait et on donnait des explications.,, Ib. It is extraordinary that in defiance of these confessions of Brissot, relative both to Mr. Pitt and Lord Grenville a British writer could venture to represent ministers, as "scrupulously observant of the most [illegible] punctilios, which could furnish the smallest pretence for repelling peace.,,

"of November,, [6]. Their readineſs therefore to negotiate with the new government of France, in order, if poſſible, to avert the horrors of a war, admits of no doubt: and, though they had not formally recogniſed the French republic, yet the very act of entering into a negotiation with the perſons, who had the direction of it, was a virtual acknowledgement, that to theſe perſons (whether juſtly or unjuſtly is another inquiry) belonged the executive authority of France. Had the Britiſh miniſtry, as their adverſaries pretend, being reſolved at all events to engage in a war with France, with a view of overturning the new government of that country, they would hardly have negotiated with its agents, they would hardly have given and have courted explanations, they would hardly have declared, that outward forms and diplomatic punctilios would preſent no obſtacles to their treating on ſubjects, which regarded the welfare of both parties. It is a fact likewiſe, which is known to the whole world that Lord Grenville actually conducted

6. "Le miniſtere Anglais avait indiqué à un des agens de France à Londres les termes dans leſquels l'interpretation de ce décret devait être conçue pour raſſurer pleinement le cabinet de Saint-James et le Parlement.,, Ib. Whether the French government really gave ſatisfactory explanations, is a queſtion, which will be examined in the following part of this chapter.

a negotiation with Mr. Chauvelin, relative to the complaints, which the Britiſh government had to make on the conduct of France: but whether the grounds of complaint were removed or corroborated by this negotiation, is a queſtion, on which the reader will eaſily decide, when the Notes of Mr. Chauvelin, of the French executive council, and of the Britiſh ſecretary of ſtate are laid before him.

Before however we proceed to this negotiation, which commenced on the 27. of December 1792, it will be neceſſary to take notice of the conference, which Mr. Pitt had with Mr. Maret in the former part of this month [7], and which is circumſtantially related by Mr. Miles [8], who was an intimate friend of the latter, and acted on this occaſion as mediator between the two parties. A French agent, (not Mr. Maret)

7. I do not know the exact day, on which this conference was held: but it muſt have taken place in the firſt half of the month, becauſe Mr. Maret, though he waited for an anſwer from the French executive council relative to this conference, departed from London on the 18, as appears from a Letter written by Mr. Miles to Le Brun on the 19, which begins thus: "Je vous ai déja écrit par Monſieur Maret, qui eſt parti *hier* pour ſe rendre à Paris.,, Authentic Correſpondence, Appendix p. 63. At the end of January Mr. Maret came again to London: but the hiſtory of this ſecond journey belongs to the fifteenth chapter.

8. Authentic Correſpondence, p. 89—95.

with whom Mr. Miles had frequent conferences, but whoſe name he has not mentioned, had aſſured Mr. Miles, that he was empowered by the French executive council, to demand an audience of Mr. Pitt, and had requeſted Mr. Miles to wait on the miniſter, and obtain his conſent. This conſent Mr. Pitt granted, without knowing even the name of the perſon, with whom he was to confer: for, what was very extraordinary, the French agent inſiſted, that his name ſhould not be mentioned, "till he had poſitive aſſurance, that he would be received, and a rendezvous was given"[9]. As this circumſtance neceſſarily excited diſtruſt, Mr. Miles before the meeting took place again preſſed the agent not to deceive him, he repreſented the diſagreable conſequences, which might enſue, if he were not really authoriſed by the French executive council, to demand the interview, to which Mr. Pitt had conſented, and in caſe he were not already authoriſed, Mr. Miles propoſed to defer the conference for a few days, during which a meſſenger might go to Paris and return with the neceſſary inſtructions. But the French agent again proteſted that he was already

9. Ib. p. 90. Mr. Pitt's condeſcenſion in granting an interview to an agent of the French executive council, even though this perſon inſiſted that his name ſhould not be previouſly mentioned, ſhews how anxiouſly Mr. Pitt deſired to avoid a rupture with France.

empowered to hold a conference with Mr. Pitt [10]. After all these preparations and repeated protestations, every one would have supposed, that this person would have been able on the day of meeting to produce such instructions from the French executive council, as would have empowered him to treat on the differences subsisting between Great Britain and France. But, strange to relate, when the meeting took place, and his instructions were demanded, it appeared, that *he had no authority whatsoever:* and to augment, if possible, the insult which he had thus offered to the British minister, he had the assurance to present another, as the person authorised to treat, who had no more authority, than the pretended plenipotentiary himself. This other person was the well-known Mr. Maret, who was come over to England merely in the domestic concerns of the Duke of Orleans, and who, as his intimate friend Mr. Miles expressly testifies, *never pretended to have had any other business* [11]. And that he had no authority whatsoever from the French executive council to treat on state affairs, may be proved not only by the testimony of Mr. Miles, but by the evidence of Mr. Maret himself: for on the 11. of January, 1793, a few weeks after his return to Paris he wrote a letter to Mr. Miles

10. Ib. p. 91.
11. Ib. ib.

in which he made the following declaration. "*I had "no authority to treat, I had no miſſion: and when I de- "clared this to Mr. Pitt and to yourſelf, I declared the "truth*,, [12].

A ſcene like that, which been juſt deſcribed, would have been ſufficient to rouſe the indignation of any man, who was not endowed with the greateſt moderation. The two-fold deception, which took place on this occaſion, and the falſhoods of which the French agent was not aſhamed to be guilty, ſhewed that the emiſſaries of the executive council thought themſelves at liberty to trifle with a Britiſh miniſter even at the expenſe of truth. If then, after the manifold indignities, which the Britiſh government had

12. Mr. Maret's own words were: "Je n'avais ni autori- "ſation, ni miſſion: et j'ai dit la verité en la déclarant à "vous et à Monſieur Pitt.,, Authentic Correſpondence, Appendix p. 70. — On the 18. of December 1792, about a week after the conference had been held, Mr. Miles, in a letter to Le Brun, expreſſed his ſurpriſe at the unexpected iſſue of it, in the following terms. "Mr. * * * m'a toujours "juré qu'il était autoriſé à voir le Miniſtre, et je vous laiſſe "à juger de ma ſurpriſe, quand j'ai vu ſortir de derriere le "rideau M. Maret, comme chargé d'une miſſion ſecrete, et "que c'etait lui, et non Mr * * * qui devait voir Mr. Pitt. "Si j'ai été étonné de tout ce qui eſt paſſé, j'ai du l'être bien "d'avantage, quand j'ai appris *que Mr. Maret n'était pas auto- "riſé de traiter des affaires politiques*.,, Ib. p. 64.

already received from the national convention, this additional insult had provoked an absolute refusal to listen any longer to the representations of its agents, I much question, whether any Briton, who has the honour of his country at heart, would venture to blame it. Yet, notwithstanding these repeated affronts, Mr. Pitt, who sacrificed resentment to the desire of preserving peace, declared to Mr. Maret at this very conference, that in case he could obtain instructions, "*it* "*would give him great pleasure, to treat with him, as a* "*confidential person from the French executive council*,, [13]. Greater willingness, and in fact, when we consider all circumstances, greater condescension on the part of a British minister was hardly possible: and the expression, "a confidential person from the *French executive council*,, is far from indicating a contempt for the new government of France, or a reluctance to treat with the agents of a council, "whose heads had "not been anointed from the holy oil cruse before the "altar of Rheims,, [14]. Mr. Maret himself was so

13. Mr. Miles says, p. 94. that he has Mr. Maret's own authority for this assertion.

14. These ill-timed words of a celebrated leader of opposition were applied by Le Brun, in his report to the convention of the 19. of December (Moniteur 21. Dec. 1792) with great advantage to the French cause, which is in general under great obligations to the same orator.

well pleaſed with his reception, and derived from it ſuch ſanguine expectations of being enabled to act as a mediator of peace, which he ſincerely wiſhed to preſerve [15], that he immediately diſpatched a courier to Paris, in the hope of obtaining inſtructions to treat with the Britiſh government [16]. But the French executive council not only refuſed to ſend the required inſtructions, but even ordered him to abſtain from all converſation with Mr. Pitt on the ſubject of politicks, and to return immediately to Paris. "He was at my houſe,, ſays Mr. Miles [17], "when the diſpatch arri-"ved, and I read it with the more ſurpriſe and in-"dignation, on finding that Le Brun had reported to "the convention, that Mr. Pitt, *alarmed* [18], had ſolici-

15. Authentic correſpondence, p. 91. 92.

16. Ib. p. 94.

17. Ib. p. 95.

18. As Le Brun attributed to fear Mr. Pitt's readineſs to treat with an agent of the French executive council, which he moreover ſtrangely perverted, what inference would he have deduced, had a Britiſh ambaſſador been ſent to Paris to demand explanations? Nor was Le Brun the only one, who aſcribed Mr. Pitt's pacific diſpoſition to the meaneſt motives, on which account Mr. Miles, in a letter to Le Brun of the 2. of January 1793 made the following complaint. "Sa condeſcendance a été attribuée, non à la franchiſe, non "à l'interêt qu'il eſt cenſé prendre à la proſperité de ſa patrie, "non pas à un principe de bonne politique, fondé ſur les

"ted an interview with the secret agents of the exe-
"cutive council, but that he (Le Brun) had expressly
"forbidden them to have any communication with the
"English minister,,.

Dejected at the unexpected issue of this affair, Mr. Miles wrote to Le Brun on the 18. of December, the day that Mr. Maret departed from London, and said: "I am sincerely grieved to see all my efforts for "preserving peace and uniting the two nations, likely "to fail through ill founded prepossessions [19], miscon- "ceptions, and underhand manoeuvres [20], as dange-

"bases de la probité et de l'humanité, mais à la foiblesse, ou "à un motif encore moins excusable, qui ne lui sera jamais "attribué *que par des hommes sans vertu, et qui étant depourvus de tout sentiment d'honneur, ne croyent pas que de tels sentimens puissent exister chez les autres*, Selon eux, c'etait "à la crainte ou à la perfidie, que M. Maret devait son en- "trevue avec M. Pitt. Grand Dieu! quelle crainte aurait-il "pu avoir? Une seule peut-être! Le poignard d'un assassin! "Et qu'avait-il à gagner par la perfidie etc.,, Authentic Correspondence. Appendix p. 92.

19. Namely ill-founded prepossessions against the British ministry, which Mr. Miles in this letter endeavours to remove.

20. Mr. Miles (p. 94.) ascribes to the underhand manoeuvres of Mr. Chauvelin, to whom Mr. Maret communicated the conversation between himself and Mr. Pitt, the refusal of the executive council, to permit Mr. Maret to negotiate. At the same time, another motive operated probably with Le Brun, as will appear hereafter.

"rous, as they are contrary to the real intereſt of both "countries [21].„ In the ſame letter, ſpeaking of Noel and Maret, he ſaid: „I cannot but approve of their ci-"vility toward me, and their loyalty toward their "country; *and if you had permitted the latter to com-"plete what he had ſo well begun, I believe you would "have had reaſon to be ſatisfied with his conduct.* After "having aſſured you, that I had no perſonal intereſt in "the negotiation, for which I had nearly paved the "way, I hope you will yield to wiſe and prudent "counſels, and that you will not miſs the opportunity, "which offers, of ſecuring happineſs to your country, "and tranquillity to Europe. Do not imagine, that "the people of England are diſpoſed to revolt againſt "the government: do not imagine, that war is wiſhed "for in this country: on the contrary, we wiſh to live "on good terms with France„ [22]. In the ſame letter

21. "Londres le 18. Decembre 1792.
"Je ſuis au deſeſpoir, Monſieur, de voir tous mes efforts "pour conſerver la paix et rapprocher les deux nations prêts "à s'échouer par des préventions mal-fondées, des mal-"entendus, et des intrigues ſourdes et dangereuſes, autant "qu'elles ſont contraires aux veritables interêts des deux "pays.„ Authentic Correſpondence. Appendix p. 71.

22. "J'ai à me louer de leur conduite honnête à mon "égard et loyale envers leur patrie; *et ſi vous euſſiez permis "au dernier (Maret) d'achever ce qu'il a ſi bien commencé, je "crois que vous auriez eu lieu d'en être très ſatisfait.* Après

likewise he declared to Le Brun, that, though Mr. Maret's conference with Mr. Pitt had through the fault of the executive council produced no effect, he had promised Mr. Noel, (who was then lately arrived in London, but before the end of the month went as French minister to the Hague) to procure for him also a conference, as soon as he should be authorized by the executive council [23]: and in another letter which wrote he on the following day, and which Mr. Noel himself transmitted to Paris [24], he again reminded Le

"vous avoir assuré, que je n'ai aucun interêt personnel dans "la negotiation que j'avois presque entamée, j'espère que "vous vous prêterez à des conseils sages et prudents, et que "vous ne perdrez pas l'occasion qui se presente d'assurer le "bonheur de votre pays et la tranquillité de l'Europe. N'imaginez point que le peuple Anglais soit disposé à se revolter "contre le gouvernement; n'imaginez pas qu'on désire la "guerre ici; point du tout, nous désirons de vivre en bonne "intelligence avec la France.,, Ib. p. 77.

23. "La premiere fois que je vis M. Noel, et qu'il m'eut "appris l'objet de son voyage, je lui promis de lui procurer "le moyen d'obtenir une entrevue avec M. Pitt, dès qu'il "eut l'autorisation du conseil executif.,, Ib. p. 76.

24. His letter to Le Brun of the 19. of December begins thus. "Je vous ai déja écrit par M. Maret, qui est parti hier "pour se rendre à Paris. Je vous écris encore aujourd'hui "confidentiellement, et c'est M. Noel qui aura la bonté de "faire passer ma lettre.,, Ib. p. 63.

Brun, "to authorise either Maret or Noel, to give satis- "factory explanations upon those points, which appeared "and with reason, to give uneasiness to our govern- "ment [25]." But all his expostulations were fruitless: for the French executive council, departed not from the resolution, which had been once taken [26].

It is here unnecessary to examine, whether the executive council acted with propriety, or not, in refusing to authorise Mr. Maret to treat with the British ministry, as it undoubtedly possessed the power of exercising its own judgement, in regard to the choice of a negotiator. But as Mr. Maret had already had a conference with Mr. Pitt, as he was highly satisfied with his reception, and in consequence of the assurances, which he received from the British minister, had sent a courier to Paris in order to obtain instructions, the refusal of the executive council, especially as Mr. Maret himself sincerely wished to prevent a rupture, by no means evinced a similar pacific disposition on

25. "Voilà l'histoire abregée de cette ridicule avanture (Mr. Maret's Conference with Mr. Pitt) "qui m'ôtera à jamais "peut-être les moyens d'entamer une negotiation, *si vous "n'autorisez pas Maret ou Noel à donner des explications suffi- "santes sur les points qui semblent donner, et avec raison, de "l'inquietude à notre gouvernement.*" Ib. p. 65.

26. This resolution has been quoted at the end of the preceding paragraph.

the part of the French government. Mr. Chauvelin on the contrary was very hoſtilely inclined: he made no ſcruple to declare, "that if he was not received at "St. James's, *the height of his ambition would be to leave this country with a declaration of war* [27],,: and Mr. Miles, who was well acquainted with his character, has declared, that if a pretext for a quarrel between the two countries had been purpoſely ſought, „France certainly could not have ſelected a better object for the purpoſe,, [28]. It is no wonder therefore that the Britiſh miniſtry would rather have negotiated with Mr. Maret, whoſe pacific ſentiments coincided with their own, than with Mr. Chauvelin, who was equally deſirous of war with his employers themſelves. Beſides, if Mr. Chauvelin alone was deſtined to negotiate, why did the executive council ſend ſo many other agents at this time to London [29]: and why did theſe agents demand conferences, if they had no authority to treat? We may ſubmit it to the judgement of every impartial man to determine, whether this conduct bore not evident marks of duplicity, whether theſe agents

27. Authentic correſpondence, p. 84.

28. Ib. ib.

29. Mr. Miles (p. 96.) ſays "there was a conſtant ſupply of them.,, But Mr. Maret, as we have ſeen was not of the number, as he had no miſſion whatſoever from the executive council.

agents belonged not to the claſs of emiſſaries, whoſe object was to excite an inſurrection, and whether the conferences, demanded of the Britiſh miniſtry, were not intended merely as cloaks to cover their really hoſtile deſigns [30]. It may be demanded further, whether Le Brun, if he had been diſpoſed to prevent a rupture with Great Britain would have ſo ſhamefully misinterpreted the conference which was held with Mr. Maret: or whether the executive council would have permitted it, if they had not been inclined to provoke the Britiſh government to a conteſt, which, it was the firm belief in Paris, would inſtantly occaſion a revolt throughout this country [31]. But whether theſe queſtions be anſwered in the affirmative, or not, thus much at leaſt has been proved by evidence, which no one can controvert, that it was no refuſal on the part of the Britiſh miniſtry, as oppoſition writers, and oppoſition orators have repeatedly aſſerted, but the obſtinacy of the French executive council, which prevented Mr. Pitt's conference with Mr. Maret from producing the deſired effect [32].

30. Mr. Miles (p. 94.) has promiſed to explain a future period the cauſe of the above-mentioned impoſition, which was practiſed by the French agent both on himſelf and Mr. Pitt. Whether he has ever done ſo, I know not.

31. See the Authentic Correſpondence, p. 96.

32. Though the calumnies, which have been propagated

As it was the will therefore of the French executive council, that Mr. Chauvelin alone ſhould con-

againſt the Britiſh government both at home and abroad during the preſent war, are almoſt without number, yet nothing can well ſurpaſs the malevolence, which appears in the inventions, which certain perſons have ventured to lay before the public as real hiſtory, in regard to Mr. Maret. For they have not only declared, that he was furniſhed with inſtructions from the executive council, but have even fabricated the terms of theſe inſtructions, which they have rendered very conciliatory, in order to increaſe the odium, which they would willingly throw on miniſters, who, as they pretend, refuſed theſe advantageous offers, and conſequently, as the ſaid perſons conclude, merited the execration of their country. That this repreſentation of the conduct of certain oppoſition writers may not be thought exaggerated, I will quote the following paſſage which every one acquainted with political publications will eaſily know where to find. "It is confidently reported, that Mr. Maret had it "in his inſtructions, unequivocally to offer to our miniſtry "theſe three points: firſt, that the navigation of the Schelde "ſhould be given up; ſecondly, that the French troops "ſhould not approach the Dutch territories within a given "diſtance; and that the decree of the 19. of Nov. ſhould be "either altered or repealed. When the oſtenſible reaſons for "undertaking a war are thus previouſly removed by the "conceſſion of the enemy, then none but the moſt ſuſpicious "motives can induce miniſters to ſacrifice the peace, treaſure, "and welfare of the country to their ſecret or wicked views.„ — A charge of ſo black a nature, as is here laid to the

duct the negotiation with the Britiſh miniſtry, he accordingly, on the 27. of December 1792, delivered to Lord Grenville, his majeſty's principal ſecretary of ſtate for the foreign department, the following note [33].

Britiſh miniſtry, and laid with the conſciouſneſs, as it neceſſarily was, of being unable to ſupport it by any real evidence, betrays ſomething worſe than mere levity. Nor has the charge been confined to political publications, for it has been often heard even in the Britiſh ſenate, till the authentic documents were publiſhed by Mr. Miles, who calls it (p. 92) "the vile expedient of a diſtreſſed and hungry faction, impatient to get into office, upon any terms, and by any "means." — Similar falſhoods were propagated in regard to Mr. Maret's journey to London at the end of January 1793: but the notice of theſe muſt be deferred to the 15. chapter, where the hiſtory of Mr. Maret's ſecond journey will be given at large.

33. The French original is printed in the Moniteur 3. Jan. 1793. — In order to preſerve, as much as poſſible, diplomatic accuracy, I have in general hitherto quoted French documents in their original language, even where an Engliſh tranſlation is given in the text. But as the Notes, which were exchanged during the preſent negotiation are very long, and it is neceſſary to lay the *whole* of their contents before the reader, in order to enable him to judge, whether the ſubjects in debate were fully exhauſted, on which his final deciſion muſt now depend; further, as theſe notes in the Engliſh tranſlation were laid before the Britiſh

"The underfigned minifter plenipotentiary of "France has the honour to communicate to Lord Gren-"ville the inftructions, which he has received from "the executive council of the French republic, with "orders to lay them before his Britannic majefty's fe-"cretary of ftate for the department of foreign affairs, "in cafe he fhould think that he fhould not fpeedily "enough obtain an interview with the minifter.

"The French government, by continuing, fince "the recall of Lord Gower from Paris, to leave at Lon-

Parliament on the 28. of January 1793, and thus acquired the authority of the originals themfelves, I hope no one will take it ill, that I here make an exception, and produce only the Englifh tranflation, which I copy from the New Annual Regifter. However fhould any one doubt of its accuracy, he may eafily compare it with the originals, becaufe it will be always noted, where the originals are to be found: and in thofe paffages, where there is room for verbal criticifm, I fhall not neglect to quote even here the French words themfelves. At the fame time I fhall take the liberty of accompanying the Notes, which paffed on this occafion, with a continued commentary, in which the *actions* of the French government will be compared with its *declarations*. — During this negotiation, Mr. Chauvelin wrote twice to Lord Grenville on the alien and corn bills: thefe two letters have no reference to our prefent inquiry, but belong to the eleventh chapter, where proper notice has been already taken of them.

"don a minifter plenipotentiary, thought they gave to "his Britannic majefty an unequivocal proof of the "defire, they had to remain in good underftanding "with the Britifh court [34], and to fee all thofe clouds

34. This argument has likewife been ufed even by Britifh writers, to prove the pacific difpofition of the French rulers. But the premifes by no means warrant the inference, which is deduced from them: for one government may have refolved to engage in war with another, and yet, in order to conceal its intentions, permit its ambaffador to refide with that other government, till the plan is fully ripe for execution. The mere poffibility of this cafe deftroys the whole force of the above-mentioned argument: and that in regard to France it was not only poffible, but highly probable, or rather abfolutely certain, is evident from the facts, which have been related in the tenth and twelfth chapters of this work. Further, it is to be obferved, that, immediately after the return of Lord Gower from Paris, Mr. Chauvelin was actually recalled from London, that his letters of recall were brought by Mr. Noel, that Mr. Chauvelin objected, "that though he was not well with the Englifh minifter, yet "he was perfectly fo with Mr. Fox and fome other members "of oppofition, and that it would not be prudent in France, "*to lofe the fruits of his labours with thefe gentlemen, and* "*their fubfequent fervices*, for a vain form of diplomatic eti-"quette,,, and that in confequence of this argument the executive council revoked the order, and permitted Mr. Chauvelin's further refidence in London. See the Authentic Corrafp., Appendix p. 83. So far therefore was *friendfhip* for the Britifh court, as was afferted in Mr. Chauvelin's Note,

"dissipated, to which events necessary and inseparable "from the internal government of France [35], seemed "then to have given birth. The intentions of the ex-"ecutive council of France toward England have never "ceased to be the same [36]: but they cannot see with "indifference the public conduct, which the British mi-"nistry observe at present toward France. It is much "to be regretted, that they have perceived in this con-"duct an indisposition, which they still force themsel-"ves not to believe [37]. They think it a duty howe-

the cause of his continuing to reside in London, that sheer *enmity* to the court of Great Britain was the motive of it.

35. The events, which are here officially declared to have been *necessary and inseparable from the internal government of France*, were the massacres committed on the 10. of Aug. 1792. From this declaration we may judge of the character of the men, with whom Great Britain was then doomed to negotiate.

36. This assertion admits of no doubt.

37. The French executive council here complains, that the British government was *ill* disposed toward that of France, as if they had a right to expect, that it should be *well* disposed toward those, who on the 28. of Nov. and on other occasions, had avowed their intentions of overturning the British constitution. But it is the practise of the modern rulers of France to make an absolute game of common sense; and they shew in all their dealings, that they imagine, men are already prepared to receive chains, not only for their persons, but for their understandings. It must be admitted

"ver, which they owe to the French nation, not to "leave it much longer in a ſtate of uncertainty, into "which it has been thrown by ſeveral meaſures lately "adopted by the British government, an uncertainty in "which the Engliſh nation muſt ſhare, and which muſt "be equally unworthy of both [38]. The executive "council of the French republic has conſequently au-"thoriſed the miniſter of France at London to demand "with openneſs of the miniſters of his Britannic ma-"jeſty, whether France ought to conſider England as "a neutral or hoſtile power, and has particularly char-"ged him to obtain on this point a definitive anſwer [39].

likewiſe, that not a few have anſwered theſe expectations: and hence the preſent Directory is encouraged to impoſe on the world fallacious arguments with as much aſſurance, as the national convention did.

38. Whatever unworthineſs there may be in ſtate of uncertainty, no ſuch unworthineſs fell to the ſhare of the Britiſh miniſters, for they were already tolerably certain in regard to the deſigns of France, and conſequently in regard to the meaſures, which it was neceſſary to take at home.

39. The beſt anſwer to this queſtion was contained in the decree of the 19. of November, in the encouragement given by the national convention on the 28. of the ſame month to the ſocieties, who announced their intention of overturning the Britiſh conſtitution, in the decree of the 15. of December, and in the reſolution of the 24. of that month, not to except England from the decree of the 19. of Novem-

"But in demanding from the ministers of his Britannic "majesty an open and candid explanation of its intentions toward France, the executive council does not "wish, that the smallest doubt should exist respecting "the disposition of France toward England, and of its "desire to remain at peace with it. They even wish "to answer previously to all those reproaches, which "may be thrown out against France, in order to justify "England. Reflecting on the reasons, which might "determine his Britannic majesty to break with the "French republic, the executive council can see them "only in a false interpretation given perhaps to the "decree of the national convention of the 19. of November 40. If the British ministry are really alar-

ber: to say nothing of the circular letter of the marine minister, and the order actually given to invade Holland, as they succeeded by several days Mr. Chauvelin's Note of the 27. of December. In fact, after the French government had solemnly declared itself the enemy of the British government, it required no small share of assurance, to demand a categorical answer, whether the latter intended to become the enemy of the former. There was only one categorical answer, which could be given to such a question, namely: "since you are resolved to become my enemy, I *must* become your's in my own defence.,,

40. Even without so much reflexion, the executive council might have discovered many other reasons, which not only excited a suspicion, but proved to a demonstration

"med at that decree, it can only be for want of com-"prehending the true meaning of it. The national "convention never intended, that the French republic "ſhould favour inſurrections, and espouſe the cauſe of "a few ſeditious perſons, or, in a word, that it ſhould "endeavour to excite diſturbance in any neutral or "friendly country whatever. Such an idea would be "rejected by the French nation. It cannot without "injuſtice be imputed to the national convention. "*This decree then is applicable only to thoſe people, who* "*after having conquered their liberty may requeſt the* "*fraternity and aſſiſtance of the French republic by* "*a ſolemn and unequivocal expreſſion of the gene-*"*ral will* [41].

that the national convention was hoſtilely inclined toward the Britiſh cabinet.

41. This explanation is an inſtance of ſuch black hypocriſy, and ſuch daring aſſurance, as is hardly to be found but within the limits of republican France: for it was given twelve days *after* the decree of the 15. of December, in which the national convention had ſolemnly declared, "that every nation, which would *not* rebel againſt its government, ſhould be treated as an *enemy*.„ See Note 14. to the preceding chapter. It was given likewiſe three days after the reſolution of the 24. of December, by which the national convention had determined, that the decree of the 19. of November ſhould be actually applied to England. And yet Mr. Chauvelin, or rather the executive council, was not

"France not only ought and wiſhes to reſpect "the independence of England, but that alſo of its

aſhamed to aſſert in this very note, that ſuch an idea could not without injuſtice be imputed to the national convention, and that this venerable body, which had declared itſelf the decided enemy of all nations, which would not rebel againſt their governments, had no deſign whatſoever of exciting inſurrections in neutral countries. Beſides, the interpretation here given of the decree of the 19. November, is in direct contradiction to the plain terms of the decree itſelf, which are, "la convention nationale accordera fraternité et ſecours à tous les peuples qui *voudront* recouvrer leur liberté,,, not *qui ont recouvré* leur liberté, as the interpretation implies, which in other reſpects is a manifeſt abſurdity, it being incredible, that in any country a diſaffected party, which had been able without the aſſiſtance of France to accompliſh its purpoſe and effect a revolution, ſhould be ſo completely beſotted, as *afterwards* to require the intervention of the great nation. Further, the general proclamation, annexed to the decree of the 15. of December, in which the following words, "nous ſommes venus *pour chaſſer vos tyrans*,,, (Ch. XII. Note 22.) was put into the mouth of the French generals, affords an additional proof, that it was not the intention of the national convention to defer the promiſed fraternity, till the nations, for whom this ineſtimable bleſſing was deſigned, had already dethroned their ſovereigns. And that it was the grand *object* of the decree of the 19. of November to *excite* inſurrections, had been admitted by the ſame French miniſter, Le Brun, from whom Chauvelin received his inſtructions. For on the 5. of

"allies, with whom it is not at war. The undersigned "therefore has been charged to declare formally, *that*

December, three weeks therefore before Mr. Chauvelin delivered the present Note to Lord Grenville, Le Brun in a letter to the president of the national convention announced an insurrection in a bishoprick of the German empire as an *happy effect* of the said decree. "Citoyen Président, nous "éprouvons de jo[illegible]e[illegible]jour les heureux *effets* du décret de la "convention nationale, qui promet au nom de la nation "Françaife affiftance et protection aux peuples qui ofent fé-"couer le joug de la tyrannie, et qui plantent au milieu "d'eux l'arbre de la liberté. Les habitans de l'eveché de "Porentru etc. — *forts de la loi du* 19. *Novembre*, leur cou-"rage s'eft ranimé etc.„ Moniteur 7. Dec. 1792. (The refult of this happy effect was the eftablifhment, under the aufpices of the great nation, of the now forgotten Rauracian republic, which like the Cisrhenane, preferved a temporary exiftence, till the mother republic thought proper to take her daughter-republics into her own bofom). In like manner, the Prefident himfelf on the 3. of December had quoted the decree in queftion, and introduced it with the following preface. "N'aurions nous *réveillé* les peuples fouverains, detrônés "par les rois, que pour les replonger par des traités dans la "fervitude? — Notre diplome d'alliance et de défence reci-"proque eft écrit de la main de la nature. Nos principes et "*notre haine contre les tyrans*, voilà nos miniftres plenipo-"tentiaires.„ Moniteur 6. Dec. 1792. (It is never to be forgotten, that, in the language of the national convention, the words, *Roi* and *Tyran* are perfectly fynonymous). Likewife Rémi, a celebrated orator of the convention faid on

"*France will not attack Holland, while that power con-*
"*fines itself on its part within the bounds of strict neu-*
"*trality* [42].

the 2. of December: "Apprenez aux peuples à punir leurs "tyrans d'une maniere digne d'eux. — Si vous eleviez des "doutes sur la condamnation du dernier de vos tyrans, si "vous le supposiez encore au dessus des autres hommes, quel "exemple donneriez vous *aux peuples à qui vous portez la li-* "*berté? Ils croiraient devoir hesiter, comme vous, à punir* "*leurs tyrans*.,, Ib. — After the unanimous interpretations then, which had been publickly given in the convention itself at the beginning of December, one of which proceeded from the president, and another from the minister for foreign affairs, it was expected that the British ministry at the end of the same month should give credit to Mr. Chauvelin's diametrically opposite interpretation!

42. Yet only *fourteen days* after this solemn declaration, which has had such an effect on a celebrated opposition writer, that he has asserted so late as the year 1797, "the security of Holland, while she preserved her neutrality was professed and in a manner *garanteed*,,, the executive council sent positive orders to General Miranda, to invade, within twelve days at furthest, Dutch Flanders and the province of Zealand. See Ch. XII. Notes 50 — 53. It cannot be objected that the States General had in the mean time transgressed the bounds of neutrality, for a more scrupulous observation of them was impossible. An attack on France could not even have suggested itself to the government of Holland; for the Dutch troops were withdrawn from the frontiers, to preserve tranquillity in the interior, which the French party in Hol-

"The Britiſh government being thus aſſured re-
"ſpecting the two points, no pretence for the leaſt diſ-

land threatened to diſturb; and it was the defenceleſs ſtate, in which the Dutch frontier towns were thus left, that tempted the executive council to give the order for invaſion. But we need not wonder at the falſity diſplayed in Mr. Chauvelin's Note, ſince Briſſot, who knew all the ſecrets of the executive counci[l], and was their principal agent in the national convention, declared two days *after* the order for the invaſion of Holland had been actually given, that the French government had no ſuch intention. His own words were: "L'aggreſſion du Stadthoulder envers la France, ou l'inſur-"rection contre lui de la majorité des Hollandais, voilà *les* "*ſeuls cas*, où la France croirait de ſon devoir, et de ſa ju-"ſtice, de porter les armes dans les Provinces-Unies: *et ces* "*cas n'exiſtent point, et la France, en ce, veut reſter tranquille.*,, Moniteur 15. Janv. 1793. The words, "ces cas n'exiſtent point,,, contain likewiſe an acknowledgement, that the Stadtholder had not acted hoſtilely toward France. Laſtly, as ſoon as Briſſot had ended his ſpeech, the national convention confirmed his declaration in regard to Holland by the following decree: "Que le Conſeil exécutif eſt chargé de déclarer au gouvernement d'Angleterre, que l'intention de la république Françaiſe eſt d'entretenir l'harmonie et la fraternité avec la nation Anglaiſe, de reſpecter ſon indépendance et *celle de ſes alliés*, tant que l'Angleterre et ſes alliés ne l'attaqueront pas.,, Ib. On the tenth of January therefore the French government gave the order for the invaſion of Holland, and on the twelfth of the ſame month a *formal decree* was iſſued containing the moſt poſitive aſſurances of

"ficulty can remain, but on the question of opening "the Schelde, a question irrevocably decided by reason "and justice, of little importance in itself [43], and on "which the opinion of England, and perhaps even of "Holland are too well known, to render it difficult to "make it seriously the sole cause of a war. Should "the British ministry however embrace this last motive "to induce them to declare war against France, would "it not then be probable, that their private intention "was to bring about a rupture at any rate, and to take "the advantage at present of the most futile of all "pretences, to colour an unjust aggression long ago "meditated [44]?

the contrary. So daring and so solemn a falshood had probably never been uttered by statesmen of any country, till French philosophy and French republicanism had set religion and honour at defiance.

43. It was of no importance therefore, whether the mouth of the Schelde should be converted into a station for a French fleet! See what said on this subject in the tenth and eleventh chapters. The French government knew likewise very well how important the mouth of the Schelde was for *France*, or they would not have stipulated in the fourteenth article of the treaty, which they forced on Holland in May 1795, that the town and harbour of Flushing, the fortifications of which command the mouth of the Schelde, should be constantly garrisoned by French troops.

44. This passage is fraught with artifice and sophistry.

"On this fatal supposition, which the executive "council rejects [45], the undersigned would be authori-"sed to support with energy the dignity of the French

In the first place it is presupposed, what is absolutely false, that the appropriation of the Schelde to France (for this was manifestly the meaning of what was called the opening of it) was a matter of total indifference both to England and to Holland: and from these premises is deduced the inference, not that the British ministry, in case they opposed the design, set too great a value on the preservation of the Schelde, which is the only inference, that the premises, even if they were true, would warrant, but that the British ministry had *long ago* meditated an attack on France. Now since the 16. of November 1792, the day on which the resolution was made for the opening of the Schelde, several other very alarming measures had been taken by the national convention, which necessarily operated as still stronger inducements with the British ministry, to oppose the ambition of France. Consequently, even *if* a declaration of war had proceeded from the British government, instead of proceeding, as it really did, from the French convention, and even if the opening of the Schelde had been a matter of as little consequence, as was pretended, still the natural conclusion would have been, that those more alarming measures, that those more important motives had occasioned the war, and not that long existing causes, which the executive council neither did nor could allege, had produced it.

45. Here the fatal supposition is rejected: but with the usual consistency of the executive council it will be soon afterwards again assumed.

"people, and to declare with firmneſs that a free and "powerful nation will accept war, and repel with indignation an aggreſſion ſo manifeſtly unjuſt, and ſo "unprovooked on their part [46]. When all theſe explanations neceſſary to demonſtrate the purity of the "intentions of France, and when all peaceful and "conciliatory meaſures ſhall have been exhauſted by "the French nation, it is evident that the whole "weight, and the whole reſponſibility of the war will "ſooner or later fall upon thoſe who have provoked it. "Such a war would really be the war of the Britiſh "miniſtry only againſt the French republic: and ſhould "this

46. Whoever has read the facts recorded in the tenth and twelfth chapters of this work will find it difficult perhaps to repreſs the indignation, which he muſt neceſſarily feel at the hypocriſy and inſolence of the French executive council, in daring to uſe ſuch expreſſions, as "*unprovoked* "*aggreſſion*, *purity* of the intentions of France, *peaceful and* "*conciliatory* meaſures, and the like. But though they well knew, that they were uttering falſhoods, they knew likewiſe that theſe falſhoods would produce effect: they knew that they were furniſhing their advocates with the means of defence: and they knew by experience how many thouſands were at that time ready to become the dupes of the moſt wretched artifice. It is likewiſe a matter of great importance, when a revolution of principles is to be effected, to gain the popular opinion.

"this truth appear for a moment doubtful, it would "not perhaps be impoſſible for France to render it "ſoon evident to a nation, which, in giving its confi- "dence never renounced the exerciſe of reaſon, and "its reſpect for juſtice and truth [47].

47. "Ce ne ſera réellement qu'une guerre du *ſeul miniſtere* contre la *république* Françaiſe, et ſi cette verité pouvait paraitre un moment douteuſe, il ne ſerait peut-être pas difficile d'en convaincre bientôt une *Nation*, qui en donnant ſa confiance, n'a jamais renoncé à l'exercice de ſa raiſon, à ſon reſpect pour la verité et la juſtice.,, This ſentence relates to the appeal to the Engliſh *nation*, which Le Brun had already announced to the national convention on the 19. of December, and which he ſaid he had given Chauvelin expreſs orders to make. See Ch. XII. Note 27. It has been ſhewn in the tenth chapter, that the French government was at this time fully perſuaded, the people of England were ripe for rebellion. Conſequently, it was ſuppoſed that nothing would more contribute to ſet this people in commotion, than an appeal to their *reaſon*, *and their reſpect for juſtice and truth*, namely, as it neceſſarily underſtood, and as Briſſot in his interpretation of the appeal openly declared (Ch. XII. Note 34.) from the *unreaſonableneſs*, *the injuſtice and faithleſsneſs* of their government, from which the people would withdraw that confidence they had hitherto placed in it, and take the adminiſtration of public affairs into their own hands, as ſoon as they were convinced, (which conviction the French attempted to produce by every poſſible artifice, though in vain) that the Britiſh miniſtry *alone* wiſhed

"Such are the instructions, which the undersigned "has received orders to communicate officially to Lord

for war, and that too merely because France was become a *republic*. Such is undoubtedly the meaning, though it is very artfully veiled, of the present passage in Mr. Chauvelin's Note. Now when two governments are at variance, and in a negotiation relative to the points in dispute, an ambassador of the one receives orders, not only to use insulting language to the ministers of the other, but to excite an insurrection of the people, it is evident that the former government wishes not for a continuance but for a breach of peace with the latter, which the circular letter of the marine minister, issued during this very negotiation, fully confirms. If a British ambassador at Paris had ventured, in a note to the executive council, to threaten an appeal to the people of France, in case the national convention continued to pursue its plans of conquest and aggrandizement, and to intermeddle in the domestic concerns of neutral nations, though such an appeal would have been much more justifiable, than that with which the British government was threatened, yet there can be no doubt, that he would either have received for answer an order to quit the country, or would have been committed to the Temple, as an exciter of sedition, for under the republican government of France the imprisonment of foreign ministers takes place at Paris as well as at Algiers. Lastly, it is not improbable, that the executive council, beside the grand motive of exciting an insurrection in England, had an additional reason for their insolent conduct: they wished probably to irritate the British ministry, and to provoke a declaration of war already de

"Grenville, inviting him, as well as all the council of "his Britannic majesty, to weigh with the most serious "attention the deliberations and demands, which they "contain. It is evident, that the French nation de- "sires to preserve peace with England. It proves this "by endeavouring to remove every suspicion, which "so many passions and various prejudices are continual- "ly labouring to excite against it [48]. But the more "it shall have done to convince all Europe of the pu- "rity of its views, and the rectitude of its intentions [49], "the greater right it will have to a claim of being no "longer misunderstood [50].

termined at Paris, in order to avoid the reproach of being the first aggressors. But in this they were wholly disappointed: for Lord Grenville replied to the menace, with a temperate firmness, which the French themselves hardly expected.

48. It was not passion and prejudice, but the own acts and declarations of the national convention recorded in the Moniteur itself, which excited the suspicion, and more than suspicion of hostile designs against Great Britain. Nor did the present negotiation contribute in the least to the diminution of it.

49. *Purity* of the views, and *rectitude* of the intentions displayed by the national convention on the 19. and 28. of November, and the 15. and 24. of December!

50. It is true that their views were misunderstood, and very strangely misunderstood, especially by some, though perhaps not by all, of their friends and advocates: but they

„The underſigned has orders to demand a written "anſwer to the preſent note. He hopes that the mi-"niſters of his Britannic majeſty will be induced by "the explanations, which it contains, to adopt ideas fa-"vourable to a good underſtanding between the two "nations; and will have no occaſion, in order to return "to them, to conſider the terrible reſponſibility of a "declaration of war, which would inconteſtably be "their work [51]; the conſequences of which muſt be

were not miſunderſtood by the Britiſh miniſtry, who clearly ſaw the point to which they were directed. Gentlemen of the oppoſition party likewiſe appear at preſent to have diſcovered the drift of French politicks, as we may judge from an admirable ſpeech delivered in the Houſe of Commons on the 20. April 1798, on which Mr. Pitt very juſtly remarked, that if reſiſtance to the ambition of republican France had been deferred till the period, when the honourable gentleman became convinced of its neceſſity, the Houſe of Commons would have ceaſed to be the theatre of his oratorical talents.

51. If this poſition was ſo eaſy to be proved, why did not the executive council attempt the proof of it? And why did they not compare their own conduct, even to the niceſt detail, with that of the Britiſh government, if they were convinced that the compariſon would illuſtrate the pretended purity of their views, and the vaunted rectitude of their intentions? In fact they well knew that ſuch a compariſon would illuſtrate only the baſeneſs of their deſigns, and therefore they very prudently avoided it. Their object was, not to inveſtigate the truth, which would have

"fatal to both countries and to all mankind, *and in* "*which a generous and free people could not long con-* "*fent to betray their own interefts, by ferving to affift* "*and fupport a tyrannical coalition*,, [52].

(Signed) Chauvelin.

been highly prejudicial to them, but to lead thofe into error, whom it was their intereft to deceive.

52. "Dans laquelle un peuple généreux et libre ne pourrait confentir long-tems à trahir fes propres interêts, en fervant d'auxiliaire et de renfort à une coalition tyrannique.,, Here we have another allufion to the threatened appeal to the people of Great Britain, whofe generofity is extolled, not out of any regard entertained for them by the French executive council, but in order to feparate the people from the government, to gain over the former by the aid of flattery for the French caufe, and by the affiftance of an odious contraft to place the conduct of the latter, if poffible, in a deteftable light. By this artifice the rulers of France endeavoured to excite the Britifh nation againft the Britifh government, and to work the one againft the other, that both might at length fall a prey to French ambition: for they imagined that the people of Great Britain were fo eafy to be duped, as to be capable of being converted into inftruments of French ambition, as Barbaroux faid in the national convention on the 1. of February: "j'ai efpérance de voir le peuple Anglais fortir enfin de la ftupeur, — et *nous* venger *lui-même* d'une Cour etc.,, Moniteur 3. Feb. 1793. And that they expected the artifice would foon fucceed, appears from the expreffion in Mr. Chauvelin's note: "ne pourrait confentir *long-tems* à trahir fes propres interêts.,, Laftly

When we reflect, that the ostensible object of this note was to remove the causes of those complaints, which had been made by the British government, and to effect a reconciliation with that of France, we must acknowledge that it is a very singular phaenomenon in diplomatic history. Whenever it is the *real* intention of one cabinet to regain the lost friendship of another, it is usual to adopt polite and conciliatory language: but when one government, which has already threatened another with imminent danger, says to that other government at the very outset of a negotiation apparently designed to restore harmony between them, "if the armament which you have begun (and which in the present case, as has been clearly proved, was merely defensive) be still continued, we shall appeal to your people, which will not long consent to betray their own interests by serving to support a tyrannical coalition,,, it is evident, that the real object of that government is *not* to effect a reconciliation. In fact Mr. Chauvelin's note was so far from removing the causes of those complaints, which the British government had very justly made, that it only added new injuries and insults: and if ministers had

the assertion which is here manifestly implied, that the British government, in opposing the French convention, acted with treachery to the British nation was as insolent, as it was artful.

refused to return any answer, it may at least be doubted, whether they would have merited censure. Nay, if such a negotiator as Mr. Chauvelin, a man who was sowing the seeds of civil war, while he affected to be a minister of peace, had been ordered on the receipt of this note, to depart immediately from the kingdom, it would have been nothing more, than what the French executive council would have done under similar circumstances. But so desirous was the British administration of preventing, if possible, an open rupture with France, that Mr. Chauvelin was permitted to remain, till it was found that all further negotiation must be fruitless, and that the French government, instead of offering satisfaction for the past and security for the future, confirmed by the negotiation itself the suspicion of its designs, to involve Great Britain both in foreign and domestic war.

Four days therefore after the receipt of Mr. Chauvelin's note, Lord Grenville returned the following answer [53].

„Whitehall, Dec. 31. 1792.

"Sir

"I have received from you a note, in which, styling yourself minister plenipotentiary of France, you "communicate to me as the king's secretary of state,

53. The French original is printed in the Moniteur, 14. Jan. 1793.

"the inſtructions, which you ſtate to have yourſelf re-"ceived from the executive council of the French re-"public. You are not ignorant, that ſince the un-"happy events of the 10. of Auguſt the king has "thought proper to ſuſpend all *official* communications, "with France [54]. You are yourſelf no otherwiſe ac-"credited to the king, than in the name of his moſt "chriſtian majeſty. The propoſition of receiving a mi-"niſter accredited by any other authority or power in "France, would be a new queſtion, which, whenever it "ſhould occur the king would have a right to decide "according to the intereſts of his ſubjects, his own digni-"ty, and the regard, which he owes to his allies, and to "the general ſyſtem of Europe. I am therefore to inform "you, Sir, in expreſs and formal terms, that I acknowledge "you in no other public character, than that of mini-"ſter from his moſt chriſtian majeſty, and that conſe-"quently you cannot be admitted to treat with the "king's miniſters *in the quality and under the form ſta-"ted in your note* [55].

54. See what ſaid on this ſubject in the ninth chapter.

55. "Dans la qualité et ſous la forme dont il eſt queſtion dans votre note.,, That when Lord Grenville returned this anſwer, Mr. Chauvelin had received no other credentials, than thoſe which had been given him by Louis XVI. appears from a paſſage in the note of the executive council of the 7. of January 1793, in which is ſaid of Mr. Chauvelin "quoi-

"But obferving that you have entered into expla-
"nations of fome of the circumftances, which have gi-

qu'il ne foit accredité auprès de fa majefté Britannique que de la part du ci-devant roi. (Moniteur 14. Jan. 1793). Indeed it was in the note of the 7. of January, which was delivered to Lord Grenville on the 13. of that month, that the executive council firft announced to the Britifh miniftry its intention of furni[illegible]g Mr. Chauvelin with new credentials. On the 31. of December 1792 therefore he had no other *public* character, than that, with which he had been invefted by Louis XVI. and if the Britifh cabinet has been ever fo difpofed to acknowledge at this early period the French republic in due form (a queftion, which Lord Grenville leaves here undetermined) ftill it was not in its power on the 31, of December to admit Mr. Chauvelin as the *accredited* minifter of the French republic, becaufe he had neither delivered, nor had even himfelf received, any letters of credence from the adminiftrators of that republic. Confequently it was impoffible to admit him to treat with the kings minifters "in the quality and under the form ftated in his note." But Lord Grenville had already declared to him *"that outward forms would be no hinderance to his Britannic majefty,* whenever the queftion related to explanations, which might be fatisfactory and advantageous to both parties. See Note 4. to this chapter. The queftion therefore, whether the differences fubfifting between the two parties could be amicably fettled or not, depended not on the form, but on the *fubftance* of the negotiation: it depended upon this, whether the French executive council, whatever might be the organ, through which it fpake, really gave explanations, which

"ven to England fuch ftrong grounds of uneafinefs "and jealoufy [56], and that you fpeak of thefe expla- "nations as being of a nature to bring our two coun- "tries nearer [57], I have been unwilling to convey to "you the notification ftated above, without at the "fame time explaining myfelf clearly and diftinctly "on the fubject of what you have communicated to "me, though under a form, which is neither regular "nor official.

"Your explanations are confined to three points. "The firft is that of the decree of the national con- "vention of the 19. of November, in the expreffions

were fatisfactory, and affurances, on which the Britifh government could rely.

56. Well might Lord Grenville fay "*fome* of the circumftances, which had given uneafinefs to England: for Mr. Chauvelin's Note contained no allufion whatfoever, either to the declaration of the national convention on the 28. of November, that it was ready to affift in overturning the Britifh conftitution, or to the decree of the 15. of December, which declared hoftilities againft every nation, which refufed to take up arms againft its government, or to the determination of the national convention on the 24. of December, that the decree of the 19. of November fhould be actually applied to England.

57. It is true, that Mr. Chauvelin *fpake* of them as fuch: but whether they really were fo, the reader will eafily determine from the Notes 41 and 42. to this chapter.

"of which all England ſaw the formal declaration of "a deſign to extend univerſally the new principles of "government adopted in France, and to encourage diſ-"order and revolt in all countries, *even in thoſe, which* "*are neutral* [58]. If this interpretation, which you "repreſent as injurious to the convention, could admit "of any doubt, it is but too well juſtified by the con-"duct of the convention itſelf: *and the application of* "*theſe principles to the king's dominions has been ſhewn* "*unequivocally by the public reception given to the pro-*"*moters of ſedition in this country, and by the ſpeeches* "*made to them preciſely at the time of this decree, and* "*ſince on ſeveral different occaſions* [59].

"Yet notwithſtanding all theſe proofs, *ſupported* "*by other circumſtances* which are too notorious [60], it "would have been with pleaſure that we ſhould have "ſeen here ſuch explanations, and ſuch a conduct, as "would have ſatisfied the dignity and honour of Eng-"land, with reſpect to what has already paſſed, and "would have offered a ſufficient ſecurity in future for "the maintenance of that reſpect toward the rights, the

58. The eleventh article of the decree of 15. December (Ch. XII. Note 14) is a general proof of this aſſertion: and the reſolution of the 24. of December (Ib. Note 14.) is a particular proof of it in regard to England.

59. See Ch. XI. p. 120—127.

60. Ib. p. 134—145.

"government, and the tranquillity of neutral powers, "which they have on every account the right to "expect.

"Neither this satisfaction, nor this security, is "found in the terms of an explanation, *which still de-* "*clares to the promoters of sedition in every country,* "*what are the cases in which they may count beforehand* "*on the support and succour of France, and which re-* "*serves to that country the right of mixing herself in* "*our internal affairs whenever she shall judge it pro-* "*per, and on principles incompatible with the political* "*institutions of all the countries of Europe.* No one "can avoid perceiving how much a declaration like "this is calculated to encourage disorder and revolt in "every country [61]. No one can be ignorant how con- "trary it is to the respect, which is reciprocally due "from independent nations, nor how repugnant to "those principles, which the king has followed, on his "part, by forbearing at all times from any interfe- "rence whatever in the internal affairs of France [62].

61. Consequently the explanation, which the French executive council gave of the decree in question, was so far from affording satisfaction for the past, and security for the future, that it only increased the insult already offered, and magnified the danger, with which Great Britain was already threatened.

62. The acknowledgement of le Brun, the French mi-

"And this contrast is alone sufficient to shew, not only "that England cannot consider such an explanation as "satisfactory, but that she must look upon it as *a fresh "avowal of those dispositions, which she sees with so "just an uneasiness and jealousy.*

"I proceed to the two other points of your expla- "nation, which concern the general dispositions of "France with regard to the allies of Great Britain, and "the conduct of the convention and its officers relative "to the Schelde. The declaration, which you there

nister for foreign affairs, on this subject, at the latter end of August 1792, has been already quoted at the beginning of the ninth chapter: and that the British cabinet had continued to preserve the most strict neutrality toward France even to the period when Lord Grenville wrote the present note, was admitted by the national convention itself on the 13. of January 1793. For the introduction to this decree runs thus. "La convention nationale informée par le ministre "des affaires étrangeres, des préparatifs extraordinaires de "l'Angleterre, considérant le changement de conduite de ce "pays relativement *au caractere de neutralité qu'il avait con- "servée jusqu'ici touchant les affaires de la France etc.*, Monit. 16. Jan. 1793. With respect to the sudden change in the conduct of the British administration, which is here made a subject of complaint, it was the unavoidable consequence of the measures, which had been taken by the convention itself: for it is obvious, that, when one nation is threatened by another, it must put itself in a posture of defence

"make, that France will not attack Holland, ſo long "as that power ſhall obſerve an exact neutrality, is "conceived nearly in the ſame terms with that, which "you were charged to make in the name of his moſt "chriſtian majeſty in the month of Iune laſt [63]. Since "that firſt declaration was made, an officer, ſtating "himſelf to be employed in the ſervice of France, has "openly violated both the territory and the neutrality "of the republic, in going up the Schelde, to attack "the citadel of Antwerp, *notwithſtanding the determina-"tion of the government not to grant this paſſage, and "the formal proteſt by which they oppoſed it* [64]. Since "the ſame declaration was made, the convention has "thought itſelf authoriſed to annul the rights of the "republic exerciſed within the limits of its own terri-"tory, and enjoyed by virtue of the ſame treaties, by "which her independence is ſecured And at the very "moment, when, under the name of an amicable ex-"planation, you renew to me in the ſame terms the

63. The following is the paſſage in Mr. Chauvelin's Note of the 18. June, to which Lord Grenville here alludes. "Il s'empreſſe en même tems de lui déclarer, conformément au deſir énoncé dans cette réponſe, que les droits de tous les alliés de la Grande Bretagne qui n'auront point provoqué la France par des démarches hoſtiles, feront par lui non moins religieuſement reſpectés." Moniteur 20. July 1792.

64. See Ch. X. Note 10. and Ch. XI. Note 7.

"promise of respecting the independence and the "rights of England and her allies, you announce to "me, *that those, in whose name you speak, intend to* "*maintain these open and injurious aggressions. It is* "*certainly not on such a declaration as this, that any* "*reliance can be placed for the continuance of public* "*tranquillity.*

"But I am unwilling to leave without a more par-"ticular reply, what you say on the subject of the "Schelde. If it were true, that this question is in it-"self of little importance, this would serve only to "prove more clearly, that it was brought forward only "for the purpose of insulting the allies of England by "the infraction of their neutrality, and by the viola-"tion of their rights, which the faith of treaties obli-"ges us to maintain. But you cannot be ignorant that "here the utmost importance is attached to those prin-"ciples, which France wishes to establish by this pro-"ceeding, and to those consequences, which would "naturally result from them [65]: and that not only

65. The dangerous consequences both to England and to Holland, which necessarily resulted from the opening of the Schelde, when France was in possession of the Low Countries have been shewn in Ch. X. p. [illegible]15, and Ch. XI. p. 156 — 159. With respect to the [illegible]ciples, which the French republican government w[illegible] establish by this proceeding, they implied nothing less, than, that the mo-

"those principles, and those consequences, will never "be admitted by England, but that she is and ever "will be, ready to oppose them with all her force.

"France can have no right to annul the stipula-"tions relative to the Schelde, unless she have also the "right to set aside equally all the other treaties be-"tween all the powers of Europe, and all the other "rights of England, or of her allies. She can have "even no pretence to interfere in the question of open-"ing the Schelde, unless she were the sovereign of "the Low countries, or had the right to dictate laws "to all Europe.

"England will never consent that France shall ar-"rogate the power of annulling at her pleasure, and "under pretence of a pretended natural right, of "which she makes herself the only judge, the politi-"cal system of Europe, established by solemn treaties, "and garanteed by the consent of all the powers. "This government, adhering to the maxims which it "has followed for more than a century, will also never "see with indifference that France shall make herself, "either

dern rulers of France possessed the right, not only to inter-meddle, in the internal affairs of neutral nations, but to act as the arbitrators [illegible] all Europe. In fact, they have both assumed this right, [illegible] ve exercised it during seven years with almost unremitted success.

"either directly or indirectly ſovereign of the Low "countries, or general arbitreſs of the rights and liber- "ties of Europe. *If France is really deſirous of main- "taining friendſhip and peace with England, ſhe muſt "ſhew herſelf diſpoſed to renounce her views of ag- "greſſion and aggrandizement, and to confine herſelf with- "in her own territory, without inſulting other govern- "ments, without diſturbing their tranquillity, without "violating their rights* [66].

66. "Si la France déſire réellement de conſerver l'amitié et la paix avec l'Angleterre, il faut qu'elle ſe montre diſpoſée à *renoncer à ſes vues d'aggreſſion et d'aggrandiſſement, et à ſe tenir à ſon propre territoire, ſans outrager les autres gouvernemens, ſans troubler leur repos, ſans violer leurs droits*.„ By this clear and preciſe declaration of the conditions, under which the Britiſh cabinet was willing to continue at peace with France, and without which peace could not poſſibly be maintained, the negotiation was brought to a criſis: and the iſſue of it now depended entirely on the queſtion, whether the national convention would renounce its views of conqueſt and aggrandizement, and ceaſe to interfere in the internal concerns of neutral nations, to infringe on their privileges, and diſturb their tranquillity. If the national convention thought proper to ſubmit to theſe conditions, which, on the one hand were abſolutely neceſſary for the preſervation of Great Britain, and, on the other, and could not be conſidered as injurious to France, becauſe they were nothing more than what the French government itſelf had repeatedly

"With reſpect to that character of ill-will, which "is endeavoured to be found in the conduct of Eng- "land toward France, I cannot diſcuſs it, becauſe you "ſpeak of it in general terms only, without alleging "a ſingle fact. All Europe has ſeen the juſtice and "the generoſity, which have characteriſed the conduct "of the king. *His majeſty has always been deſirous of "peace: he deſires it ſtill, but ſuch as may be real and "ſolid, and conſiſtent with the intereſts and dignity of "his own dominions, and with the general ſecurity of "Europe* [67].

"On the reſt of your paper I ſay nothing. As "to what relates to me and to my colleagues, the "king's miniſters owe to his majeſty the account of

declared to be the baſis of their new ſyſtem of politicks, peace was preſerved, whether France were a monarchy or a republic, for no alluſion whatſoever was made in theſe conditions to any particular form of government. But if the national convention rejected the conditions, they confirmed the ſuſpicions already entertained: and left the Britiſh miniſters no other choice, than either to prepare for a ſerious combat, or to ſacrifice their country to the ambition of France.

67. "Sa majeſté a toujours déſiré la paix. Elle la déſire encore, mais re[illegible] et ſolide, et telle qu'elle ſoit compatible avec les interêts [illegible]gnité de ſes états, et avec la ſureté générale de l'Europe." Here reference is again made to the conditions, which had been already preciſely determined.

"their conduct: and I have no anſwer to give to you "on this ſubject, any more than on that of *the appeal* "*which you propoſe to make to the Engliſh nation* [68]. "This nation according to that conſtitution, by which "its liberty and its proſperity are ſecured, and which "it will always be able to defend againſt every attack, "direct or indirect, will never have with foreign pow-"ers connection for correſpondence, except through "the organ of its king: of a king, whom it loves and "reveres, and who has never for an inſtant ſeparated "his rights, and his happineſs, from the rights, the in-"tereſts and the happineſs of his people [69].

"(Signed) Grenville.,,

68. Beſide the inſinuation in Mr. Chauvelin's Note, ſee the declarations made on this ſubject in the national convention by Le Brun and Briſſot, Ch. XII. Notes 29. 30. 32. where Lord Grenville's obſervations on it are quoted likewiſe in the French original.

69. This note is written with the coolneſs and dignity of a ſtateſman, who is conſcious of having juſtice on his ſide, and forms a ſtriking contraſt with the menacing language adopted in Mr. Chauvelin's Note: and this contraſt is the more remarkable, when we conſider that the Britiſh ſecretary of ſtate was doomed to notice not only unprovoked aggreſſions, but explanations ſtill more diſguſting and inſolent, than the aggreſſions themſelves. Yet there are writers even of our own country, who have ventured to declare that no one can compare the *temperate* language of the memorials

Two days after Lord Grenville had communicated this anſwer to Mr. Chauvelin, Mr. Miles wrote a letter to Le Brün, the French miniſter for foreign affairs, on the ſubject of the pending negotiation: and as this Letter is a document of ſome importance, and throws conſiderable light on the hiſtory of French politicks, it will be neceſſary to make from it a few extracts [70]. It is dated Cleveland-row, 2. Jan. 1793,

from the executive council of France with the *inſufferable arrogance* viſible in the Notes of Lord Grenville, without drawing a concluſion greatly to the diſadvantage of the latter. Such an aſſertion is quite in character, and correſponds exactly with the tone adopted by the French themſelves, who during the late negotiation at Raſtadt, after all that part of Germany, which lies to the Weſt of the Rhine, together with the Auſtrian Netherlands had been formally ceded to them, after they had made themſelves maſters of Holland and Italy, and after they had conquered Switzerland in the midſt of the negotiation, continually talked of the *great ſacrifices* which *France* had made, in order to obtain peace. One ſhould really ſuppoſe that French republicans poſſeſſed the privilege of ſetting common ſenſe at defiance.

70. The French original is printed in the Authentic Correſpondence of Mr. Miles with Le Brun, Appendix p. 92 — 98. I do not quote the whole of this letter here, becauſe ſeveral parts of it relate to other things, and have been already introduced in various places, as the ſubjects required.

and begins thus. „You always exprefs, Sir, in your "different reports to the convention, and in the des- "patches, which I have feen, the defire of preferving "peace between England and France: but what re- "liance can be had on *proteftations, which are contra- "dicted by facts?* How is it poffible to believe your *in- "tentions* pacific, while your *conduct* is hoftile? Do we "live in an age when enigmas are in vogue, or is it "neceffary in order to comprehend your meaning, to "read, what you write, backward [71]. — It is a me- "lancholy truth, Sir, that profperity dazzles nations, "as well as individuals, and that great calamities are "fometimes neceffary, to teach them juftice and mode- "ration. The rapidity of your conquefts in the Au- "ftrian Netherlands, in Germany, and in Savoy, made "you lofe fight of what you owe to yourfelves and "others: and becaufe you fucceeded by the intrepidity "of your arms againft fome governments, naturally "weak, and already infected with the contagion of the "times, you thought you could dictate laws to all Eu- "rope, and force it to adopt the fame principles of "anarchy, of which you have been the victims fince "the 14. of July 1789.„ — Mr. Miles, after a long paffage, in which he endeavours to prove the pacific

71. The paffage, which immediately follows relates to Mr. Maret and has been quoted in this chapter, Note 18.

disposition of the British cabinet [72], then proceeds, as follows. "Recall all your emissaries, put an end to "your propaganda, and no longer strive to disturb the "public tranquillity in this country. Your decrees of "the 19. of November and 15. of December *) are "menaces, which no government can hear, without ta-"king measures of precaution immediately for its own "safety: and while such decrees exist, we cannot rely "on your *pacific assurances*. Besides, when *you* express "your sentiments directly contrary to the explicit de-"clarations of the *Convention*, you can only be consi-"dered as a private individual. In the name of God, "if you wish to avoid an universal conflagration, do "not meddle with our government. *If* we are less "free than you, if we were even in the most abject "state of slavery, let us and our chains alone: and as "you do not feel them, why trouble yourselves about "them? I dwell the more willingly on this article, as "I am no stranger to the groundless hopes you have "conceived of a general revolt: and while you *encou-"rage such schemes*, it will be impossible for me to as-

72. See Ch. XI. Note 51.

* "I had reason to believe that these decrees were levelled at this country, in consequence of the delusion, which prevailed in France, that we were on the eve of an insurrection in England, and that the promise of support would instantly produce an explosion. *Note of Mr. Miles.*

"ſiſt you, or even to hold any correſpondence with "you, or the executive council.„ — Laſtly, after having once more aſſured Le Brun, that the Britiſh cabinet was ſincerely diſpoſed to preſerve peace, and that it would not enter into a war, unleſs forced to it, either as a meaſure of precaution, or as a meaſure of neceſſity to repel an aggreſſion on the part of France [73], he made to the French miniſter the following declaration. "This country would not be averſe "to an arrangement dictated more by imperious cir- "cumſtances, than by juſtice. I have propoſed this "arrangement as the only condition, on which you "would agree to give up the Schelde, renounce your "conqueſts, and grant peace to Pruſſia and Auſtria [74]. "*It is for the executive power (council) to decide.*„

73. Mr. Miles's own words in the French original were: "ne rendez pas la guerre néceſſaire, ni comme meſure de précaution, ni par néceſſité pour repouſſer une aggreſſion de votre part, *et vous ne l'aurez pas:* comptez là-deſſus, et je repondrai du reſte.

74. Mr. Miles has not explained in what the propoſed arrangement conſiſted: nor is it eaſy to diſcover it from the contents of this letter alone. In the ſentence immediately preceding, where it is natural to look for an explanation, he had ſaid: "Be wiſe, and you will [illegible] liberty to Liege "and Brabant: the empire and the emperor will have nothing "to ſay, and a brave and loyal people will be freed from a

On the 7. of January 1793, after the French executive council had received Lord Grenville's Note

"yoke, which has long oppressed them.,, — But, as Mr. Miles himself says, that the arrangement, which he had proposed, was dictated more by imperious circumstances, than by justice, he could not allude to the just-mentioned settlement in regard to Liege and Brabant, because he represents *that* arrangement as perfectly consistent with justice. Besides, he says to Le Brun, that he had proposed the arrangement in question, as the only condition, on which the executive council would consent to renounce its conquests: but it is a certain fact, as will presently appear, that the erecting of Brabant and Liege into an independent republic was a condition, to which the executive council was resolved not to submit. The arrangement in question therefore must mean something else: and as Mr. Miles had been already informed in a letter dated Paris 17. December 1792, that the executive council would insist on the formal acknowledgement of the French republic as a *sine quâ non* (Authentic Correspondence, Appendix p. 83), we may conclude that the arrangement, which Mr. Miles proposed to the British ministry as an indispensable condition of peace, was no other than the required acknowledgement of the French republic, especially as he says it was dictated rather by imperious circumstances, than by justice. If this conclusion be just, the British ministry, according to Mr. Miles's own account would have consented at the close of the year 1792 to have acknowledged the French republic, had this republic consented to renounce all views of conquest and aggrandizement. The words of the

of the 31. of December, and Le Brun, who in all matters relative to foreign affairs was the principal perſon in it, had likewiſe received Mr. Miles's Letter of the 2. of January, the following Note which, as will appear from the cloſe of it, was the *Ultimatum* of the French government, was ſigned by Le Brun in the name of the executive council, and ſent to Mr Chau-

original are: On n'eſt pas du tout éloigné d'un arrangement, que les circonſtances imperieuſes ont peut-etre dicté beaucoup plus que la juſtice. But whether this or any other arrangement was meant, Mr. Miles repreſented the acceptance of it by the Britiſh miniſtry as a mark of great moderation: and in the ſentence immediately following that, which was laſt quoted, he ſaid to Le Brun "if you decline an arrangement *ſo reaſonable* (un arrangement ſi raiſonnable) a calamitous war will be the conſequence. The refuſal therefore or acceptance of it on the part of the executive council decided the iſſue of the negotiation. But we ſhall ſee from their Note, which was dated the 7. of January, and conſequently after Le Brun had received the preſent letter from Mr. Miles, for it was immediately ſent to Paris, in a deſpatch from Noel (Auth. Correſp. Append. p. 105.) that they ſtill perſiſted in the opening of the Schelde, in the occupation of the Netherlands as long as they thought proper, and in the right to interfere in the internal concerns of neutral nations, in caſes which they reſerved to themſelves to determine. Their object therefore was not merely to found a republic in France, but to acquire unlimited dominion over *other* nations.

velin, who on the 13. of January communicated it to Lord Grenville [75].

"The proviſional executive council of the French "republic, before they reply more particularly to "each of the points comprehended in the Note "remitted to them on the part of the miniſter of his "Britannic majeſty, will begin by repeating to that "miniſter the moſt expreſs aſſurances of their ſincere "deſire to maintain peace and harmony between "France and England. The ſentiments of the French "nation toward the Engliſh have been manifeſted, du-"ring the whole courſe of the revolution, in ſo con-"ſtant, ſo unanimous a manner, that there cannot re-"main the ſmalleſt doubt of the eſteem, which it "vows to them, and of its deſire to have them for "friends [76].

75. The French original is printed in the Moniteur 14. Jan. 1793, and is ſuperſcribed: Note officielle du pouvoir exécutif de France, en réponſe à celle du miniſtere Britannique. Paris le 7. Janvier 1793, l'an deuxieme de la république. — In the New Annual Regiſter for 1793, where the Engliſh tranſlation of this Note is printed, an error of the preſs has taken place in regard to the date, namely 4 inſtead of 7.

76. It cannot be denied that the national convention had manifeſted its ſentiments to many Engliſhmen, (eſpecially to thoſe, who on November 28. ſignified their intention of overturning the Britiſh conſtitution) in ſo conſtant,

"It is then with great reluctance, that the re-"public would see itself forced to a rupture much "more contrary to its inclination, than to its *interest* 77.

so unanimous a manner, that there could not remain the smallest doubt of the esteem, which it vowed to *them*, and of its desire to have *them* for friends, or, more properly speaking, for dupes. In addition to the documents quoted in the tenth chapter from the Moniteur, as proofs of *this* kind of friendship, may be alleged the Fête civique, celebrated at White's Hotel in Paris on November 18, the day before the celebrated decree in favour of universal insurrection was voted. This festival is described at length in Rivington's Annual Register for 1792, P. II. p. 153—155. The company was composed of British, French, and some few persons from other nations: several members of the national convention were present, likewise Generals Dillon, Santerre and Bruyere, with Lord Edward Fitzgerald, Thomas Payne, and other well known characters. After dinner the following, among many other, toasts were drunk. "The national convention of France.,, — The patriotic societies of Great Britain and Ireland, with those who have contributed to inform and enlighten the people, Priestley, Fox, Sheridan, Barlow, etc. — "*The approaching national convention of Great Britain and Ireland.* — "May revolutions never be made *by halves.*

77. From this declaration the British government could draw no other conclusion, than that an open attack on the part of France was not far distant: for, as the French rulers themselves declared, that a rupture with England would

"Before it proceeds to ſuch a diſagreable extremity "explanations are neceſſary; and the object of them "is ſo highly important that the executive council "have not thought, that they could intruſt them to a "ſecret agent always to be diſavowed [78]. For this

not be contrary to their *intereſt*, one might be certain, that their thirſt after conqueſt and dominion, on which no man, who has read the tenth and twelfth chapters of this work, can entertain a doubt, would ſhortly derive new gratification in a war with England. The reaſon why they ſuppoſed, that a war with England would be ſo advantageous to them, has been already aſſigned in the tenth chapter. They imagined, namely, that the diſaffected party in England (as was afterwards the caſe in Ireland) would immediately join them, that a civil war would be the conſequence, and that both parties (for they conſidered the diſaffected merely as inſtruments in their own hands) would at length fall a prey to French avarice and ambition. Their pretended friendſhip therefore for the Engliſh democrats (for they certainly had none for the nation at large) was nothing more than a ſnare: and without doubt they have often laughed in their hearts, that ſo many thouſands have been dupes enough, to fall into it. And with regard to thoſe advocates of the French, who have deſcribed the Britiſh miniſters as the authors of the war, they could have no right to lay this accuſation, even were it founded on truth: for no advocate can conſiſtently cenſure a ſtep, which his client himſelf declares to be agreable to his own intereſt.

78. This obſervation was intended as an excuſe for

"reaſon they have thought proper under every point "of view, to intruſt them to citizen Chauvelin, *though "he is not accredited to his Britannic majeſty but from "the late king.*

"The opinion of the executive council on this "occaſion is juſtified by the manner, in which our ne-"gotiations are at the ſame time carried on in Spain, "where citizen Bourgoign was exactly in the ſame ſi-"tuation, as citizen Chauvelin at London, which how-"ever has not prevented the miniſter of the Catholic "king from treating with him [79] on a convention of "neutrality, the ratification of which is to be exchan-"ged at Paris between the miniſter for foreign affairs "and the chargé des affaires of Spain. We will even "add, that the principal miniſter of his Catholic ma-"jeſty, when writing officially on this ſubject to citizen "Bourgoign, did not forget to give him his title of mi-"niſter plenipotentiary of France [80]. The example

their refuſal to ſend inſtructions to Mr. Maret, with whom Mr. Pitt had expreſſed a deſire to negotiate, and who was undoubtedly much better qualified, to have prevented a rupture, than Mr. Chauvelin. But for this very reaſon he did not ſuit the purpoſe of the executive council.

79. We have ſeen likewiſe that nothing prevented the miniſters of his Britannic majeſty from treating with citizen Chauvelin.

80. "Miniſtre plenipotentiaire de France.„ — Now as

"of a power of the first rank, such as Spain, might "have induced the executive council to hope, that we "should have found the same facility at London. The "executive council readily acknowledges, that this ne-"gotiation has not been demanded according to diplo-"matic strictness, and that citizen Chauvelin is *not for-*

Mr. Chauvelin, when he delivered his Note of December 27, had, by the acknowledgement of the executive council, no other credentials, than those which he had received from the king of France, and Mr. Bourgoign, by the acknowledgement of the same council, was in the same situation at Madrid, as Mr. Chauvelin was at London, the circumstance, that the minister of the king of Spain still continued to give him the title of *ministre* plenipotentiaire de France, by no means proves what the executive council intended to prove by it. For since Mr. Bourgoign had received no letters of credence from the executive council, the title, which the Spanish ministry still gave him, was necessarily founded on the letters of credence, which he had brought from Louis XVI. The British ministry likewise refused not to grant Mr. Chauvelin a title derived from *this* source, as appears from the first paragraph in Lord Grenville's Note of the 31. of December. They declared only, what was perfectly true, that, when he came forward as an agent of the French executive council, he could not act under a title, and under an authority, which he had not derived from that council. This declaration was surely very different from a refusal to treat with him at all, a refusal which was never made, for as Brissot himself said, "the British ministry

"*mally enough authorized* [81]. To remove entirely this "obſtacle, and that they may not have to reproach "themſelves with having ſtopt, by a ſingle defect in "form, a negotiation, on the ſucceſs of which depends "the tranquillity of two great nations, they have ſent "to citizen Chauvelin credential letters, which will "give him the means of treating according to all the "ſeverity of diplomatic forms.

"To proceed now to the three points, which can "alone form an object of difficulty with the court of "London, the executive council obſerves on the firſt, "that is to ſay, the decree of November 19., that we "have been miſunderſtood by the miniſters of his Bri- "tannic majeſty, when they accuſe us of having given "an explanation, which announces to the ſeditious of "all nations, what are the caſes, in which they may "depend before-hand on the ſuccour and ſupport of "France. Nothing can be more foreign to the ſenti- "ments of the national convention, and to the expla- "nation which we have given, than this reproach: and "we did not think it was poſſible, that the open de-

both gave and courted explanations. See Note 5. to this chapter.

81. Hitherto therefore the executive council had no reaſon to complain, that the Britiſh miniſtry did not treat with him by the title of miniſter plenipotentiary of France.

"sign of favouring seditious persons could be imputed "to us, at a moment even when we declared, *that it* "*would be doing an injury to the national convention, to* "*ascribe to them the plan of protecting insurrection and* "*seditious commotions, which might arise in any corner* "*of a state, of associating with the authors of them, and* "*thus of making the cause of a few individuals that of* "*the French nation* [82].

"We have said, and we choose to repeat it, that "the decree of November 19. could not be applicable, "but to the single case, where the *general* will of a "nation, clearly and unequivocally expressed, should "*call* for the assistance and fraternity of the French "nation

82. On this explanation see Note 41 to the present chapter. — The words here inserted by the executive council "*in any corner of a state* (dans quelque *coin* d'un état) and the words "*cause of a few individuals* (la cause de quelques particuliers) are very artfully introduced: for thus they reserved to themselves the right of assisting the seditious in all countries, as soon as their number was at all considerable. At the very time therefore that they pretended to give a satisfactory explanation of the decree, they maintained their resolution of applying it: for they had nothing more to do, than to declare, that the number of the seditious in any country was considerable, and, by their own avowal, they were authorized to put it in practice.

"nation [83]. Sedition can certainly never exiſt, where "there is an expreſſion of the general will. Theſe

83. "Nous vous avons dit, et nous aimons à vous le re-"peter que le décret du 19. Novembre ne pouvait avoir ſon "application que dans le *ſeul* cas, où la volonté *générale* "d'une nation, *exprimée clairement et ſans équivoque*, appel-"lerait l'aſſiſtance et la fraternité de la nation françaiſe. Cer-"tes, la *ſedition* ne peut jamais être là où ſe trouve l'ex-"preſſion de la *volonté générale*." It deſerves particularly to be noticed, that this ſolemn declaration, not to interfere in the internal concerns of any nation, with a view of overturning its government, till the *general* will of that nation, clearly and unequivocally expreſſed, ſhould *call* for the aſſiſtance of France, was given by the executive council on the 7. of January, and that on the *day following*, namely on the 8. of January, the inſtructions for the commiſſaries in Belgia (that is, the commentary on the decree of December 15. quoted in the preceding chapter) were ſigned by the ſame executive council, in which they declared that they regarded *whole* nations as enemies, which *reſolved* to retain their ſovereigns. The executive council's own words were: La nation Françaiſe regarde comme ennemi, même un peuple *entier*, ſi refuſant la liberté et l'égalité il *voulait* traiter avec un prince et avec des caſtes privilegiées. Chauſſard p. 198. This, ſaid the executive council, was the ſpirit of the eleventh article (l'eſprit de l'article XI.) of the decree of December 15. Likewiſe the *words* of that article are in direct contradiction to the explanation given in the Note to the Britiſh government of 7. January. See the preceding

"two ideas mutually exclude each other: for sedition "is, and can only be a commotion of a small number

Chapter. Further the executive council, in its commentary on the eleventh article of the decree of December 15, said: "Les deux dispositions, qui renferment cet article ne sont *ni* "*une vaine menace*, *ni une promesse illusoire*; elles sont au "contraire *des conséquences directes* de *tous* les principes, des-"quels dérive la loi juste et salutaire décrétée par la conven-"tion nationale.„ Chauffard, p. 225. Now there can be no doubt that the instructions given to the commissaries on Jan. 8. conveyed the *true* meaning of the executive council, and consequently that the explanation given to the British government on Jan. 7, was given *with the consciousness of its falshood*: for it could have answerd no purpose, to have deceived their own commissaries, whereas the keaping the British cabinet in the dark in regard to their real designs afforded the most effectual means of putting them in execution. Besides, the instructions given to the commissaries corresponded not only to the words of the decrees of Nov. 19. and Dec. 15, but likewise to all the interpretations, which had been given in the national convention itself. See Note 41. Lastly, the declaration made to the commissaries, that even a *whole* nation would be treated as an enemy, if it refused to rebel against its sovereign, and consequently that France would intermeddle in the internal concerns of neutral nations, even where *not one* seditious person was to be found in the whole country, forms also a strange contrast with the declaration made at the same time to the British government, that their number must be very *considerable*.

"against the majority of a nation; and this commo-
"tion would ceaſe to be ſeditious, if all the members
"of a ſociety ſhould ariſe at once, either to correct
"their government, to change its form entirely, or to
"accompliſh any other object [84].

before the national convention would think itſelf juſtified in interfering.

84. Briſſot likewiſe, in his report of the 12. of January 1793. ſaid: "Un peuple libre ſait diſtinguer *l'inſurrection* de "la *révolte*, la volonté bien prononcée d'une *grande majorité*, "du voeu partiel de quelques individus. Proteger ces der-"niers contre la *majorité*, c'eſt proteger la révolte; c'eſt être "injuſte, et un peuple libre ne veut point l'injuſtice; les "moyens ténébreux ſont indignes de lui.„ Moniteur 15. Jan. 1793. Yet in Briſſot's work, A ſes commettans, p. 87. we find the following paſſage: "Les *révolutions*, répondait-on, ne ſe font qu'avec les *minorités*: C'eſt la *minorité* qui a fait la revolution Françaiſe.„ But even if the revolutionary principles of the French rulers had involved no contradiction, and even if their theory had been in itſelf perfectly pure and juſt, ſtill the *application* of their theory to particular caſes was ſubject to various doubts, the determination of which they reſerved to themſelves: for inſtance, the deciſion of the two previous queſtions, firſt, whether the diſaffected party in any country, to which they had directed their attention, really conſtituted a majority of that country, and ſecondly, whether the majority at the ſame time wiſhed for the intervention of French fraternity. Conſequently the executive council, in order to acquire the right of applying the decree

"The Dutch were certainly not seditious, when "they formed the generous resolution of throwing off "the Spanish yoke: and, when the general will of "that nation called on the assistance of France, it was "not accounted a crime to Henry IV., nor to queen "Elizabeth, that they listened to them [85]. A know-

of November 19. to England, and of interfering in the internal concerns of this kingdom, wanted, according to its own explanation, nothing more than the simple declaration, which it was at all times in its power to make, that the English societies, which had sent addresses to France in November 1792, and at other times, constituted the majority of the English nation. It is obvious therefore, that, when they pretended to give a satisfactory explanation of the decree of November 19, they sought evasions for the application of it, and endeavoured to obtain their object by deceiving the English government. After all, it was ridiculous to enter into theoretical distinctions relative to what should, or should not be made, when the application of the decree to England actually *was* made. But this is a *fact*, which the conduct of the national convention on November 28 and Debember 24 had proved beyond a doubt. They ought to have instantly repealed the offensive decree, and to have acted up to that repeal: but we see from this very Note of the executive council that they insisted on retaining it, and it has been shewn in the twelfth chapter of this work, that they continued to regulate all their actions by it.

85. But neither Henry IV, nor queen Elizabeth made a public declaration that they were ready to assist *all* nations,

"ledge of the general will is the only basis of trans-
"actions between nations: and we cannot treat with

which thought proper to take up arms against their governments: and there is surely a wide difference between the lending of assistance to a *particular* people, *after* it is really oppressed, and the making a *general prospective* declaration like that contained in the decree of November 19. Besides, at the time, when this decree was voted, France not only was itself in a state of revolution, but had already infused similar principles into the neighbouring nations; and therefore such a decree necessarily disturbed the general repose by setting men's passions every where in commotion. Nor will any man venture to compare the state of the disaffected party in England, when this decree was issued, with the state of the Dutch, when they were assisted by queen Elizabeth. For the latter were persecuted in the most cruel manner by the Spanish governor, the Duke of Alva, who, in order to force them to popery, introduced a Robespierrian system of terrorism, who instituted domiciliary visits, in order to discover *religious* heretics, as the French Directory did in 1798, in order to discover *political* heretics, and daily brought offerings to the sword or the fagot, as the modern rulers of France have done to the guillotine. The support of a nation thus cruelly oppressed, when that nation demanded assistance, was very different from the encouragement of insurrection in a country, where the inhabitants, upon the whole, have great reason to be satisfied with their condition. A great deal likewise depends on the *object* of the support, which one nation gives to another. Queen Elizabeth, after she had assisted the Dutch in shaking off the

"any government, but because that government is supposed to be the organ of the general will of the nation, to which it belongs. When by this natural interpretation therefore the decree of November 19. is reduced to its real signification, it will be found, that it anounces nothing more, than an act of the general will above all contest, and so founded in right, that it was not worth while to express it. For this reason the executive council thinks, that the evidence of this right might have perhaps rendered it unnecessary for the national convention to make it the object of a particular decree: but with the preceding interpretation it cannot give offence to any nation [86].

Spanish yoke, left them in quiet possession of their liberty, and even secured it by all possible means; whereas the French rulers have removed from the Dutch, as they have done from the Swiss, a merely imaginary yoke, in order to impose on them a real and insupportable one.

86. We have seen that the preceding interpretation contained the grossest falshoods; consequently it could not be satisfactory. Even Brissot, though in his report to the national convention of the 12. of January (Moniteur 15. Jan. 1793) he supported the executive council, and endeavoured to justify the decree by similar sophistry, called it a few months afterwards, on more mature deliberation, "*l'absurde et impolitique* decret du 19. Novembre, qui a *justement* excité les inquietudes des cabinets étrangers. — A ses Commettans, p. 68.

"It appears that the minifters of his Britannic ma-
"jefty have made no objections under the declaration
"refpecting Holland, fince their only obfervation on
"this fubject relates to the difcuffion concerning the
"Schelde [87]. It is on this laft point therefore, that
"we have to make ourfelves underftood.

87. It is not true, that the minifters of his Britannic majefty made no objections under the declaration refpecting Holland: for Lord Grenville, in his Note of December 31, had combated that declaration with the following folid and unanfwerable argument. In the month of June 1792 the French government had already engaged to refpect the rights of the allies of England, as long as thofe allies continued neutral: but it had fince *acted* contrary to that engagement, French fhips of war having forced their way up the Schelde, in oppofition to the formal proteft of the States General, and thus violated the rights of the Dutch, the allies of England. And not only was this violation founded on a refolution of the French executive council, but the faid council announced its determination to fupport that refolution. Since therefore the French government broke its word in regard to *one* important point, what fecurity had Great Britain that it would not break its word in *another*, and ftill further violate the rights of the Dutch by an open invafion of their country? — This was the clear meaning of Lord Grenville's argument; and experience foon proved that it was juft, for it was only ten days after the date of his Note, and only three days after the date of the prefent note of the executive council, that the order for the immediate invafion of Holland

"We here repeat that this queftion itfelf is of "little importance. The Britifh minifters thence con-"clude, that it is therefore more evident, that it has "been brought forward only for the purpofe of infulting the allies of England. We reply with much "lefs warmth and prejudice [88], that this queftion is

was actually given. See Ch. XII. Notes 50 — 52. It is no wonder therefore, that on the 7. of January the executive council wifhed to evade the queftion of the danger, which threatened Holland. The manner, in which they evaded it, was likewife extremely artful, indeed much more fo, than any one, on a fuperficial reading of their Note, would imagine. They exchanged, namely, the inference for the premifes, wholly fet afide the *analogical* part of Lord Grenville's argument, confined themfelves to the opening of the Schelde, without taking the leaft notice of the conclufion, which had been drawn from it, and argued, as if the Britifh cabinet could have no reafon to fufpect an invafion of Holland, provided it heard fomething confolatory about the Schelde.

88. So far was any warmth from being vifible in Lord Grenville's Note, that it was written with all poffible coolnefs and deliberation, though the infolence of Mr. Chauvelin's Note, to which he replied, was fufficient to have irritated any ftatesman, who had lefs command of his paffions. With refpect to prejudice, I leave every impartial reader to determine, whether the Notes of the Britifh or the Notes of the French government, are more confiftent with truth, with juftice, and with reafon. And even if the French Notes had

"abſolutely indifferent to England [89], that it is little "intereſting to Holland [90], but that it is of the utmoſt "importance to the Belgians [91]. That it is indifferent "to England does not even require to be proved. "It is little intereſting to Holland, ſince the productions "of the Belgic Netherlands can be conveyed through

been able to lay the moſt ſolid claim to one or all of theſe qualities, it was not well calculated to produce a reconciliation with the Britiſh government, to ſay to its face, that it wrote with warmth and prejudice. But reconciliation was not the object of the executive council.

89. The contrary of this aſſertion, and the dangerous conſequences reſulting to England from the opening of the Schelde, when the French are maſters of the Netherlands, have been ſo clearly ſhewn in the tenth and eleventh chapters, that it would be a waſte of time to add any thing more on the ſubject.

90. This poſition is ſo manifeſtly falſe, that a confutation is unneceſſary. The Dutch themſelves beſt knew, whether the opening of the Schelde would be injurious to them, or not: and if they had not been fully convinced, that it would, they would have hardly been ſo anxious to ſecure the cloſe of it by ſo many different treaties, from that of Weſtphalia in 1648 down to the treaty with France in 1785.

91. They ought rather to have ſaid "of the utmoſt importance to *France*: for the union of the Auſtrian Netherlands with France was already determined, when the French executive council drew up this Note, as will preſently be proved by authentic documents.

"the canals, which end at Oſtend [92]: but it is of "great importance to the Belgians, on account of the "numerous advantages, which they may derive from "the port of Antwerp. It is therefore on account of "this importance, to reſtore to the Belgians the enjoy-"ment of a valuable right, and not to offend any one, "that France has declared, that it is ready to ſupport "them in the exerciſe of ſo legal right [93].

"But is France authorized to break ſtipulations, "which oppoſe the opening of the Schelde? If we "conſult the right of nature, and of nations, not only "France, but all the nations of Europe are authorized "to break them. No doubt can remain on this "point [94].

92. But this is not the ground, on which the importance of the cloſe of the Schelde for Holland reſted. Nor is the poſition itſelf true: for the produce of Bruſſels, and all other parts of the Low Countries, which lie to the East of the Schelde, can be much more conveniently ſhipped at Antwerp than at Oſtend.

93. It is evident from this declaration, that the French executive council was determined not to abandon the deſign of opening the Schelde. Likewiſe in the inſtructions ſent to Mr. Chauvelin, it was expreſſly ſaid, "*that the Schelde would not be given up*.„ See the Authentic Correſp. p. 84.

94. When individuals in civil ſociety enter into a contract, each party circumſcribes his right of nature, in order to obtain civil privileges, to which the right of nature alone

"If public right is conſulted, we ſay that it ought "never to be but the application of the principles of

would not entitle him. In like manner, when two nations enter into a treaty, they ſubmit themſelves to limitations, to which the right of nature would not oblige them, in order to obtain political advantages, which without ſuch limitations would be unattainable. Neither a contract therefore between individuals, nor a treaty between nations can exiſt, without a reſtriction of the exerciſe of natural right. Conſequently, if we adopted the maxim, that every treaty, which was inconſiſtent with the free exerciſe of the right of nature, was in itſelf void, no treaty whatſoever could ſubſiſt. The whole depends on this ſingle queſtion: Is he, who enters into a contract with another, entitled to ſubmit himſelf to the limitations, which ariſe from that contract? If he is *entitled* to ſubmit himſelf to theſe limitations, he is undoubtedly *bound* to fulfil the conditions of the contract, and no third perſon has a right to diſpenſe with the obligation. The caſe is exactly the ſame in regard to whole nations. But the government of the Auſtrian Netherlands, like every other independent government, was certainly entitled to ſubmit itſelf to a limitation in the navigation of the Schelde, eſpecially ſince, as far as this limitation operated, both ſides of the Schelde were Dutch territory, a circumſtance, which in itſelf gave the Dutch a claim to the ſovereignty over that part of the river. And the continuation of this long enjoyed ſovereignty had been further granted to them by the Emperor Joſeph, only ſeven years before the period in queſtion, for the ſum of ten millions of florins: France itſelf had been

"the general right of nations to the particular circum-"ſtances, in which nations may be in reſpect to each "other; ſo that every private treaty, which might vio-"late theſe principles, could never be conſidered, but "as the work of violence [95]. We will next add, that

a party to the engagement, and by a particular treaty with Holland in the year 1785 had garanteed to them that very ſovereignty, of which it now attempted to deprive them. See Martens Recueil des principaux traités, Tom. II. p. 612. Conſequently, it was neither the right of nature, nor the right of nations, but wholely and ſolely the right of the ſtronger, on which the opening of the Schelde in the year 1792 was grounded. Even, if the Auſtrian Netherlands had been at that time already formally ceded to France, ſtill the French government would have had no right to have taken ſuch a ſtep: for, if an eſtate is mortgaged, or is otherwiſe ſubject to any kind of limitation, that eſtate does not change its quality by a change of its maſter. The new proprietor, if he chooſes to free himſelf from the limitation, muſt, provided he act according to juſtice, make a compromiſe, and give an equivalent to the perſon or perſons, in whoſe favour the limitation had been made. But this mode of proceeding does not accord with the ſyſtem adopted by the rulers of France, who expect, as we have lately ſeen in the negotiations at Raſtadt, that, when they take poſſeſſion of an eſtate, which is encumbered with debts, thoſe debts ſhould be transferred to the eſtates of their neighbours.

95. But is ſuch a treaty therefore not binding? It was the work of violence, that in the negotiation at Raſtadt the

"in regard to the Schelde, the treaty was concluded "without the participation of the Belgians [96]. The

left bank of the Rhine was ceded to France, for the German empire, unless it had been forced to the concession, would not have yielded to its enemy so many beautiful and important provinces. Yet the French directory certainly did not consider the articles of cession as therefore null and void. Public right is founded on existing treaties, whatever were the circumstances, which gave birth to those treaties: and all that the executive council said on this subject, is mere sophistry and confusion. In fact, it was not their intention to convince by clear argumentation, but to perplex their opponents with finely-sounding words: and the French rulers in general have so completely laid aside the works of Puffendorf, Grotius, and Vattel, that Mr. Genet, in a Note to the American secretary of state, said: "I thank God, I have forgotten what these hired jurisprudists have written upon the rights of nations. See the New Annual Register 1793, Public papers p. 111.

96. If no treaty, made by any two governments, were valid, till it had been ratified by the general voice of the subjects of those two governments, it would be difficult to find a valid one in any part of Europe. It is in fact absurd to talk about consulting the great mass of the people, in regard to the connexions between its government and that of other nations. For how is it possible, that they, who are seldom rightly informed in regard even to political facts, who are wholly unable to penetrate into the secrets of foreign cabinets, and to discover the springs of action, should be able to form a proper estimate of the relative situation of their own

"Emperor, to secure the possession of the Netherlands, "sacrificed without scruple the most inviolable of "rights. Being master of these beautiful provinces he "governed them, as Europe has seen, with a rod of "absolute despotism, respected none of their privileges, "but those which were of importance for him to pre-"serve, and continually attacked or destroyed the "rest [97]. France entering into a war with the house "of Austria [98], expels it from the Low Countries, and "restores liberty [99] to those people, whom the court "of Vienna had devoted to slavery. Their chains are "broken [100]: they are restored to all those rights,

country to that of foreign ones? Least of all have the present lords of France a right to appeal to a want of expression of the general will: for they set at defiance not only the people, but even their representatives, who are both qualified and bound to discuss political subjects.

97. Do the new masters of the Netherlands act otherwise? or rather do they not act infinitely worse?

98. Namely by a declaration of hostilities on the part of France at a time, when the Austrian cabinet was neither prepared for war, nor, in all probability, had any intention of acting offensively. See Ch. VII. p. 69—77.

99. In like manner the Romans, after they had reduced Greece to a Roman province said, *Libertas* Graeciae data. Livii Hist. Lib. XXXIII.

100. And other chains, ten times as heavy imposed on them.

"which the houſe of Auſtria had taken from them [101].
"How can that right, which they had over the Schelde, "be excepted, eſpecially when it is of real importance "only to thoſe, who were deprived of it [102]? In "ſhort, France has too good a profeſſion of political "faith [103] to make, to be afraid of avowing its prin-"ciples. The executive council declares then, not that "it may appear to yield to ſome expreſſions of threat-"ening language, but only to render homage to "truth [104], that the French republic does not mean

101. In order that thoſe rights, together with whatever privileges the Emperor Joſeph had left unimpaired, might be ſurrendered to the new houſe of France.

102. That is, in plain Engliſh, "as this right was of real importance to France. And hence aroſe the determination of the executive council, not to abandon its deſign.

103. Their *profeſſion* of political faith was certainly very captivating, and has produced wonderful effects, eſpecially in a popular pamphlet which appeared in the year 1797, where many examples of their fair *profeſſions* are quoted at length. But a compariſon of their *profeſſions* with their *actions*, which latter are left wholly unnoticed in the ſaid pamphlet, will probably induce the reader of the preſent work to draw a concluſion diametrically oppoſite to that, which reſults from a contemplation of their profeſſions alone.

104. We have already ſeen *in what manner* the French rulers rendered homage to truth. As to threatening language, no inſtance is to be found of it in Lord Grenville's Note,

"to establish itself an universal arbiter of the treaties, "which bind nations together. It equally knows to "respect other governments, and to take care that it "may make its own respected. It does not wish to give "law to any one [105]: and it will never suffer any one "to give laws to it. *It has renounced, and still renounces* "*all conquest* [106]: and its occupying the Netherlands "will

though many in that of Mr. Chauvelin. At the same time must be admitted the truth of their assertion, that they were not influenced in any of their actions by a fear of the British government: for a French agent said to Mr. Miles on November 13. 1792, *that France as little dreaded England, as she did the republic of Ragusa.* Authentic Correspondence, Appendix p. 58. And this contempt of the power of England, which arose from the expectation of a civil war, necessarily increased their inclination to hostilities. They little thought at that time, that the ruin of their then considerable navy would be the consequence: on the contrary, they expected, that the navy, and the commerce of England would be transported to France.

105. The decree then of December 15, and the commentary on it by the executive council, which commanded whole nations, whether they wished it or not, to overturn their existing governments, under pain of being treated as enemies by the French convention, *prescribed laws to no one!*

106. If we had not been already too much accustomed to hear glaring falshoods from the executive council, to expect an adherence to the truth, our indignation would

"will continue no longer than the war, and during "that time which may be neceſſary for the Belgians "to ſecure and conſolidate their liberty [107]: after

perhaps be rouſed at the daring aſſertion *that they ſtill renounced all conqueſt*, when the Dutchy of Savoy had only a few weeks before been incorporated into France by a ſolemn and unanimous decree of the national convention. See Ch. X. Note 3. (Yet a celebrated oppoſition writer has ventured to declare, "*that the ancient limits of France were propoſed as her dominion.*,,). The incorporation of Nice and its territory was likewiſe unanimouſly voted within three weeks after this pretended renunciation of aggrandizement. See the Moniteur 1. Feb. 1793. And on the very ſame day, that the incorporation of Nice was voted, the incorporation of the Auſtrian Netherlands, and the biſhopric of Liege, was propoſed by Danton, who ſaid to the national Convention: "Je ne demande rien à votre enthouſiasme, mais tout à votre raiſon, mais tout aux *interêts* de la république Françaiſe. N'avez vous pas *préjugé cette réunion*, quand vous avez décrété une organiſation proviſoire pour la Belgique? Vous avez tout conſommé par cela ſeul, que vous avez dit aux amis de la liberté: organiſez-vous comme nous.,, Ib. Nor was Danton's propoſal rejected, but only *deferred*, till the Proces-verbal of the people of Liege, for which they waited, ſhould arrive in Paris. *Ib.* In this manner did the rulers of France *render homage to truth*: in this manner did their actions correſpond to their promiſes, to renounce conqueſt and aggrandizement.

107. By this clauſe the executive council reſerved to itſelf the right of occupying the Auſtrian Netherlands with a

"which, provided they be independent or happy, "France will be sufficiently rewarded [108].

French army, as long as it thought proper: for it is to be understood, that the French alone would determine the question, *when* the liberty of the Belgians could be considered as sufficiently consolidated. Besides, it was easy to foresee, that if a French army remained there, till the Belgians became a free people, it would remain there, till it was expelled by force.

108. Here we have a specimen of the sentimental, which has not failed of its effect: for a celebrated opposition writer, though he has quoted not a syllable either from Mr. Chauvelin's Note of Dec. 27, or from Lord Grenville's answer to it, or from his reply to the present Note, has quoted this sentimental passage not less than twice in the compass of one page. But if, instead of suffering ourselves to be influenced by passion, we attend to the dictates of cool reason, we shall discover, that *at the very time* that the executive council wrote thus sentimentally on the pretended independence of the Belgians, it was fully determined *to incorporate Belgia into France.* For in the first place, within four and twenty hours after this Note was signed, the executive council signed the instructions for the commissaries in Belgia: and the whole drift of these instructions, which are printed in Chaussard Memoires historiques et politiques, p. 180 — 228. was manifestly to reduce the Belgians to a state of absolute dependance on France, as every one must perceive even on a superficial reading. Secondly, on Dec. 31. 1792, a whole week therefore, before the Note of the executive council to

"When that nation ſhall find itſelf in the full "poſſeſſion of its liberty, and when its general will

the Britiſh government was ſigned, one of the commiſſaries, Publicola Chauſſard, received his private inſtructions, in which was ſaid: "Prions et requérons tous ceux à qui le dit "commiſſaire s'addreſſera, ou pourra s'addreſſer, de lui don-"ner toute aſſiſtance et toutes les facilités qu'il jugera con-"venables et neceſſaires pour remplir, *conformément au voeu "de la république*, l'objet de ſa miſſion.,, Chauſſard, p. 157. Thirdly, when the commiſſaries, who were nine in number, met at Bruſſels on the 3. of February 1793, to determine the important queſtion: "La Belgique doit-elle être réunie à la France?,, agreably to their inſtructions, or, as was ſaid, agreably to the will of the republic, the queſtion was determined in the *affirmative*. See the documents on this ſubject in Chauſſard Memoires, p. 80—85. See likewiſe p. 11—21, where the reaſons are aſſigned for the neceſſity of incorporating Belgia into France. Three days after the deciſion, Chauſſard wrote to Le Brun, the French miniſter for foreign affairs, and ſaid: "La *minorité* favorable aux principes révo-"lutionaires ſe diviſe elle-même: nous tâchons de la rallier "autour du ſyſteme de la *réunion*; mais une partie ſe flatte "de l'eſpoir d'une convention nationale.,, Ib. p. 86. But the national convention confirmed the deciſion of the commiſſaries, as Chauſſard himſelf ſays p. 425, Note 15. "La convention par un decret a approuvé les arrêtés de ſes commiſſaires dans la Belgique.,, Likewiſe in Briſſot's work, A ſes commettans, p. 87. we find the following paſſage. "Cambon diſait hautement devant ſes Belges mêmes: la guerre de la

"may be declared legally and unfettered, then if Eng-
"land and Holland ſtill affix any importance to the

Belgique nous coute des centaines de millions; leurs révenus ordinaires, et même des impôts extraordinaires ne les mettront jamais à même de nous rembourſer, et cependant nous avons beſoin. L'hypothèque de nos aſſignats touche à la fin. Que faut-il faire? Vendre les biens eccleſiaſtiques du Brabant; voilà une hypotheque de deux milliards. Mais comment nous en emparer? En nous réuniſſant à la Belgique. *Et auſſitôt on ordonne cette réunion.*„ Laſtly, General Dumouriez, who was well acquainted with the ſecrets of the French government has publicly made the following confeſſion. "L'intention *ſecrète* à Paris n'était point que le peuple Lie-"geois, et *encore moins celui de la Belgique*, ſe réunît en "corps de nation, pour ſe donner une conſtitution et des "loix; *on craignoit* qu'une fois aſſemblés ces deux peuples "ne connuſſent leurs forces, *et ne fondaſſent une république* "*indépendante.*„ Vie de Dumouriez, T. III. p. 348. There remains therefore not the ſhadow of a doubt, that it was the intention of the French government *from the very beginning* o incorporate Belgia into France, and conſequently it is certain that the aſſurances of the contrary, which were given to the Britiſh government on the 7. of January, were given *with the conſciouſneſs of their falſhood.*

With reſpect to the pretended love for the Belgians, which according to the executive council was ſo great, that their independence and happineſs was the whole reward which was ſought by France for its kind exertions, the above-quoted paſſage in Chauſſard's Letter to the French

"opening of the Schelde, the executive council will "leave that affair to a direct negotiation with the Bel-

minifter for foreign affairs affords an admirable proof of it. For it appears from that paffage, that the majority of the Belgians wifhed for no revolution whatfoever, and that even a part of the minority wifhed, not for an union with France, but for a national convention of their own. Chauffard himfelf therefore admitted that the incorporation of Belgia into France was a meafure, which was difapproved by far the greateft part of the inhabitants. And this reprefentation was in fact much too feeble: for fo early as the 29. of Dec. 1792, at a meeting of the Belgians at Bruffels, the propofal, that they fhould renounce their old conftitution, and take the new oath, produced the following effect. Le ferment fut *hautement refufé* dans le plus grand nombre des fections. "Point d'égalité, point de nouvelles loix; nos Etats, notre ancienne Conftitution, et point d'autre chofe,, *s'écriait de toutes parts.* Moniteur 6. Jan. 1793. The French executive council therefore were well acquainted with the fentiments of the Belgians, even before they figned the inftructions for the commiffaries. But Chauffard, faithful to his truft, eafily difcovered the means of removing all objections; and faid in his vote for the incorporation: "On m'oppofe le voeu du "peuple: *le voeu d'un peuple enfant ou imbécile ferait nul,* "parcequ'il ftipulerait contre lui-même.,, Such is the *French* method of promoting the high-prized happinefs and fovereignty of the *people.* Well therefore did Dumouriez fay: "On *difait* aux Belges dans le préambule, qu'ils étaient libres; on les *traitait* en efclaves.,, Vie de Dumouriez, T. III.

"gians. If the Belgians, through any motive whate-
"ver, shall consent to deprive themselves of the navi-
"gation of the Schelde, France will not oppose it. It
"will respect their independence even in their
"errors [109].

p. 374. — That the French rulers have spoken so speciously, and have acted so infamously, is no wonder, because systematic deception is a constituent part of their general plan: but that so many men of talents and penetration could suffer themselves to be duped by their artifices, is really a wonder. Fortunately however for Great Britain, our *ministers* saw more clearly: or we should ere now have shared the wretched fate, which has befallen the Dutch and the Swiss.

109. It was to be expected that so captivating and sentimental a passage, as this, would not escape the notice of a celebrated writer, who has made a copious collection of the fair *professions* of the French rulers. Indeed he has not only quoted it, but has ventured to declare, that "implicit respect was manifested to the *independence* and *constitutions* of other nations.,, — But in *what* manner the independence of Belgia was respected, in *what* manner its constitution, which the majority of the inhabitants wished to preserve, was held in honour, and in *what* manner the French executive council regulated its conduct by the will of the sovereign people, has been shewn in the preceding note. Further, says Dumouriez, immediately after the words last quoted: "On ne leur laissait aucune administration; on les mettait en tutelle. On se chargeait du séquestre de tous les biens ecclesiastiques, qu'on nommait biens nationaux, sans s'embarrasser,

"After ſo free a declaration, which manifeſts the "preſent deſigns of peace, the miniſters of his Britannic majeſty ought to entertain no doubt reſpecting "the intentions of France [110]. *But if theſe explanations appear to them inſufficient, and if we are ſtill "obliged to hear the language of haughtineſs, and if hoſtile "preparations are continued in the ports of England, after "having done every thing in our power to maintain peace, "we will prepare for war* [111], conſcious at leaſt of the

s'il conviendrait aux Belges de dépouiller ſon clergé, et de déclarer ſes biens nationaux. Tout cela ſe faiſait, *pour les forcer à ſe donner à la France;* et bientôt on employa *la violence et les moyens les plus criminels*, pour arracher l'émiſſion de ce voeu.„ Whoever wiſhes to read a circumſtantial account of theſe violent and infamous meaſures, of which not only Dumouriez, but even Briſſot (A ſes commettans p. 82—87.) loudly complains, may conſult the ſecond volume of Deſodoards Hiſtoire philoſophique de la revolution de France. The deſcription given by Deſodoards, which no one will call in queſtion, as the author is himſelf a ſtaunch republican, and a decided enemy of Great Britain, ſhould be further compared with the all-promiſing manifeſto, with which the entry of the French army into the Netherlands was accompanied, and it will then be confeſſed, that a more abominable plan of ſyſtematic deception was at that time introduced, than had ever diſgraced the annals of mankind.

110. Nor did they entertain any doubt.

111. Hence it is evident that this Note of the executive council contained their *Ultimatum*: for they expreſſly ſay

"justice of our cause, and of the efforts we have made "to avoid that extremity [112]. We shall combat with "regret the English, whom we esteem [113]: but we "shall combat them without fear.

(Signed) Le Brun.

To this final Note of the French executive council Lord Grenville returned, within five days after the receipt of it the following answer [114].

"we will prepare for war (nous nous disposerons à la guerre) if the explanations appear insufficient, and the preparations in the ports of England be still continued." — The British government therefore was reduced to this dilemma: either to admit, that the explanations given by the executive council were satisfactory, and to put a stop to the preparations making in the sea-ports: or to reject the explanations as unsatisfactory, and to continue the preparations in the sea-ports. But it has been fully proved, that the former was *impossible*: consequently, the latter was *unavoidable*.

112. One becomes gradually so accustomed to the hypocrisy of the French rulers, that indignation at length gives way to contempt.

113. With great artifice was this clause inserted. It was designed to separate the people from the government, and to promote the expected insurrection. They never lose sight of their favourite maxim: *Il faut soulever les administrés contre les administrans.*

114. The French original of Lord Grenville's answer to the Note of the executive council was not printed in the Moniteur, as the preceding Notes were: but as the English

"Whitehall Jan. 18. 1793.

"I have examined, Sir, with the utmoſt attention "the paper you remitted me on the 13. of this month. "I cannot help remarking, *that I have found nothing "ſatisfactory in the reſult of it.* The explanations "which it contains, are nearly reduced to the ſame "points, which I have already replied to at length. "The declaration of wiſhing *to intermeddle with the af-"fairs of other countries* is there renewed. No denial is "made, nor reparation offered for the outrageous pro-"ceeding I ſtated to you in my letter of December 31: "and the right *of infringing treaties and violating the "rights of our allies* is ſtill maintained by ſolely offer-"ing an illuſory negotiation upon this ſubject, which "is put off, as well as the evacuation of the Low "Countries by the French armies, to the *indefinite "term,* not only of the concluſion of the war, but like-"wiſe of the conſolidation of what is called the li-"berty of the Belgians.

"It is added, that, if theſe explanations appear "inſufficient to us, if you ſhould be again obliged to "hear a haughty tone of language, if hoſtile prepara-"tions ſhould continue in the ports of England, after "having made every effort to preſerve peace, *you will "then make diſpoſitions for war.*

tranſlation was officially laid before Parliament, it ſupplies the place of the original.

"If this notification, or that relative to the treaty "of commerce, had been made to me under a regular "and official form [115], I should have found myself "under the necessity of replying to it, that to threaten "Great Britain with a declaration of war, because she "judged it expedient to augment her forces, and also "to declare that a solemn treaty should be broken, be-"cause England *adopted for her own safety such pre-"cautions as already exist in France* [116], would only be

115. It was admitted by the French executive council, in the very Note to which Lord Grenville here replied, that Mr. Chauvelin was no otherwise accredited to his Britannic majesty than from the late king of France, and that he was not formally enough authorized to treat as an agent of the new government of France. Consequently Mr. Chauvelin's communication of the Note, to which Lord Grenville here replied, was in diplomatic strictness no *official* communication: and as this was avowed by the executive council itself, no one could censure a British minister for using the same language. Indeed it is obvious, that, if the British government had been ever so inclined to acknowledge at that early period the French republic, it could not consider any individual as the accredited ambassador of that republic, till credentials from the part of those, who had the administration of it, had been both delivered and received. But (as Lord Grenville had already explained to Mr. Chauvelin) the issue of the negotiation depended, not on the *form*, but on the *substance* of it. See Note 4 to the present chapter.

116. It has been proved that the French naval prepara-

"considered, both the one and the other, as new "grounds of offence [117], which, as long as they "should subsist, would prove a bar to every kind of "negotiation.

"Under this form of extra-official communica-"tion, I think I may yet be permitted to tell you, not "in a tone of haughtiness but of firmness, *that these* "*explanations are not considered as sufficient*, *and that*

tions preceded those, which were made in Great Britain, by three whole months, and that the number of ships of war, which were ordered by the British government to be put in commission in the latter half of December and the former part of January, was inferior to the number of those, which France had already in commission, to which was now to be added the considerable reinforcement of ships of the line and frigates ordered by the national convention on the 13. of January. See Ch. X. Note 5. Ch. XI. Note 44. and Ch. XII. Notes 59. 61.

117. To complain about preparations, which were not only mere measures of defence, but were still less extensive than those already adopted by the menacing power, and, while the motives, which had given rise to the preparations of the menaced nation, still continued, to insist on the cessation of those preparations, and lastly, when the causes of alarm were openly avowed, to accompany the demand with a new menace, that, unless it were instantly complied with, a declaration of hostilities would be the consequence, was in fact to treat the menaced nation with the utmost insolence and contempt.

"*all the motives, which gave rise to the preparations, still* "*continue.* These motives are already known to you "by my letter of December 31, *in which I marked in* "*precise terms what those dispositions were, which could* "*alone maintain peace and a good understanding*[118]. "I do not see that it can be useful to the object of "conciliation, to enter into a discussion with you on "separate points under the present circumstances, as I "have already acquainted you with my opinion con-"cerning them. If you have any explanation to give "me under the same extra-official form, which will "embrace all the objects contained in my letter of the "31. of December, as well as all the points, which "relate to the present crisis with England, her allies, "and the general system of Europe, *I shall willingly* "*attend to them.*

"I think it however my duty to inform you in "the most positive terms, in answer to what you tell "me on the subject of our preparations, *that under the* "*present circumstances all those measures will be conti-*"*nued, which may be judged necessary to place us in a* "*state of protecting the safety, tranquillity, and the* "*rights of this country, as well as to garantee those of*

118. On the precise terms, in which Lord Grenville had marked to Mr. Chauvelin the dispositions, which alone could maintain peace and harmony between the two nations see Note 66 to this chapter.

"our allies, and to ſet up a barrier to thoſe views of ambition and aggrandizement, dangerous at all times to the "reſt of Europe, but which become ſtill more ſo, being "ſupported by the propagation of principles deſtructive of "all ſocial order.

(Signed) Grenville.

When we examine the ſeveral parts of the preceding negotiation, we muſt confeſs, that the motives, which had induced the Britiſh government to have recourſe to a naval armament, were far from being removed by it, and that thoſe cauſes of alarm, which have been deſcribed at large in the tenth chapter, continued to operate in full force. And in the middle of January 1793 were now to be added thoſe additional cauſes, which have been related in the twelfth chapter, cauſes which neceſſarily produced ſo much the more ſtriking effects, as they aroſe at the very time, that the French executive council was pretending to remove the former cauſes of complaint, and during negotiations, of which the apparent object was the preſervation of peace. For the decree of December 15. the new addreſs to all nations in favour of inſurrection, the menace in the national convention of an appeal to the Britiſh people, and the deciſive refuſal on December 24. to except Great Britain from the decree of November 19, ſucceeded Mr. Pitt's conference with Mr. Maret, and took place about the period, when

the French executive council must have been engaged in preparing instructions for Mr. Chauvelin. It was only four days after Mr. Chauvelin had delivered his Note of December 31, and on the very day, on which Lord Grenville replied to it, that the marine minister, Monge, wrote the circular letter to the French sea-ports, threatening England with an invasion and fifty thousand caps of liberty. It was only one day after the executive council had in the Note of January 7. solemnly pledged its word to respect the independence both of England and its allies, that this same council instructed its commissaries, that the French republic considered every nation as an enemy, which, however unanimous in the resolution, was determined to preserve its ancient form of government. Lastly, it was only three days after the solemn pledge to respect the allies of England had been given, and even before any reply either was or could be made by the British government, that positive orders were sent to General Miranda for an immediate invasion of Holland. It lies not therefore within the power of sophistry itself to deny, that the French executive council entered into the negotiation with the sole view of amusing the British government, till the plan, which had been laid for the destruction of the British empire, was fully ripe for execution. But the British government had more penetration, than the French

government imagined, and was too wiſe to be decoyed into a ſnare, which within the compaſs of a few years has proved the ruin of millions [119].

Beſides, the negotiation itſelf, even without any reference to thoſe facts, which place the ſyſtematic

119. The readineſs to give credit to the proteſtations of the French rulers, till the iniquitous invaſion of Switzerland at laſt opened the eyes of all, who choſe to ſee, and rendered the truth, that the actions of theſe pretended benefactors of mankind were uniformly at variance with their ſpecious profeſſions, as palpable even to the illiterate in politicks, as it had been from the very beginning to the intelligent, appears from the following paſſage of a letter written from Paris in the autumn of 1798 and publiſhed in the Annals of the Pruſſian monarchy (Annalen der preuſſiſchen Monarchie) November 1798, p. 272—276. "The (French) government "ſent to Germany, ſome time ago, a man of great talents "and information, who expreſſes himſelf with ſpirit and "fluency, in order to probe the public opinion, and if poſſi-"ble *to work upon it.* He is lately returned, and has informed "me that he has made the following report to the govern-"ment: *that before the events in Switzerland foreigners were* "*ſtill* inclined *to ſuffer themſelves to be deceived in regard to* "*the real views of the French government, but that after thoſe* "*extortions and exceſſes all attempts to juſtify its conduct were* "*without effect.*" — This paſſage proves likewiſe, what indeed wants at preſent no proof in England, that the French government ſtill ſends revolution-profeſſors abroad, *to work on the public opinion.*

deception of the French rulers in the cleareſt point of view, proved beyond a doubt, that they preferred the gratification of their ambition, and a war with England, to moderation and a continuance of peace. For, if they had preferred the latter, they would have readily accepted the conditions, which were offered by the Britiſh government, ſince theſe conditions were nothing more, than, firſt, that France ſhould renounce its views of aggreſſion and aggrandizement, and ſecondly, that it ſhould ceaſe to interfere in the internal concerns of neutral nations [120]. Without

120. Not only were theſe conditions diſtinctly ſpecified in Lord Grenville's Note of December 31, but the conduct of the national convention, as being contrary to what was required in thoſe conditions, had on the 13. of December been alleged in his Majeſty's ſpeech as the cauſe of the Britiſh armament. "I have carefully obſerved, (ſaid his Ma-"jeſty) a ſtrict neutrality in the preſent war on the continent, "and have uniformly abſtained from any interference, with "reſpect to the internal affairs of France: *but it is impoſſible "for me to ſee, without the moſt ſerious uneaſineſs, the ſtrong "and increaſing indications, which have appeared there of an "intention to excite diſturbances in other countries, to diſregard "the rights of neutral nations, and to purſue views of conqueſt "and aggrandizement etc.*," — Great Britain therefore had recourſe to an armament, as to a meaſure of defence, becauſe France had diſplayed views of conqueſt and aggrandizement.

Without a compliance with theſe conditions on the part of France, it would have been madneſs to have

and had interfered in the internal concerns of neutral nations, particularly of Great Britain itſelf. And, when that armament became a ſubject of negotiation, the queſtion, whether it ſhould ceaſe or be continued, depended entirely on the queſtion, whether the French rulers would abandon or retain their plan of interference and aggrandizement, whether they would accept or reject the propoſed conditions. The whole negotiation turned on this ſingle point, and therefore it is ſheer ſophiſtry, when the adverſaries of the Britiſh miniſtry, intermix other queſtions, ſuch as the new form of government in France, to which the negotiation had not the moſt diſtant reference. The French rulers themſelves were conſcious, that it was their views of conqueſt and aggrandizement, which occaſioned the Britiſh armament, and that they were determined under no conditions to abandon thoſe views: for on the day, which preceded the declaration of war, Danton ſaid in the national convention: "Les limites de la France ſont marquées par la nature: nous les atteindrons dans leurs quatre points, à l'Océan, au Rhin, aux Alpes, aux Pyrenées. — On vous menace de l'Angleterre! Les tyrans de l'Angleterre ſont morts: vous avez la plenitude de la puiſſance nationale.„ Moniteur 1. Feb. 1793. From this paſſage we ſee likewiſe the reaſon, why the conditions, propoſed by the Britiſh government were rejected by the rulers of France. They ſuppoſed namely, in conſequence of the expected rebellion, that the Britiſh conſtitution was at its laſt gaſp: in the heat of their imagination they repre-

deſiſted from the preparations, which were making in the ports of Britain. For, in regard to the former, it was certainly not to be expected, that, after the conqueſt of Holland, and the great acceſſion of ſea-coaſt and naval power, which would accrue from it to France, the government of that country would not take the earlieſt opportunity of attacking Great Britain with double force. It was ſurely not to be expected, that a nation, which has ever been the great rival of France, a nation which on account of its power and wealth is envied by all Europe, would alone remain unmoleſted. Nor could it be ſuppoſed, that the deſire of humbling Britain, which is neceſſarily inherent in the French, would diminiſh with the increaſe of their power, and that this deſire would at length vaniſh, when they had acquired the means of controlling us according to their pleaſure. The renunciation therefore of conqueſt and aggrandizement on the part of France was a condition eſſential to the ſalvation of Britain. Equally neceſſary was the acceptance, and even the moſt punctual fulfilment of the other condition: for it was wholly impoſſible that Great Britain ſhould preſerve its internal tranquillity,

ſented royalty in Britain as even expired: and diſdained therefore to be re-conducted within the limits of moderation by a government, which on account of its imagined debility they deſpiſed.

while the decrees of November 19. and December 15 continued in force, while the French government continued to encourage thoſe ſocieties, who by their own avowal on the 28. of November had formed the reſolution of overturning the Britiſh conſtitution, and while it ſtill perſevered in infeſting our country with its apoſtles of rebellion [121]. It is clear therefore that France had no right to expect a ceſſation of the warlike preparations on the part of Britain, unleſs the former would condeſcend to accept of conditions, which were indiſpenſably neceſſary for the preſervation of the latter. This matter was repreſented very perſpicuously by Mr. Miles on the 11. of January 1793, in a letter addreſſed to his friend Mr. Maret, who was then become *Chef du département pour les affaires étrangeres*, and conſequently the principal perſon in that department, after the miniſter himſelf. Mr. Miles pointed out the impoſſibility, that the Britiſh government ſhould remain tranquil, unleſs the executive council would conſent to fulfil what was required in the propoſed conditions: and at the ſame time he poſitively aſſured Mr. Maret, *that if the executive council would comply with them, a war would not take place* [122].

121. See Ch. X. p. 120—140.

122. As this letter was written to a man in an official capacity, and is a document of ſome importance, it is neceſſary to quote the following extract from the original.

To the French minister for foreign affairs himself Mr. Miles had already written on the 2. of January on

A Londres le 11. Janvier 1793.

La dépêche envoyée par Monsieur Chauvelin Lundi 31. Decembre vous est certainement parvenue, cependant vous ne m'en accusez pas la reception. Vous me parlez de l'ardeur du peuple Français et de ses ressources immenses; hélas! mon cher ami, il n'est question ni de l'une ni de l'autre. Après les griefs détaillés dans la réponse de Milord Grenville à la note de Monsieur Chauvelin, quel autre parti y a-t-il à prendre pour la France, que *de reculer ou se battre.* Je n'en connois aucun. Vous me direz, peut-être, que ce qu'on a exigé est trop humiliant; mais mon cher ami, *il n'est pas question d'orgueil, mais de justice.* — Si l'Assemblée nationale dans un moment d'ivresse fait des bévues ou des injustices, il convient qu'elle corrige les uns et répare les autres. Permettez que je vous repete ce que vous avez déja lu dans la réponse de Milord Grenville, que les ordres donnés à vos officiers généraux de poursuivre l'ennemi sur les terres neutres est une atteinte contre l'indépendance des puissances qui ne sont point en guerre avec vous. L'arrêté du Conseil sur l'ouverture de l'Escaut est une infraction des traités. L'appropriation de la Savoie est contre vos propres principes; vous avez renoncé à toutes conquêtes, et vous en faites! Comment se fier à une nation qui ne respecte ni ses traités ni ses sermens? Le décret du 19. Novembre ainsi que celui du 15. Décembre étant conçus en termes généraux, et invitant, pour ainsi dire, les peuples de tous les pays à se revolter contre leurs gouvernemens respectifs, en leur pro-

the same subject, and had assured him, *that the fate of Britain and France depended on the decision of the executive council* [123]. If this council then had been really desirous of peace, it would have decided in favour of the acceptance of the proposed conditions, especially as they contained nothing more, than the proposal, that France should remain true to the prin-

mettant du secours, sont des griefs trop evid[illegible] trop serieux pour ne pas indigner le gouvernement Britannique, et justifier ses craintes, sur tout après que l'assemblée nationale a accueilli, avec un empressement aussi peu décent que peu politique, les addresses de quelques clubs factieux en Angleterre, qui ne dissimulaient pas leurs intentions de tout bouleverser. *Voilà donc, mon cher Maret, où nous sommes; si vous pouvez engager le conseil exécutif à revenir sur ses pas relativement aux articles ci-dessus, la guerre n'aura point lieu.* Il faut convenir que l'Angleterre ne peut que se sentir comprise dans les décrets qui offrent ce que vous appellez fraternité à tous les peuples du monde. Il est évident aussi que notre existence politique ne permettra nullement que la France s'aggrandisse: et vous ne pouvez nier que le traité de 1788 nous oblige à garantir la fermeture de l'Escaut, et que vous y êtes tenu par le traité de 1786. Il est aussi vrai, que pendant qu'un traité existe on doit le respecter. Répondez le plutôt possible à ma lettre etc. Authentic Correspondence etc. Appendix p. 106—108.

123. The words of the original are: "*C'est au pouvoir exécutif à decider:* and a few lines after, "*Vous êtes maitre de leur destin.* Authentic Correspondence, Appendix p. 97. 98.

ciples, which from the commencement of the revolution it has uniformly professed. No alteration was required in the new form of government: the subjects of negotiation related solely to the *external* power of France: and if this power had continued in the hands even of Louis XVI., and he had acted toward Great Britain in the same manner as the national convention did, the British government would have been equally obliged to insist on the same conditions, and, in case of their rejection, to persevere in the preparations for war. But we have seen that the executive council, instead of accepting the conditions, which his Majesty had mentioned in his speech to the British Parliament on the 13. of December, and which Lord Grenville in his first Note to Mr. Chauvelin had very distinctly proposed as the only possible basis of peace [124], still insisted on the right of applying the

124. The proposition was in fact so clear (see the Notes 66. and 120. to this chapter) that it creates just matter of surprise, that an eminent leader of opposition could venture, on the 18. of February 1793, in the House of Commons to lay the following charge to ministry: "that in the late ne-"gotiation — they never stated distinctly to the French go-"vernment any terms and conditions, the accession to which, "on the part of France, would induce his Majesty to perse-"vere in a system of neutrality.„ See New Annual Register 1793, British and foreign history, p. 57. But another leader

decree of November 19. in certain caſes, that is in fact, of interfering at its own pleaſure in the internal concerns of Great Britain [125]. On the right of violating exiſting treaties, of depriving the allies of Eng-

of oppoſition does not reſt ſatisfied with this charge: for he ſeems at leaſt to deny the exiſtence of the negotiation itſelf, ſaying in his late popular pamphlet, "we neither made war upon theſe aggreſſions, which might have led to a termination of it upon their removal, *nor would we conſent to put their removal into a train of amicable negotiation.*" — It is true, that whoever derives his knowledge of Britiſh and French politicks from this eminently ſuperficial, though highly eloquent, pamphlet, might be induced to ſuppoſe, it were true, that no negotiation was conducted between the two governments, ſince the author has thought proper, if we except a few ſpecious promiſes in the Note of the executive council, which he calls *conciliatory declarations*, to paſs over the negotiation in total ſilence. On the other hand, as he acknowledges that a *correſpondence* was carried on between Lord Grenville and Mr. Chauvelin, he appears in reality to object only to the *term* negotiation. But as this very term was uſed not only by Mr. Fox in the above-mentioned charge, but likewiſe by the French themſelves, who ſpake of "negotiations avec l'Angleterre," (Ch. X. Note 49.) and as it is not the name, but the thing, which demands our attention, I leave it to the reader to give whatever appellation he thinks proper to the diplomatic communications between Great Britain and France. In *verbis* ſimus faciles.

125. See Notes 82 — 84 to this chapter.

land of privileges garanteed to them by almost all the powers of Europe, and of occupying the Netherlands with a French army till the liberty, as it was called, of the Belgians was consolidated, that is for ever [126], was likewise formally insisted. Consequently the two conditions of peace, proposed by the British government, were unequivocally rejected. Thus was the negotiation brought to a crisis: for without the acceptance of these conditions Great Britain *could not* desist from the preparations then making in the ports, and these conditions France *would not* accept. The former therefore *was obliged* to continue its preparations, as Lord Grenville explained to M. Chauvelin, in his Note of January 18., on this very ground. And as the French executive council formally and positively declared, that they would commence hostilities, if the explanations given in the Note of January 7. were not deemed satisfactory, and the preparations in the British ports were not consequently discontinued, we have an irrefragable proof, *that it was not in the power of the British cabinet to prevent a rupture with France* [127].

126. See the Notes 106—109. to this chapter.

127. On the 18. of January therefore Mr. Miles closed his correspondence with the French minister, Le Brun, with the following Letter: "Un événement m'est arrivé qui m'ôte à jamais la douce espérance d'être utile à la chose publique.

CHAPTER XIV.

Proof, that the French rulers had fully reſolved on a war with Great Britain ſome time before the middle of January 1793. Inveſtigation of the motives which induced them to undertake it.

We have ſeen in the preceding chapter that the queſtion, whether a rupture ſhould take place be-

J'aurais voulu écarter la guerre, ce terrible fléau du genre humain: *mais enflés d'un orgueil très deplacé vous n'écoutez ni la prudence ni la juſtice.* Je me trouve tracaſſé et eſtropié de tout côté et de toute maniere. Je n'en puis plus. Il y a bien des années que vous connoiſſez mes principes: mes démarches ont été dictées jusqu'à préſent par l'amour de la verité et de la liberté, non pas d'une liberté effrenée et ſans bornes comme la vôtre, mais d'une liberté bien entendue, bien raiſonnée, et qui rend le monde un paradis terreſtre. Mais que faire? *L'enthouſiasme vous avengle et vous ne voyez plus ni la juſtice ni la prudence.* Quant il était queſtion du traité de commerce, j'exprimai mes voeux dans une lettre addreſſée à Mr. Pitt que ce traité pût devenir la baſe d'une alliance entre les deux nations, qui aſſurerait à l'Europe et au monde entier la douce jouiſſance d'une paix éternelle. Mais au lieu de la paix, c'eſt la guerre que je vois prêt à s'éclater et engloutir les deux nations. *Le Brun! vous allez vous charger d'une terrible reſponſabilité.* Songez y bien; il eſt encore tems; vous pouvez tout reparer: j'ai le coeur gros

tween Great Britain and France, was fully decided before the middle of January [1] 1793, and that this decision was founded on the refusal of the French executive council, to accept the conditions of peace, which had been proposed by the British government. Now as the Note, in which the refusal was signified, was signed by Le Brun on the 7. of January, the executive council must at least on that day, if not sooner, have come to a resolution of engaging in a war with England, because they knew from Lord Grenville's express declaration, in his Note of the 31. of December, that without the acceptance of the proposed conditions, a rupture would be unavoidable. But they had undoubt-

et obsedé par des idées tristes et lugubres; la vie commence à me peser furieusement.„ Authentic Correspondence, Appendix p. 113. But this last warning was of no more avail, than the preceding: the resolution, once formed, was not altered: and Le Brun's obstinacy, of which Mr. Miles had already complained in a letter to Mr. Maret of the 4. of January *, rendered him insensible to the calamities, in which and he and his colleagues were wantonly involving Great Britain and France.

* "J'ai le coeur navré de voir que tous mes efforts pour écarter la guerre n'aboutissent à rien *et ça à cause de l'opiniâtreté de Le Brun,* qui est assurement très mal instruit de la situation interieure de ce pays.„ Ib. p. 89.

1. It was on the 13. of January, that the Ultimatum of the French executive council was delivered to Lord Grenville.

edly formed this reſolution at a ſtill earlier period, and even before the anſwer of the Britiſh court to Mr. Chauvelin's Note of December 27. was known to them: for it was on the very day, on which Lord Grenville replied to it, namely December 31., that the marine miniſter, Monge, ſent his celebrated circular letter to the ſea-port towns of France, and it is evident that no miniſter would take ſo open and deciſive a ſtep, before war had been reſolved on in the cabinet [2]. The date of the circular letter deſerves

2. This is ſo obvious that the circular letter of the marine miniſter was conſidered by the inhabitants of the ſea-ports as the ſignal of an immediate attack on England. The following anſwer returned by the municipality of St. Malo, dated 17. January, and printed in the Journal de Paris 28. January 1793 may ſerve as an example.

Lettre du Conſeil-général de la Commune de St. Malo, au Miniſtre de la Marine, le 17. Janvier.

A l'inſtant où nous avons reçu votre lettre, avec la deliberation du Conſeil exécutif en date du 7. Janv. nous nous ſommes empreſſés, de concert avec l'Ordonnateur civil, de lui donner la plus grande publicité par la voie de l'impreſſion, bien certain que nos concitoyens feraient jaloux de prouver leur patriotiſme, *en entrant dans les vues du Pouvoir exécutif*, et faiſant leurs efforts pour coopérer de tous leurs moyens, à anéantir les tyrans, et les hordes d'eſclaves ligués contre notre liberté. Nous n'avons point été trompés dans notre attente, Citoyen Miniſtre, et déja nous vous an-

likewiſe in another reſpect to be particularly noted, becauſe it ſhews, that the reſolution of engaging in a war with England was formed by the executive council, even before they knew the conditions, under which the Britiſh government was willing to preſerve peace with France, and conſequently that they were determined on a rupture, at all events, whatever might be the terms required, as the price of peace. Though the queſtion therefore, whether a rupture muſt take place between Great Britain and France could not be

nonçons que nos armateurs travaillent avec grande activité, à diſpoſer les objets neceſſaires à l'armement de ſix corſaires, dont trois montent 28 canons en batteries et trois autres plus petits. Vous pouvez compter qu'ils ſeront prêts à l'inſtant où la Convention nationale ouvrira ſur les mers un nouveau champ d'honneur aux Français régénerés.,, — The contents of the *Deliberation of the executive council bearing date 7. of January*, which is mentioned in this letter, have, I believe, never been made known to the public: but it is evident from the manner, in which the municipality of St. Malo ſpake of it, that its tendency was the ſame, as that of the letter written by the marine miniſter, namely, to rouſe the people to a war with England. The circumſtance therefore that it was ſigned by the executive council on the *very ſame day*, on which the Note of the executive council to the Britiſh government was ſigned, affords a new and very ſtriking proof of that glaring duplicity, which characterizes the rulers of modern France.

brought to its final iſſue before the tribunal of the public, till the Ultimatum of the executive council had been delivered on the 13. of January, yet their private determination had been irrevocably made, without the leaſt regard to the reſult of a negotiation. Indeed the whole conduct of the French rulers from the middle of November to the middle of January afforded one continued proof of this aſſertion: and Mr. Miles, who in conſequence of his connexions with Le Brun and other leading men in France, was intimately acquainted with their ſecret views, has teſtified, that the executive council had formed a decided reſolution on the part to be taken in regard to England, not four weeks only, when the circular letter of the marine miniſter was iſſued, but even *ten* weeks, before the open declaration of hoſtilities [3].

That the reſolution, to engage in a war with England, was taken by the executive council, at leaſt before the negotiation was finiſhed, if not before it commenced, appears likewiſe from the confeſſions of General Dumouriez. In the firſt volume of his Memoirs, where he ſpeaks of his own reſidence in Paris during the former part of January, and the meaſures which were then concerting for the next campaign, he

3. Compare p. 87. with p. 88. of the Authentic Correſpondence with Le Brun and others.

ſays in poſitive and unequivocal terms, that Le Brun, the French miniſter for foreign affairs, deſired him to pay no regard to the negotiation with Great Britain, and *that this negotiation was not made even a ſubject of the leaſt inquiry* [4]. We have here alſo an additional proof, that the executive council, of which Le Brun, in all matters relative to foreign countries was the chief, was reſolved *at all events* on a war with England, and that the negotiation, which was then carrying on, had no other object, than to amuſe its government, till the plan of attack was ripe for execution. Further, General Dumouriez informed General Miranda in a letter dated Paris 10. January, that the war between England and France appeared to be decided. He ſaid indeed to Miranda, "decided on the part of England,, [5], being too prudent to betray the ſecrets of the executive council: but that he himſelf was convinced, the Britiſh government had at that time *not* determined on a war with France, is manifeſt from the circumſtance, that in a paſſage of his Memoirs, where he had juſt before expreſsly ſpoken

4. "Le Brun pria même le général d'écarter tout ce qui concernait les negociations avec l'Angleterre, et la Hollande: *il n'en fut pas du tout queſtion.* Memoires de Dumouriez Tom. I. p. 108.

5. La guerre de la part d'Angleterre paroît à-peu-près decidée. Correſpondance du General Miranda etc. p. 3.

of the *fifteenth* of January [6], he ſays *it would have been extremely eaſy for France, to have avoided a war with England* [7]. Dumouriez therefore certainly did not believe on the *tenth* of January, that the Engliſh cabinet had determined on a war with France: for in that caſe he could not have ſuppoſed, that the French government, on the *fifteenth* of that month, might ſo eaſily have avoided a rupture: nor could he have at all imagined, that the deciſion of war and peace depended on the will of the executive council, unleſs he had been thoroughly perſuaded, that the deſigns of the Britiſh government were pacific. The expreſſion therefore *guerre de la part d'Angleterre* muſt be conſidered as ſynonymous to *guerre avec l'Angleterre*: the uſe of it muſt be aſcribed to the caution, which he thought was neceſſary in writing to Miranda, but

6. Tom. I. p. 103. "Nous étions déja au 15 du mois de Janvier.

7. "La Clos, qui venait d'être nommé commandant dans l'Inde propoſait, qu'on le fit partir avec quinze mille hommes et quinze vaiſſeaux de guerre, ce qui ſuppoſait neceſſairement la guerre avec les Anglais et les Hollandais, guerre qui n'était point déclarée, et qu'il eût été *très facile* et très-néceſſaire d'éviter. Ib. p. 105. He ſays alſo p. 128. "De Maulde en arrivant à Paris pour ſe juſtifier vint trouver le général, et lui dit, que ſi on voulait garder la neutralité avec la Hollande et l'Angleterre, *rien n'était plus facile*."

which no longer operated, when he published his memoirs: and the decision in favour of war must be understood of the French government, a construction, of which the justness is demonstrated, not only by Le Brun's acknowledged resolution, to pay no regard to the negotiation with England, but likewise by the order sent to General Miranda on the same tenth of January, to make an immediate attack on the United Provinces. And it receives still further confirmation from the declaration made by Lord Auckland in the House of Lords on the 9. of January 1798, whence it appears, that at the time when preparations were making [8] to open a negotiation between Lord Auckland, then ambassador at the Hague, and General Dumouriez, the General himself acknowledged, that the French executive council had determined on a war with England. His Lordship further added, that he had not mentioned the matter before, but that he then felt himself at liberty to state it [9].

But

8. Of these preparations, which commenced only a few days before the declaration of war, more will be said in the following chapter.

9. See the parliamentary debates on Jan. 9. 1798. — As no personal interview, if I mistake not, took place between Lord Auckland and General Dumouriez, the negotiation having been stopped at the very outset by the declara-

But whatever may be the period, at which the French cabinet came to a ſettled reſolution in regard to the war with England and Holland, the *fact* that it did come to this reſolution, and that too before the middle of January 1793. has been ſo fully demonſtrated in the tenth and twelfth chapters of the preſent work, that it would be a waſte of time to ſay any thing further on the ſubject. Indeed the poſitive order ſent to General Miranda on the 10. of January, for an immediate invaſion of Holland, and the conſiderable augmentation of the French marine, which was ordered only three days afterwards, expreſsly to act againſt England, though the French had a greater number of ſhips already in commiſſion, than were at that time fitting in the Engliſh ports [10], would alone

tion of war on the part of the national convention, the ſecret, which his Lordſhip has revealed, muſt have been contained in ſome written or verbal meſſage, either to himſelf or to ſome other perſon. Now Dumouriez relates in his Memoires, Tom. I. p. 142. that he ſent a confidential letter to his friend De Maulde, who was then at the Hague, and that De Maulde ſhewed this letter to Lord Auckland. But whether the acknowledgement of General Dumouriez was contained in this confidential letter, or in ſome other deſpatch, his Lordſhip can beſt determine. As the information however was really communicated, the vehicle is of no great conſequence.

10. See Ch. XII. Note 61.

demonstrate the truth of the assertion. Lastly, Mr. Miles says in the work [11], which has been frequently quoted, "I have other documents in my possession, "which all tend to prove, that France was too much "intoxicated with her success, and too confident that "she was invincible, to keep any measures with a na-"tion, whom it was her misfortune to behold in no "other light, than as a very powerful neighbour and ri-"val, and whom she thought it was necessary to humble "if not to crush." — Perhaps the documents, of which Mr. Miles here speaks, will hereafter be laid before the public: however they are unnecessary for our present purpose, as we have already evidence enough.

To this war with Great Britain the republican rulers of France were induced by various motives, which, unfortunately for humankind, derived their origin from the French revolution.

The completion of it, as it was called, had already induced the national assembly in April 1792. to declare war against Austria [12]: they had deemed it expedient to employ their forces abroad, that they might be more at liberty to execute their projects at home, and to divert the general attention from the cabals in the centre of the kingdom to the military operations

11. Pag. 98.

12. See Ch. VII. Note 8.

on the borders, that their own ſecret machinations might leſs attract the notice of the public. When hoſtilities were once commenced, the ſame motives urged both the continuance and extenſion of them: for the miniſter of the interior declared in the ſummer of 1792, that, as there were three hundred thouſand men in arms, it was neceſſary to make them march as far as their legs would carry them, or they would return, and cut the throats of their employers [13]. War therefore was conſidered as a national benefit, and peace, as Briſſot himſelf acknowledged [14], was regarded as the only evil, which the republican rulers of France had to dread, becauſe, as Louvet obſerved, it was deſtructive to the republic [15]. The ſucceſsful campaign of 1792, and the advantages, which had been obtained over Auſtria and Pruſſia, opened new fields of action to the French armies, which were daily increaſing both in numbers, and in military proweſs: and to men accuſtomed to ſubſiſt by rapine, nothing more inviting could be offered, than the plunder of a commercial country, whoſe wealth is proverbial. And, as it was deemed expedient, to find employment for the French ſailors, as well as for the ſoldiers, a war with

13. Ch. VII. Note 36.
14. Ib. Note 7.
15. Ib. Note 12.

Great Britain was not only an alluring object, but appeared to the national convention to afford the means of securing its authority at home.

As the war however with Austria and Prussia already answered the ends of the French rulers to a certain degree, it is probable that the declaration of hostilities against Great Britain would have been deferred to a somewhat later period, unless other causes, of which the effects were more rapid, had operated at the same time. These causes were partly general, or such as applied to other countries beside Great Britain, and partly especial, or such as applied to Great Britain alone. To the former class is to be referred the resolution of the French republicans to extirpate monarchy not only in France, but throughout all Europe, a resolution, which was formed by degrees, and which may be traced in the several stages of the French revolution.

The rational sense of liberty, which had long prevailed in Britain, was scarcely awakened in France, when, in consequence of the impetuosity of the French character, it began to degenerate into wild enthusiasm. From the original design of establishing a monarchy, limited by a proper intermixture of democracy and aristocracy [16], which is the happiest consti-

16. I purposely say the *design* of establishing such a monarchy, for the framers of the constitution of 1789, or

tution for a great empire, a ſudden transition was made to all the horrors of anarchy: and the conſti-

as it is more uſually called of 1791, becauſe it was then formally accepted, entirely failed in the execution; they by no means introduced a juſt mixture of monarchy, ariſtocracy, and democracy, and on that very account it was impoſſible, that the conſtitution ſhould be of long duration. The grand fault conſiſted in this, that the ſtates of France, which had been formerly divided into three houſes or chambers, were melted into *one*. Thus the equilibrium of the ſtate-machine, which it is the firſt object of a good legiſlator to preſerve, was totally deſtroyed: and it was eaſy to foreſee, that with ſuch an inſtitution, aided by the ſpirit of the times, the king would be degraded to a mere commiſſary of the national aſſembly, and that for want of a ſeparate ariſtocratic power, to form a counterpoiſe, the monarchical part of the conſtitution would ſoon be annihilated by the daily increaſing power of the democratic part. The ſtates ſhould have been divided into *two* houſes: the heads of the principal noble families, with the higher orders of the clergy, ſhould have been placed in the one, and the repreſentatives of the people in the other. The reciprocal action of ariſtocracy and democracy would then have preſerved an equilibrum: the prerogatives of the king, and the liberties of the people, would have been garanteed at the ſame time: tranquillity would have been ſecured to France, and the miſeries, which have been inflicted on the neighbouring countries, would have been avoided. The faultineſs of a *ſingle* legiſlative body has been ſince diſcovered by the French themſelves, and there-

tuent assembly, in which were many very respectable members, was scarcely dissolved, when the legislative

fore in the latest of their constitutions they have introduced *two* councils, in imitation of the two houses of the British Parliament. But the imitation falls greatly short of the original: for the council of elders, and the council of five hundred, can never answer the purpose, which is attained by the house of lords, and the house of commons. The house of lords, which forms the aristocratical part of our constitution is admirably devised, to keep the monarchical and democratical parts within their due limits. It has an equal interest with the commons in preventing a too great increase in the power of the one, and an equal interest with the king in preventing a too great increase in the power of the other. And as it is placed immediately between both, it can keep the constitution in a proper poise, by siding with the one, if incroachments are made by the other, and by supporting both, when they preserve the limits marked out by the constitution. But no such advantage attends the French council of elders. They are representatives of the people, and consequently belong to the democratical part of the French constitution, as well as the council of five hundred: the two councils are in fact nothing more than parts of the *same* house, and whether seven hundred and fifty representatives assemble in *one* hall, as they did before, or whether one room be allotted to five hundred of them, and another to the remaining two hundred and fifty, as at present, the difference in the result is not so great, as the authors of the last French constitution imagined. Both councils

assembly, which met in the autumn of 179 . and con-sisted chiefly of violent democrats, formed the secret

consist of men of the very same description; the members of each have an equal interest in all cases, whether they be inclined to oppose or to support the directory, to which the executive power is entrusted: and their ability or inability must be likewise in all cases the same. The present French constitution therefore has established oligarchy (the directory) on the one hand, and democracy (the two councils) on the other, without any intermediate power, to prevent mutual incroachments. Consequently, as from the natural desire, which all men have to increase their authority, the one part of the constitution must have always a tendency to oppress the other, the whole can never be kept in equilibrium. Either the directory will render the two councils, and with them the whole nation, subservient to its absolute will: or the two councils will infringe on the executive power, and impede the necessary operations of government. The former case has already taken place: for even since the 4. of September (18. of Fructidor, as they call it) 1797 the directory has governed France with a rod of iron, and their unhappy slaves might say with Tacitus, memoriam quoque ipsam cum voce perdidissemus, si tam in nostra potestate esset oblivisci, quam tacere. But if a change of circumstances from without should occasion discontents in the interior, and the two councils be enabled to resume the power, which is allotted them by the constitution, they will probably go as much beyond the constitutional exercise of it, for want of an intermediate check, as the directory has hitherto done, and thus

reſolution of dethroning the king of France, and of raiſing *themſelves*, under the ſpecious and alluring title of friends of the people, to the dignity of all-potent ſovereigns. In the jacobin club, eſpecially, where all ſubjects of importance were diſcuſſed and arranged, before they were introduced into the national aſſembly, the plan was already ſettled at the beginning of the year 1792, not only for the eſtabliſhment of a republic in France, but for the introduction of the ſame form of government in every quarter of Europe. The ſpirit, which animated the club of the jacobins, operated on almoſt every member of the national aſſembly: and to the national convention, which met in

reduce the executive power to a ſtate of debility, unleſs, in imitation of the national convention, they take the whole into their own hands, and deſtroy the conſtitution at one ſtroke. Though the Britiſh conſtitution therefore is adapted to all caſes, the preſent conſtitution of France is adapted to none: under the latter there is always danger either of deſpotiſm or anarchy, under the former there is danger, neither of the one, nor of the other: the former has ſtood the teſt of a whole century, the latter was ſhaken to its foundation before it had exiſted even two years. A compariſon then, which ſo illuſtrates the excellencies of the Britiſh original and the defects of the French imitation, muſt excite in Britons of every deſcription the ſincere deſire of tranſmitting unaltered to poſterity the conſtitution, which they have inherited from their anceſtors.

September 1792, it was transmitted in all its vigour. A hatred of kings, which, without distinction either of their political power, or of their private character, were denominated tyrants, betrayed itself in every harangue: and sovereigns of all descriptions were openly branded, in what was called the senate of a great nation, with the opprobrious appellation of public robbers [17]. And this hatred displayed itself not mere-

17. Les *rois* ne savent combattre les peuples qu'en *brigands*, said Barbaroux in the national convention, on the 8. of December 1792. See the Moniteur 10. December 1792. And whoever consults the Moniteur, not to mention the Journal des Jacobins, with the view of discovering other expressions of the same kind, will find them in abundance. I will not trouble the reader therefore with many extracts: but I cannot avoid quoting a passage from a letter written by a very celebrated member of the convention, Thomas Paine, whose principles, as is well known (for he was afterwards imprisoned) were deemed by the jacobins *too moderate.* This letter, which was read in the national convention on the 14. of January 1793, begins thus. "Citoyen Président, *mon mépris et ma haine pour le gouvernement monarchique* sont assez connus; ma compassion pour les infortunés, amis ou ennemis, est également profonde. J'ai voté pour mettre Louis Capet en jugement, parcequ'il était nécessaire de prouver à l'univers *la perfidie, la corruption, et l'horreur du système monarchique.* La masse des preuves, que vous avez sous les yeux, le constate suffisament. Il en résulte que la monarchie, *quelque forme qu'on lui donne, despotique ou limitée,*

ly in detached speeches, or in the opinions of only a few orators, but was so generally adopted, that it

devient nécessairement le centre autour duquel se forment et se rassemblent tous les genres de corruption, et que le metier de *roi* detruit aussi certainement toute moralité dans un homme, que le métier de *bourreau* toute sensibilité. Je me rappelle que pendant mon séjour en Angleterre je fus extrêmement frappé d'un mot de M. Anthoine aux Jacobins, lequel est *parfaitement conforme* à l'idée que j'énonce: *Faites moi roi aujourd'hui*, disait-il, *et je serai demain un brigand*.,, Moniteur 18. Jan. 1793. — Of expressions, abusive of the English government in particular, the following may serve as specimens. "Voyez par quels moyens *perfides* le gouvernement Anglais a tout-à-coup aliené la Nation Anglaise. — Faire ici le tableau de la comédie jouée par les *machiavelistes* qui dirigent l'Angleterre, c'est peindre les *forfaits* de presque toutes les puissances de l'Europe.,, These words were uttered in the national convention on the 1. of January 1793, by Brissot, who was afterwards called Allié de Pitt. See the Moniteur 3. Jan. 1793. A similar expression, "un acte de *perfidie*,,, was used likewise in a letter to Lord Grenville by the *temperate* Mr. Chauvelin, as he has been termed. See Note 38. to Ch. XI. On the 31. of January 1793 Danton represented royalty as already extinguished in England, saying: les *tyrans* de l'Angleterre sont morts; vous avez la plénitude de la puissance *nationale*. Moniteur 1. Feb. 1793. On the day, on which the national convention declared war, Ducos said, "le peuple Anglais trompé par les proclamations *mensongeres* et les terreurs *hypocrites* de son gouvernement etc.: and in the public manifesto, with which the entry of

became an essential ingredient in French politicks. *Principles* (said the President of the national convention, Gregoire, on the 28. of November 1792.) are waging war against royalty, which will fall under the blows of philosophy [18]: and five days afterwards, another President, Barrere, with his gorgeous eloquence, declared, that *their principles and their hatred of kings* were their ministers plenipotentiary [19]. But should any one still entertain a doubt, whether this hatred extended itself to the French rulers in general, it will certainly be removed by the following exclamation of the *whole* national assembly on the 4. of September 1792; *We all swear hatred to kings and to royalty* [20].

the French army into Holland was accompanied about ten days afterwards, was said "le peuple Anglais se laisse égarer — *par les mensonges de son roi.* See the Moniteur 3. and 20. of February 1793. These, with numberless other passages of the same import, merit the particular attention of those gentlemen, who have taken so much offence at the warmth, with which Mr. Burke censured the conduct of the French rulers.

18. See Ch. X. Note 19.

19. *Nos principes et notre haine contre les tyrans*, voilà nos ministres plénipotentiares. Moniteur 6. Dec. 1792. It is never to be forgotten, that in the language of the French convention the words *roi* and *tyrant* are always synonymous.

20. Dites au peuple Français (said Chabot) que vous avez trop appris à connaitre les vices des rois, et de la ro-

This hatred however, which had never been accompanied with fear, was gradually converted, before the declaration of war against England, into profound contempt; and the name of king was become, in the national convention, a subject of jest and ridicule. "Another Bourbon (exclaimed Treilhard, then President of the convention, on Jan. 8. 1793, when the king of the two Sicilies had been forced by the French fleet in the Mediterranean to submit to an indignity) another Bourbon in the number of the vanquished: *kings are here the order of the day* [21]. And the contempt of the French rulers for the kingdom of Great Britain in particular was so great, that, according to their own declarations, they cared for it as little, as for the republic of Ragusa [22]. This contempt arose in some measure from the pride, with which the successful

yauté, et *que vous les détestez.* Oui, oui, s'écrient *tous ensemble* les Deputés: *Nous le jurons.* Journal de Paris 1792, p. 941. And this hatred was carried to such a length, that Jean de Brie, who was afterwards appointed by the Directory to negotiate with kings and princes, proposed to the national convention to establish, for the more easy propagation of French principles, a corps of twelve hundred knights regicide.

21. Encore un Bourbon au nombre des vaincus: *les rois sont ici à l'ordre du jour.* Moniteur 9. Jan. 1793.

22. Authentic Correspondence, Appendix, p. 58.

campaign of 1792 neceſſarily inſpired them, but more particularly from their conviction, that French principles had every where taken ſuch deep root, that the neighbouring nations were become ripe for rebellion, were prepared to depoſe their ſovereigns, and to open their gates to the pretended deliverers of humankind. Of the Engliſh nation in particular they entertained theſe ſentiments [23]: whence they ſuppoſed, that the Engliſh government was not only in a ſtate of debility, but approaching to its final diſſolution. And ſo confident were they in their expectations of univerſal inſurrection, that the impending execution of Louis XVI. was openly repreſented in the national convention as a prelude to ſimilar executions in the other kingdoms of Europe. "Teach the nations, (ſaid Remi on the 2. of December 1792) to puniſh their tyrants in the manner, which becomes them„ [24]: and two days afterwards, the celebrated orator Carra ſaid likewiſe to the national convention, "ye know, that the ſtroke, by which the head of Louis is about to fall, *will make the heads of the other deſpots totter*„ [25]. And af-

23. See the latter part of Ch. X.

24. Appreuez aux peuples à punir leurs tyrans d'une maniere digne d'eux. Moniteur 6. Dec. 1792.

25. Vous ſentez que le coup, qui va faire tomber la tête de Louis XVI, *va faire chanceler celles des autres deſpotes.* Moniteur 8. Dec. 1792.

ter the fatal cataſtrophe had taken place in France, Danton, ſpeaking of kings in general, ſaid only two days before the declaration of war againſt Great Britain: "You have thrown them the gauntlet; this gauntlet is the head of a king: *it is the ſignal of their approaching death*[26]. Even ſo early as the 21. of November, the Preſident of the national convention, Gregoire, in a ſpeech, which was tranſlated into all languages[27], and was publiſhed, two days after the celebrated decree, as a manifeſto of all nations againſt their ſovereigns, had declared, "It was a glorious day *for the univerſe*, when the national convention of France pronounced theſe words, "*royalty is aboliſhed.*

That in making theſe, and numerous other declarations of the ſame kind, the rulers of France had their eyes directed particularly to Great Britain, is too apparent to ſtand in need of additional proof, ſince the whole of the preceding hiſtory contains one continued demonſtration of it. All doubts however on this ſubject, ſhould any really remain, will be removed by the ſpeech, which was uttered by Carra in the national convention on the 2. of January: a ſpeech,

26. Vous leur avez jetté le gant: ce gant eſt la tête d'un roi: *c'eſt le ſignal de leur mort prochaine.* Moniteur 1. Feb. 1792.

27. An Engliſh tranſlation of it is printed in Rivington's Annual Regiſter 1792. P. II. p. 356.

which is ſo much the more remarkable, as it was not only inſolent in the extreme toward the Britiſh government, but was delivered at the opening of the negotiation between Lord Grenville and Mr. Chauvelin, and proved therefore, or at leaſt might have proved, at that very time, to the world at large, that it was not the object of the national convention, to produce a reconciliation with the Britiſh cabinet [28]. "Your courage (ſaid Carra) will rouſe all nations, and they will "ſoon wiſh to have their tenth of Auguſt, their con-"vention, and their republic. Already has George III. "commanded the Tower of London to be fortified. "Need we more, to enable us to predict the deſtruction "of this new Baſtile? Need we more, to enable us to "foreſee the overthrow of royal and noble tyranny in "England. The human ſpecies commenced with in-"fancy: it now approaches toward manhood. Form "not then your judgement of what you have to fear "by the preparations in England, and by the comedy "now played by the parliament in concert with the "court: and be aſſured, that it is not the real intention

28. Briſſot's inſolent ſpeeches of the 1 and 12 of January, which were likewiſe delivered during the negotiation, afford an additional proof of this aſſertion. See the Moniteur 3 and 15. Jan. 1793. Specimens of theſe ſpeeches have been already given in Ch. XII. Note 34. and in Note 17. to the preſent chapter.

"of the court to make war on us, but merely to inti- "midate the national convention [29]. Let therefore "the head of Louis fall; *and George III, with his mi- "nister Pitt, will feel if their heads rest firm on their "shoulders* [30]. Then will the parliament of Eng- "land [31] no longer hesitate to demand an alliance "with the French republic. *The same fate will attend "the other despots:* and shortly will every nation say; "the head of our tyrant is not more divine, than that "of Louis; let us strike it off therefore; let us abolish "royalty; let us imitate the French in every thing; "and cries of vive la liberté! vive l'égalité! vive la ré- "publique! shall resound in every quarter of Eu- rope

29. This acknowledgement, *that it was not the intention of the British cabinet to make war on France*, from one of its most violent enemies deserves particular attention, and above all the attention of those, who have represented ministers as taking every opportunity, before the war broke out, of *repelling* peace. With regard to their alleged endeavours to intimidate the national convention, every Briton, who loves his country, must thank them for attempting to prevent the execution of its avowed projects.

30. Fortunately for Great Britain, their heads have rested firm on their shoulders, long since the heads of Carra and his associates have fallen to the dust.

31. Namely when metamorphosed into the national convention announced on the 28. of November.

"rope," [32]. — By ſpeeches like theſe, and ſtill more by actions, which correſponded to them, the republicans of France, republicans who, as Louvet ſaid, were worthy of the name, "aſpired at the laſting renown, at the immortal honour of aboliſhing royalty itſelf, of

32. "Votre courage donnera l'éveil à toutes les nations, et toutes voudront avoir bientôt leur 10. Août; leur convention et leur république. Déja George III. a fait fortifier la Tour de Londres. En faut-il davantage, pour prédire la deſtruction de cette nouvelle Baſtille? en faut-il davantage, pour prévoir le renverſement de la tyrannie royale et nobiliaire en Angleterre? Le genre humain a commencé par être enfant; il commence aujourd'hui à devenir un homme. Ne jugez donc point de ce que vous devez craindre par les préparatifs de l'Angleterre, et la comédie qui s'eſt jouée dans le parlement de concert avec la cour: et croyez que l'intention de la cour n'eſt réellement pas de nous faire la guerre, mais ſeulement d'intimider la convention nationale. Que la tête de Louis tombe; *et George III. et le miniſtre Pitt tâteront ſi la leur eſt encore ſur leurs épaules;* alors ſeulement il n'y aura plus de difficulté dans le parlement d'Angleterre pour demander l'alliance de la république Françaiſe. *Il en ſera de même des autres deſpotes*: bientôt chaque peuple ſe dira, mais la tête de notre tyran n'eſt pas d'une nature plus divine que celle de Louis; abbattons-la donc; aboliſſons la royauté; imitons en tout les Français: et vive la liberté! vive l'égalité! vive la république dans toute l'Europe! Moniteur 4. Janv. 1793.

abolishing it for ever, at first in France, and then throughout the world„ [33].

The confident expectation of the French rulers, that the neighbouring nations were prepared to rebel against their sovereigns, and to make a common cause with those, who under specious and alluring protestations endeavoured to conceal the infamy and destructiveness of their designs, brought at last the torch of their ambition into open flame. To whatever quarter they directed their attention, they foresaw in imagination the struggles of a civil war: they rejoiced at the combat of parties, which, by weakening or destroying the power of both, prepared the way for Gallic despotism: and regarding with a smile of malevolence the folly of devoted victims, who, seduced by all the arts of systematic deception, were operating their own destruction, anticipated the triumph over the expected prey. When ambitious monarchs attempt to gratify their thirst of conquest, they seldom think of subduing more than one country at a time: but such narrow projects of aggrandizement afforded much too little nourishment for the mighty minds of these republican rulers, and before *they* could be gratified, it was necessary, that all Europe should lie prostrate at their feet. Already was Savoy both conquered, and incorporated into France: already had they made themsel-

33. Words of Louvet. See Ch. VII. Note 19.

ves maſters, and even determined on the incorporation, of the Auſtrian Netherlands: already had they vanquiſhed a conſiderable part of Germany, had commenced hoſtilities, as well againſt the republic of Geneva, as againſt ſeveral ſtates of Italy; and preparations were already made for the conqueſt of the Swiſs cantons [34]. Already had they treated the Britiſh government as an open enemy [35]: and, while they endeavoured to excite inſurrection within, had deſtined a formidable fleet and army, to ſupport their projects from without [36].

34. This laſt fact, though not generally known, admits of no doubt; for General Dumouriez (Memoires, Tom. I. p. 110) ſpeaking of Colonel Weiſs, and of the events of January 1793, ſays: "Son coup d'oeil ſur les relations politiques de la République Françaiſe et du Corps Helvétique, lancé à propos au moment de l'éruption, acheva de déjouer les projets hoſtiles; et il eſt très probable, que ſans lui la guerre eût été declaré avant la fin de Fevrier; *divers préparatifs ſecrets étant déja en activité.* Ils ſe dirigeaient d'après le plan aſſez mal combiné par Robert, Claviere, et quelques émigrés Suiſſes, *qui déterminaient l'attaque ſur trois* points à la fois.

35. The conduct of the French convention on the 28. of November was equivalent to a formal declaration of hoſtilities againſt the Britiſh government: and to their conduct on that day every meaſure, which was afterwards taken, perfectly correſponded.

36. That thirty ſhips of the line were ordered on the

And the allies of England, the States General, were not merely threatened, but the order for actual invasion had been already given. Nor was all this sufficient, to satisfy the ambitious projects of the French rulers: for Briſſot, who conſidered France in January 1793 as more powerful than all Europe [37], and not

13. of January to be put in commiſſion, in addition to the twenty two already commiſſioned, has been related in the twelfth chapter. And that the menace of a landing in England, made by the marine miniſter on the 31. of December, was not a mere gaſconade, but the reſult of a ſerious and deliberate plan, appears from the *Rapport ſur l'organiſation générale des armées* delivered in the national convention on the 25. of January, in which, where the ſubject relates to England, there occurs the following paſſage. "Toujours cette puiſſance a craint une deſcente; jamais le projet ne s'en eſt effectué, et il n'a jamais été ſerieuſement préparé. Mais il ſera ſans doute ſuivi avec plus de force et d'énergie ſous le régime de la liberté: *vous y deſtinerez* 40,000 *hommes d'embarquement*.„ Moniteur 27. Janv. 1793.

37. In his addreſs A ſes Commettans p. 75. ſpeaking of the inhabitants of France he ſays: "Ces vingt-cinq millions ſe trouvaient, *même au mois de Janvier dernier*, avec des moyens materiels et pecuniaires bien ſuperieurs à *tous ceux des puiſſances étrangeres*, même à ceux de cette Angleterre ſi fière de ſes richeſſes. Ils avaient une maſſe de reſſources, telle que jamais aucune nation n'en a poſſédée, maſſe qui ſe doublait encore, ſi l'on avait pu faire regner l'ordre; *car tout ſe tenait dans notre plan*.„

wholly without reaſon, on account, as well of the general fermentation, which then prevailed, as of the want of confidence and union among the cabinets themſelves, had formed the plan of conquering likewiſe, at the ſame time, Italy and Spain [38]. And, as if Europe were too ſmall a theatre for the exerciſe of the French arms, expeditions were in agitation to the diſtant regions of Aſia and Africa [39]. Even at that time therefore the French rulers claimed for France the title, which has been ſince aſſumed, the title of the *great nation*, for which purpoſe, as Briſſot obſerved, "it was neceſſary to have vaſt ideas, grand deſigns, and an object ſublime and difficult [40].

38. "Briſſot y étala ſes projets de conquerir l'Eſpagne et l'Italie.,, Memoires de Dumouriez, Tom. I. p. 108. Further ſays Dumouriez p. 105. Kellermann, en prenant congé de la Convention, pour aller commander l'armée du Dauphiné, forte d'à-peu près vingt-mille hommes, indépendamment de celle du comté de Nice aux ordres du général Biron, qui était à-peu-près dix à douze mille, *avait reçu l'ordre d'aller conquerir Rome*, et avait repondu gravement qu'il allait à Rome.

39. "Il s'agiſſait dans cette expedition de la Clos, (qui venait d'être nommé commandant dans l'Inde) de s'emparer du Cap de Bonne-Eſpérance et de Ceylan, pour enſuite ſe joindre à Tippoo Saib, et tomber ſur le Bengale.,, Memoires de Dumouriez, Tom. I. p. 105.

40. "Pour former des hommes, *une grande Nation*, il

The rage of conqueſt, which animated the republican rulers of regenerated France, was diſtinguiſhed likewiſe as much by its *kind*, as by its *magnitude*. The zeal of converting all mankind to their political and ſuppoſed philoſophic creed, which in minds deſtitute of religion can operate as fervently, as religious zeal in the moſt determined bigot, excited an enthuſiasm, of which modern ages furniſh no example, and which can only be compared with that of the followers of Mohammed in the ſeventh century. Conſcious too, like theſe, of their military prowefs, and of their ability to propagate their doctrines by the ſword, they had recourſe to the meaſures, which had been applied by the Saracens, and determined to impoſe the ſyſtem, adopted by themſelves, on a conquered world. They formed accordingly the reſolution, "of breaking with *all* the cabinets, of ſetting all Europe at defiance, of ſetting the four corners of Europe on fire [41]. And in the heat of their enthuſiasm they

faut de vaſtes idées, de grands objets, un but ſublime et difficile.„ A ſes Commettans p. 76.

41. Theſe expreſſions, which were vauntingly uſed by the French rulers themſelves have been quoted in the original, Ch. VII. Notes 14. 15. 16. The well-known Camille Jourdan likewiſe, in his addreſs A ſes Commettans, which was written in October 1797, has made p. 88. the following remarkable confeſſion. "Quel fut le grand *principe* de la

were so confident of success, that in the decree of the 15. of December they proclaimed to the whole world their system of universal revolution.

guerre, le grand obstacle à la paix? Ne fut-il pas dans nos doctrines révolutionaires, dans cet insensé projet *de renverser tous les trônes, de bouleverser tous les empires?*„ Yet a celebrated opposition writer, speaking of the 24. of January 1793, says: "*Before this time*, France was undoubtedly solicitous for *peace*. — The arguments, by which he endeavours, in defiance of the French rulers themselves, to support this notion, are founded, partly on the fine and pathetic expressions, which were used in the Note of the French executive council of the 7. of January 1793, and partly on the proposal, which had been made by Mr. Chauvelin to the British cabinet as long ago as June 1792, to act as mediator between France and Austria. Now of those *fine and pathetic expressions* enough has been already said in the preceding chapter, to place their falsity in the clearest point of view. And of the mediation, which was proposed before the deposition of Louis XVI. and in *his* name, it has been shewn in the seventh chapter, that if it be regarded as a request of the national assembly, it affords a proof of the blackest hypocrisy. But even had it been true, that the republican rulers of France wished for peace in June 1792, it would surely be very absurd, to conclude therefore, that they entertained the same sentiments six months afterwards, when they were become all-potent conquerors. To corroborate his opinion, the same writer says further, that the national convention, at least before the meeting of Parliament on the 13. of December,

The motives, which induced the rulers of republican France, to attempt the destruction of all kingly governments, affected the kingdom of Great Britain in an equal degree with any other kingdom in Europe: for kings of every description, whether absolute or limited [42], were considered by those political zealots as monsters, which it was necessary to extirpate. And nothing was at that time more common in the national convention, than to declaim on the slavery of Britons, and the benefits to be conferred on them by the communication of French freedom. But be-

could have done nothing, which even the British cabinet considered as a ground of war, because war was not proposed in his Majesty's speech. Now from the circumstance, that war was not proposed in his Majesty's speech, we may conclude that it was the intention of the cabinet, to act only on the defensive: but to infer, that, because it did not instantly commence hostilities, there was no reason to suspect an aggression on the part of France, is the very summit of sophistry. We may justly wonder therefore that a pamphlet, containing *such* arguments, could meet in Great Britain with so rapid a sale, and make such an impression on a nation, which reasons in general on political subjects more justly, than any nation in Europe. In fact, it affords a confirmation of that melancholy truth, that even men of sense may be deceived by the most futile reasoning, when that futile reasoning is veiled in eloquent and spirited language.

42. See Note 17 to this chapter.

ſide the *general* motives, in which Great Britain was included, *particular* reaſons induced the French rulers, at the cloſe of the year 1792, to a war with their ancient rival. In the firſt place, the internal fermentation at that time, which they themſelves aſſiſted to the utmoſt of their power, the numerous addreſſes from ſeditious ſocieties, and the civic feaſts which were held before their own eyes in Paris [43], led them to believe, that the inſurrection, which they expected in all countries, would firſt break out in Britain. Secondly, the number of ſhips of war, which France had actually in commiſſion, was ſuperior to the number of thoſe, which were ordered to be commiſſioned in the Britiſh ports: and it was imagined, that republican enthuſiasm would ſo animate the French ſailors on the one hand, and that disaffection would ſo prevail among the Britiſh ſailors on the other, that the former would gain an eaſy victory. Thirdly the land forces in England, if we except the militia, for which it was ſuppoſed the expected inſurrection would furniſh ſufficient employment, did not amount at that time to twenty thouſand men: and from the immenſe army then in the pay of France, twice or thrice that number could be ſpared, which, if once conducted

43. An example of this kind has been quoted in the preceding chapter, Note 76.

acrofs the channel, a matter fuppofed in France to be very feafible [44], might perhaps, under the peculiar circumftances of the time, have fucceeded in the attempt, to overturn the government, the conftitution, and the power of Great Britain. Laftly, till the empire of the fea was wrefted from Britain, it was impoffible that the ambition of the French rulers fhould ever be gratified: and, on the other hand, it was obvious, that as foon as the Britifh naval and commercial power was transferred to France, the conqueft of the continent would be rendered eafy, and that all Europe would foon lie proftrate at her feet.

44. See Note 32 to this chapter, and Note 39 to Chapter XII.

CHAPTER XV.

Events of the laſt fourteen days before the declaration of war. Mr. Chauvelin's demand on the 17. of January to be acknowledged as ambaſſador of the French republic. Answer of the Britiſh government, that under the exiſting circumſtances it thought proper not to comply with the demand. Order ſent to Mr. Chauvelin by the French executive council, to return to France. Similar, but later, order on the part of the Britiſh government: with the motives thereto. Copies of the papers relative to the late negotiation laid before the States General by Lord Auckland, the Britiſh Ambaſſador at the Hague, who accompanied them with a memorial on the conduct of the French rulers. Meſſage from his Majeſty to the two houſes of Parliament. Apparent preparations for a new negotiation made by General Dumouriez. De Maulde's journey to the Hague, to propoſe a conference between Lord Auckland and General Dumouriez, on the frontiers of Holland. Mr. Maret's departure from Paris on the twenty ſixth of January for London; where he remained eight days, but for want of inſtructions from the

French executive council again produced no effect. Departure of Dumouriez from Paris on the same day, to hold the proposed conference with Lord Auckland, to which the British government had consented, but which did not take place, because the national convention refused to await the issue of it, and declared war against Great Britain and Holland on the first of February.

The history of the politicks of Great Britain and France has been already brought down to the middle of January 1793, and the relative conduct of the two powers, from the time of the conference at Pillnitz, has not only been clearly represented, but the representation has been every where supported by unanswerable documents. It has been proved on the one hand, that the British cabinet was so far from acceding to a coalition against France, that it had acted toward that country according to the rules of the most strict neutrality, and even with the utmost friendship [1]. On

1. It was impossible for one government to shew a stronger proof of friendship for another, than the firm refusal of the British cabinet, till war had been declared, to accept the offers made by the French planters in St. Domingo to surrender that valuable colony to Great Britain. See the latter part of Chap. II.

the other hand it has been ſhewn, that the French government repaid this friendſhip with the blackeſt ingratitude, that it endeavoured to excite an inſurrection in Great Britain, with a view of deſtroying, not only our conſtitution, but our exiſtence as an independent nation, and that, while the ſecret machinations were conducted with all the arts of ſyſtematic deception, a formidable armament was prepared in France itſelf. It has been further ſhewn, that the meaſures adopted by the Britiſh government were merely meaſures of ſelf-defence, that they were not taken till after the French convention had *openly* avowed its deſign of overturning the Britiſh conſtitution [2], and that the naval preparations in the ports of Britain were not leſs than three months poſterior to the naval preparations in the ports of France [3]. We have ſeen likewiſe, that, when the relative conduct of the two countries became a ſubject of negotiation, and the Britiſh cabinet inſiſted on conditions, which alone could inſure the ſafety of Britain, the French government not only refuſed to comply with thoſe conditions, but declared at the ſame time in the moſt poſitive manner, that if, notwithſtanding this refuſal, the preparations in the Britiſh ports were continued, it

2. See Ch. X. Note 24.

3. See Ch. X. Note 5. and Ch. XI. Note 44.

was determined to commence hoſtilities. Laſtly, it has been proved in the preceding chapter, that the French rulers, whoſe meaſures during more than two months had uniformly tended to a war with England, came to a final reſolution on the ſubject, at leaſt before the middle of January 1793: and the various motives, which induced them to it, motives which operated before the period in queſtion, have been fully aſſigned. As the fate of the two countries therefore was now determined, the events of the laſt fourteen days, before the public declaration of hoſtilities, which took place on the 1. of February, cannot poſſibly be reckoned among the *cauſes* of the war. The real cauſes had already produced their full effect; and the events, which followed, could ſerve only as *pretexts*, or as ſophiſtical arguments to palliate an act of injuſtice, to which they gave not birth. In a review then of the *cauſes* of the war they might be ſafely paſſed over in ſilence: but, ſince whatever concerns the relative conduct of Great Britain and France till the public declaration of war againſt the former, belongs to the preſent hiſtory, it will be neceſſary to relate the events of the laſt fourteen days with the ſame exactneſs, as the preceding.

On the 17. of January 1793, though the queſtion of war or peace was fully determined, and the reſidence therefore of a French miniſter in London was

become wholly uſeleſs, Mr. Chauvelin, by order of the executive council, demanded, that the court of Great Britain ſhould formally receive him as the accredited ambaſſador of the French republic [4]. Never perhaps was a favour demanded by one government of another, at a more unſeaſonable period, than this: for a favour undoubtedly it would have been, if Great Britain, which no power could have forced to a compliance, had given ſo early an example of a formal acknowledgement of the new republic. To have acquired a claim to ſuch an expreſſion of friendſhip, this republic ſhould have itſelf acted with friendſhip toward Great Britain, ſhould have reſted ſatisfied with the revolution, which had been effected at home, and ſhould not have attempted to diſturb the tranquillity of its neighbours. If the French republic had really acted in this manner, and, inſtead of endeavouring to overturn all the kingdoms of Europe, had behaved with becoming moderation, it is not improbable, that the Britiſh government would have acknowledged the French republic, if not in January 1793, at leaſt as ſoon as it

4. That Mr. Chauvelin's Letter to Lord Grenville, in which this demand was made, was dated the 17. of January, appears from Lord Grenville's anſwer, which begins thus, "I have received your letter of the 17. inſtant." But I have not been able to find it in the Moniteur, nor in the New Annual Regiſter.

was settled on so firm a basis, as to promise durability to any engagement with it[5]. It is true, that in a political light the British ministers, if they had had the choice, must necessarily have preferred the continuance of a monarchical government in France to the establishment of a republic, not only because great republics, like

5. As the republic of France acted with avowed hostility toward the kingdom of Great Britain, and thus forfeited all pretensions to a formal recognition on the part of the British government, it is in fact unnecessary to inquire, whether the latter would have acknowledged the French republic in the year 1793, provided this republic had acted with friendship toward Great Britain and its allies, and had renounced all views of conquest and aggrandizement. No one however can assert, that the British government, in that case, would have refused: and the expression used by Mr. Pitt to Mr. Maret, "that it would give him great pleasure to treat with him, *as a confidential person of the French executive council*,, (Ch. XIII. p. 10.) and the assurance given by Lord Grenville to Mr. Chauvelin, "*that outward forms would be no hinderance to his Britannic majesty, whenever the question related to explanations, which might be satisfactory and advantageous to both parties*,,, (Ib. p. 4.) lead rather to the conclusion, that *if* satisfactory explanations had been really given by the rulers of the French republic, the British government would *not* have refused to acknowledge it. But without such satisfactory explanations, no acknowledgement of this kind could at that time be expected.

like that of France, are naturally inclined to be both restless in themselves, and to disturb the peace of their neighbours [6], but because the ambition of the new rulers of that country, aided by the energy, with which the revolution inspired the French in general, who fondly imagined they were fighting for the establishment of their political liberty [7], unavoidably ren-

6. It was a strange notion entertained by many in the year 1792, that the conversion of France into a republic would secure the tranquillity of Europe, though the notion is contradicted by the experience of all ages. We need only appeal to the Roman and Carthaginian republics, which displayed a greater thirst of conquest and aggrandizement, than perhaps any monarchy ever did. The instances, which have been alleged of the republics of Holland and Switzerland, are foreign to the purpose. For, in the first place they were merely federate republics, formed therefore only for self-defence, whereas the republic established in France was one and indivisible, formed therefore for aggression: and, in the next place, they were surrounded with neighbours more powerful than themselves, whereas the very reverse took place in regard to France.

7. The inhabitants of France however have since discovered, that they have been fighting for no other purpose, than to establish the power of a new set of governors, whose tyranny is insupportable: and that their efforts have produced no other effect, than the exchange of a virtuous sovereign, who loved his subjects, for despots, who treat them as slaves. The enthusiasm therefore of the French armies, unless the

dered France a much more dangerous neighbour to England, than it had ever been under its ancient government. And his majesty in particular, as every man in his situation would have done, necessarily felt a certain degree of indignation at the deposition and condemnation of an innocent sovereign. But neither those political reasons, nor this personal indignation, would have occasioned a declaration of war on the part of Great Britain; of war, which arose from totally different causes, as has been fully proved in the preceding chapter, and was not only declared, but *provoked*, by the rulers of France. Besides, had the British ministry, as their adversaries contend, resolved on a war with France, merely because France was become a republic [8], they would not have entered into a nego-

fertility of invention, which is characteristic of the French rulers, furnishes new means of inflaming it, will hardly be equal in future to that, which was displayed at the commencement of the war.

8. When a certain opposition writer, in order to extort a confession from government itself, that the war was its own work, and that too because France was become a republic, quotes a passage from his Majesty's speech of the 21. of January 1794, and not only suppresses the words "*an attack was made on us and our allies*,, but even interpolates the verb "*to oppose*,, so as to give the whole passage a difference sense, we can hardly ascribe his conduct to mere ignorance. But as it has been already very justly exposed

tiation with the agents of that republic, and ſtill leſs would they have propoſed conditions, under which they were ready to remain in peace with it. They demanded not, that the republic ſhould ceaſe, but merely that it ſhould conduct itſelf with moderation and friendſhip: and from the very firſt eſtabliſhment of it had armed neither by land nor by ſea, till Great Britain itſelf was threatened with deſtruction. When the Britiſh ambaſſador departed from Paris after the depoſition of the king of France in Auguſt 1792, he was particularly charged to declare, that his Britannic majeſty meant to obſerve the principles of neutrality in every thing, which regarded the arrangement of the *internal government of France*: and Le Brun was ſo ſatisfied with the declaration, that he ſaid a few days afterwards, in his report to the national aſſembly, the Britiſh ambaſſador had left *a ſatisfactory teſtimony of the ſentiments of his court*[9]. On the 18. of December Mr. Miles in a letter to Le Brun again reminded the French miniſter, that the Britiſh cabinet was determined not to interfere in the internal affairs of France, and ſpeaking of Mr. Pitt in particular he ſaid, "I dare refer you to all the public and avowed decla-

by a ſenſible and well informed opponent, it is unneceſſary to take further notice of it.

9. See Ch. IX. Notes I. 12.

"rations of the English minister, to convince you, that "from the beginning of the revolution he has made it "a point not to meddle with the internal affairs of your "government; *that he has always rejected with firmness "every proposal made to him for attacking the French* [10], "*and always refused to be concerned in any project for "a counter-revolution.* As he has made it his duty not "to meddle with your affairs, so he has made it his "glory to remain attached to his own wise and equi- "table principles,, [11]. — The same system of neutra- lity, and the determination, not to interfere in the in- ternal affairs of France prevented likewise the English ministry from interceding in behalf of Louis XVI. though the fate, which awaited him, could not possibly be a matter of indifference to them, either in a mo- ral or in a political view [12]. Lord Grenville likewise,

10. That the British cabinet positively refused to join a coalition against France in 1791 appears from Ch. I. Note 2: and that the same proposal was renewed by various courts of Europe during the summer of 1792, but that the British cabinet uniformly answered in the negative, was asserted by Mr. Dundas, in his speech in the house of commons on the 14. of December 1792.

11. Authentic correspondence, Appendix, p. 80.

12. Even if the British government had interceded in behalf of Louis XVI. it is certain, that the intercession would not have produced the desired effect: it would only have

in his Note to Mr. Chauvelin of the 31. of December, left the queſtion, whether the Britiſh cabinet would

given riſe to complaints of an officious and unwarranted interference, and thus have furniſhed the national convention with an additional pretext, for colouring the aggreſſion, on which it had already reſolved. For Danton ſaid in the convention, on the 16. of January 1793, of the interceſſion attempted by the king of Spain, and which ended, as every man acquainted with the declarations of the French rulers (ſee Ch. VII. XIV.), expected, "Quant à l'Eſpagne, je l'avouerai je ſuis étonné de *l'audace* d'une puiſſance, qui ne craint pas de prétendre *à exercer ſon influence ſur votre deliberation.* Si tout le monde était de mon avis, on voterait à l'inſtant, *pour cela ſeul*, la guerre à l'Eſpagne. Moniteur 21. Jan. 1793. Even the more moderate Vergniaud ſaid on the 31. of December, "J'aime trop la gloire de mon pays, pour propoſer à la convention, de ſe laiſſer influencer dans une occaſion auſſi ſolemnelle par la conſideration de ce que feront ou ne feront pas les puiſſances étrangeres. Moniteur 2. Jan. 1793. And Briſſot on the 19. of January ſaid of England in particular, "Je m'indignerais ſans doute, *de voir qu'on épargnât le roi, pour arrêter la flotte Anglaiſe.* Moniteur 24. Jan. 1793. This note may ſerve therefore to juſtify the conduct of the Britiſh government, not only with the friends of Louis XVI, who might otherwiſe imagine, that its interceſſion might have been of ſervice, but likewiſe with the friends of the oppoſite party, ſome of whom, with a ſtrange inconſiſtency, have likewiſe cenſured the neglect of interceſſion. Perhaps however no argument will ſatisfy the

acknowledge the French republic, wholly undetermined, and said, that, when it came to a decision, "the "king would have the right to decide according to the "interests of his subjects, his own dignity, and the re-"gard which he owed to his allies, and to the general "system of Europe,, [13]. That his Britannic majesty possessed this right, there can be no doubt: and it is equally clear, that a republic, which threatened destruction to Europe in general, and to Great Britain in particular, had no right to expect to be formally acknowledged. For it would be the height of folly to contribute voluntarily to the energy of a power, which had already declared itself hostile; it would be madness, for a man strengthen wantonly the arm, which was raised, to destroy him. But it has been proved, that the republic of France had determined to annihilate the kingdom of Britain, and that the question of

latter, since their passion for finding fault with the British ministry carries them so far, as to condemn a conduct, which on *their* part at least deserves commendation.

13. The words of the original are, "La proposition de recevoir un ministre accredité de la part de quelque autre autorité ou pouvoir en France serait une question nouvelle, laquelle, au moment où elle se présenterait, sa Majesté aurait le droit de décider d'après les interêts de ses sujets, sa propre dignité, et les égards qu'elle doit à ses alliés, ainsi qu'au systême général de l'Europe,, Moniteur 14. Janv. 1793.

war or peace was fully determined before the middle of January. The other queſtion therefore, whether the French republic ſhould be acknowledged by Great Britain, or not, which on the 31. of December had been left undetermined, and ſubordinate to the iſſue of the negotiation, was on the 20. of January, after the negotiation was ended, and the deſigns of the French government had been fully confirmed, neceſſarily anſwered in the negative. Indeed *under the existing circumſtances* an affirmative anſwer would have been abſurd: and therefore Lord Grenville in his Note to Mr. Chauvelin of the 20. of January, ſaid [14], "I have already appriſed you [15], that his Majeſty has "reſerved to himſelf the right of deciding according to "his judgement upon the two queſtions of acknowledg-"ing a new form of government in France, and of "receiving a miniſter accredited on the part of ſome "other authority in France, than that of his moſt "chriſtian majeſty. In anſwer to the demand you "now make, whether his majeſty will receive your

14. The original French note is not printed in the Moniteur: but the Engliſh tranſlation, which was laid before the two houſes of Parliament on the 28. of January 1793, and is therefore as good authority as the original itſelf, is printed in the New Annual Regiſter for 1793, Public papers p. 75.

15. Namely in the Note of December 31.

"new letters of credence, I have to inform you, that, "*under the present circumstances*, his majesty does not "think proper to receive them.„

On this refusal the republican rulers of France had no right to complain; for not only were they conscious, that their plan of revolutionizing all Europe was known to the British ministry [16], but they had declared, on their parts, five weeks before the period in question, *that they acknowledged no kingly government* [17], and at the same had issued a proclamation in which they asserted in unequivocal terms, that it was their design *to expel all kings* [18]. If under these

16. Brissot, in his report to the convention on the 12. of January, speaking of the British ministers, said, "Ils prévoyaient que cette république pouvait se consolider, *et porter le flambeau des révolutions en toute l'Europe.* Moniteur 15. Jan. 1793. As it was avowed then, that the British ministers foresaw this, (and their foresight, at a time when so many thousands were struck with blindness, does them great honour) it was undoubtedly their duty to avoid a step, which would have given additional force to the engine of destruction.

17. See the introduction to the decree of December 15, quoted in Ch. XII. Note 2.

18. Ib. Note 22. — From what has been already said in the present and two last chapters, the reader will easily determine, whether the assertion be true, that the British government refused to receive Mr. Chauvelin's new credentials

circumſtances, if after the deſign of overturning the Britiſh conſtitution had been formally announced in the national convention [19], if after the king of Great Britain had been publickly threatened in the ſame aſſembly with the fate, which was then impending over the king of France [20], and after the late negotiation had ratified both theſe and numerous other injuries and inſults, if under *ſuch* circumſtances, the Britiſh government had acknowledged the republic of France, its rulers would have aſcribed the acknowledgement, not to a deſire of preſerving peace but to the dictates of fear [21]; and Treilhard would have again exclaimed, *Another king in the number of the vanquiſhed! Kings are here the order of the day* [22]*!* In fact the French rulers themſelves could not ſeriously expect, that the republic, which was no more dreaded by Great Britain at that time, than it is at preſent, would be acknowledged under ſuch circumſtances by the Britiſh cabinet.

merely becauſe France was become a republic. It was not the *bare exiſtence* of that republic, but its *deſtructive character*, which determined the conduct of adminiſtration.

19. Ch. X. Note 24.

20. Ch. XIV. Note 28.

21. We have already ſeen (Ch. XIII. p. 11.) in what manner Le Brun interpreted Mr. Pitt's willingneſs to confer with Mr. Maret.

22. See Ch. XIV. Note 17.

Unleſs therefore they had been deſirous of ſeeking pretexts for a quarrel, they would not have then propoſed the queſtion, but would have left the deciſion to the effects of time: and hence we may ſafely infer that the demand was made with no other view, than, on the preſumption that it would be anſwered in the negative, to furniſh themſelves with at leaſt one plauſible argument, and thus colour an aggreſſion, on which they had long reſolved [23].

The refuſal, given by the Britiſh cabinet on the 20. of January, to acknowledge the French republic in the perſon of Mr. Chauvelin, could hardly have been known many hours to the executive council, before they ſent him an order to return to France: for Dumouriez, in a letter to Miranda dated Paris 23 January, ſpeaks of the order for Chauvelin's recall, as already given [24]. Dumouriez indeed ſays nothing in this letter of the above-mentioned refuſal of the Britiſh government, and aſſigns another motive for the recall of Chauvelin, namely, that Dumouriez himſelf

23. Mr. Chauvelin made no ſecret of declaring, that if he was not received at St. James's, *it would be the height of his ambition to leave this country with a declaration of war.* See the Authentic Correſpondence, p. 84.

24. His own words are "*On a donné ordre à notre ambaſſadeur Chauvelin de revenir.*" Correſpondance du Général Miranda, p. 15.

intended to go England, in order to open a new negotiation [25]. But, whatever was the motive, which induced the executive council to recall Mr. Chauvelin, the *fact*, that they did recall him, though it is not generally known, and moreover that they ſigned the order, at the lateſt, on the *twenty third* of January, is proved beyond contradiction by Dumouriez's letter of that day to Miranda.

On the *twenty fourth* of January, though the order, which had been given by the executive council could not have been known in London, a ſimilar order was ſent to Mr. Chauvelin by the Britiſh government. To this meaſure the Britiſh government was induced by various and weighty motives. In the firſt place, after the negotiation was at end, and the queſtion of war or peace was finally decided, Mr. Chauvelin's reſidence in London could be of no further uſe. This was virtually admitted by the French government itſelf, in having *already* ordered Mr. Chauvelin to return [26]. It is likewiſe the uſual practice with all go-

25. Of this deſign, which was not put in execution, more will be ſaid in the latter part of this chapter.

26. If it be objected, that according to Dumouriez's letter to Miranda, though Chauvelin was recalled, a new negotiation was intended to be conducted by Dumouriez, it may be replied, that the French executive council was ſo far from taking any part in the new negotiation, that they

vernments, when a negotiation is ended, and either a rupture, or the continuance of hostilities is already settled, to order the minister of the hostile power to depart from its territories, because his further residence would enable him to furnish his own court with information, which must be detrimental to the other power. But beside this general motive, there existed a very particular reason for dismissing Mr. Chauvelin, as soon as all hopes of a reconciliation were at an end: for his *personal* conduct was of such a kind, that no government under any circumstances, and much less in such a general ferment, as then prevailed in England, could have suffered his residence, without exposing itself to imminent danger. Every one must admit, that it is the duty of a foreign ambassador to confine his political communications to the court, to which he is accredited, and that it is an insult as well as an injury to that court, if he forms *political* connexions with persons, who act in opposition to it. It is true that an opposition party in England, if it conducts itself with moderation and dignity, and, setting aside all chicane and sophistry, examines with candour the measures of ministers, is not only entitled to respect, but is a real benefit to the nation. Yet even to *such* an opposition

took every possible measure to counteract it, in which they fully succeeded, as will appear in the sequel.

party no foreign minifter has a right to attach himfelf, and to make the members of it his confidential friends on *political* fubjects, fince by virtue of his office he muft confer on matters of ftate with minifters, and minifters alone. But Mr. Chauvelin, foon after his arrival in the fpring of the year 1792, formed a clofe alliance with the members of oppofition, and the longer he ftaid, the more clofe was the connexion. His intimacy with the oppofition party appears from his own letter of the 17. of July [27]: and when he was recalled by the executive council at the end of Auguft, he obtained a revocation of the order by ufing the following argument, "*that though he was not* "*well with the Englifh minifter, yet he was perfectly fo* "*with Mr. Fox and fome other members of oppofition,* "*and that it would not be prudent in France to lofe the* "*fruit of his labours with thefe gentlemen, and their* "*fubfequent fervices, for a vain form of diplomatic eti-* "*quette* [28]. — And before the negotiation commenced, which has been defcribed in the thirteenth chapter, he went fo far as to communicate his fecret inftruc-

27. In this letter he faid: "D'après tous les renfeignemens que je me fuis empreffé de prendre dès le premier moment que j'en ai eu connaiffance, j'ai partagé à ce fujet, et partage encore, la fecurité de tous les Anglais, *même les plus jaloux du gouvernement*. See Ch. VIII. Note 3.

28. Authentic Correfpondence, Appendix p. 83.

tions, (in which was poſitively ſtated, that the Schelde would *not* be given up, and yet that an acknowledgement of the French republic ſhould be demanded) to an intimate friend of Mr. Fox [29].

A conduct like this, even in times of perfect tranquillity, would have excited the ſuſpicion, that it was Mr. Chauvelin's intention, not to preſerve peace, but by ſecret cabals to do injury to government. At a period then, when London was overrun with French apoſtles of rebellion, when the diſaffected party in England ſpake loudly and vehemently againſt the government, when ſeditious ſocieties publickly proclaimed their deſign of eſtabliſhing a Britiſh national convention, and this deſign was as publickly encouraged by the convention of France, Mr. Chauvelin's union with men, who acted in oppoſition to government, whether the object of thoſe gentlemen, conſidered by itſelf, were reprehenſible or not, afforded an unequivocal proof, that Mr *Chauvelin's* object, was to encourage the inſurrection, which was confidently expected by his employers. Nor did his employers make it a ſecret, that they regarded him as an inſtrument of ſedition: for they commiſſioned him, firſt, "to embrace every opportunity of aſſuring the Engliſh *nation*, that notwithſtanding the ill humour of its *government*, the

29. Authentic Correſpondence, p. 84.

French desired nothing more ardently, than to merit *its* (the English nation's) esteem [30]; and secondly, to threaten the British government with *an appeal to the people* [31].

Now when ministers have condescended to negotiate with a man of this description [32], and have patiently borne with his insulting language, till the negotiation was brought to a crisis, and till it had ceased to be in their power to prevent a rupture, they are so

30. See Ch. XII. Note 27.

31. Ib. Notes 29. 32. See also Ch. XIII. Notes 47. 52.

32. Even without any regard to the personal character of Mr. Chauvelin, it was only the desire of leaving nothing untried, which might prevent a rupture, that could have induced ministers to commence a negotiation at all with the French rulers, as it was not to be expected, that any convention made with so fluctuating an administration would produce a lasting effect. Besides, as there was not only a continual struggle between the ruling-parties, but each party, when fallen, was branded with the appellation of a faction, the British government by negotiating with the rulers of the day, exposed itself to the danger of being accused by the next ruling party of having treated with factionists. To all these inconveniencies the British government submitted at the end of the year 1792, when Great Britain was threatened with an attack, in order, if possible, to prevent it. But on the 20. of January 1793 it was clear, that its efforts were, and must be, fruitless.

far from deserving censure for *then* dismissing the negotiator, that we should rather commend their moderation, in having suffered him to stay so long [33]. If a British ambassador had conducted himself in Paris, as Mr. Chauvelin conducted himself in London, the French government would certainly not have awaited the issue of the negotiation, but would either have answered his very first note with an order to quit the territories of the republic, or, since the persons of foreign ambassadors are no more respected by the modern rulers of France, than by the Dey of Algiers [34], they

33. Yet it has been said: that the dismission of Mr. Chauvelin shut the door to all negotiation. Now when a negotiation has been kept open, till the questions in dispute have been brought to a decision, as has been fully proved in the thirteenth chapter, *that* party alone can be justly said to have shut the door to the negotiation, which rendered the issue of it fruitless. But we have already seen, that it was the French executive council, which rendered the negotiation fruitless by refusing to accept the conditions proposed by the British government. Besides, if an order sent to Mr. Chauvelin to return to France be called shutting the door to the negotiation, the charge will again fall on the executive council, because they ordered Mr. Chauvelin to return, even *before* the British government did.

34. Witness the imprisonment of the Portugueze ambassador in Paris.

they would have arreſted him, as an exciter of ſedition, and have ſearched his papers. In fact any government whatſoever, which was not anxious to leave nothing unattempted, that might avert hoſtilities, would have refuſed Mr. Chauvelin, who was much more an apoſtle of rebellion, than a miniſter of peace, to remain after he had threatened an appeal to the people in his Note of the 27. of December. How much more then was it allowable, to diſmiſs him on the 24. of January, when all means of reconciliation had been exhauſted, and the fixed determination of his employers, to attack Great Britain at all events, had been fully proved? Nor could it be ſaid, that the Britiſh government diſmiſſed a French *ambaſſador*: for Mr. Chauvelin *at that time* had no claim whatſoever to the title. He had been accredited by Louis XVI, and as long as the king of France was ſtill alive, Mr. Chauvelin by virtue of the credentials, which the Britiſh government had received, might at leaſt pretend, that he was the accredited miniſter of France. But after the death of the king of France, who was executed on the 21. of January, thoſe credentials had ceaſed to be valid, and Mr. Chauvelin therefore could be conſidered only as a part of the general maſs of foreigners reſident in England. The new letters of credence from the executive council, which he had offered on the 17. of January, had been refuſed for the reaſons

already assigned. His forfeited diplomatic character therefore was not restored: for before any individual acquires the privilege of an ambassador, his letters of credence must be first accepted by the government, to which he is designed to be accredited [35]. Consequently, by the death of Louis XVI. the sole hinderance to the dismission of Mr. Chauvelin, after the negotiation had been ended, was removed: and the cogent motives, which induced the British government at that time to send away every stranger, which endeavoured to excite insurrection, operated unrestrained.

Lastly, *under the existing circumstances*, after it was certain that Great Britain would be attacked at all events, the British government might surely be permitted to express its indignation at a cruel and wanton execution, which filled all Europe with horror. It was surely allowable to remove, even with tokens of displeasure, the agent of those, who had not only brought their own sovereign to the block, but openly threatened his Britannic majesty with a similar fate [36], and Great Britain itself with destruction. It was allowable, not indeed to engage in a war with France,

35. The modern rulers of France have, of all men, the least right to call this position in question.

36. Ch. XIV. Note 28.

merely becaufe the French had executed their king [37], but certainly to cenfure the cruelty of his judges, when thofe very judges were determined, to engage in a war with Britain. And it was not only allowable, but even neceffary, to render popular a war, which could no longer be avoided, to place the actions of the French rulers in the light, which they deferved, to contribute to the indignation, which was generally excited by their cruel conduct, and, by directing the fentiments of Britons to their proper channel, roufe them to a vigourous refiftance againft an implacable enemy, which had refolved "to fet fire to the four corners of Europe." — When to thefe reafons we add the urgent motives, which at that time induced the Britifh government to remove every foreigner, who acted like Mr. Chauvelin, we fhall no longer be furprifed at the following Note, which was fent to him by Lord Grenville on the 24. of January. "I am charged to notify "to you, Sir, that the character, with which you had "been invefted at this court, and the functions of "which have been fo long fufpended, being now entire-"ly terminated by the fatal death of his moft Chris-

37. Of this charge, which has been very falfely laid to the Britifh miniftry, the prefent work contains a complete confutation by proving, that the French rulers not only declared war, but provoked it.

"tian majesty, you have no longer any public character "here. The king can no longer, after such an event, "permit your residence here [38]. His majesty has

38. It is remarkable, that this passage was omitted in that copy of the French original, which appeared in the Moniteur 31. Jan. 1793, and runs thus. "Je suis chargé de vous notifier que le caractere dont vous avez été chargé auprès du Roi vient d'être terminé par la mort funeste de S. M. T. C. Sa majesté juge à propos que vous sortiez du royaume dans l'espace de huit jours. Je vous envoie un passeport pour vous et votre suite. Je prendrai toutes les précautions pour que vous entriez en France avec les égards dus à un ministre qui avait été accredité auprès du roi par sa majesté très-chretienne.„ The passage however, which the French rulers thought proper to omit, has, together with a similar one in his Majesty's message to the two houses of parliament, been used in Great Britain as an argument, that Mr. Chauvelin was dismissed merely in consequence of the execution of Louis XVI. That he was dismissed in consequence of that event is certain: but we must not therefore conclude, that he was dismissed *merely* in consequence of that event, since it has been shewn that independently of that event there existed very urgent motives for his dismission, and that it was the death of the king of France which removed the only obstacle to their operation. The execution of the king of France therefore may in *this* sense be said to have occasioned the removal of Mr. Chauvelin. But even if this argument be deemed inconclusive, and it be still asserted, that Mr. Chauvelin was ordered to leave England for no

"thought fit to order, that you should retire from this "kingdom within the term of eight days; and I here-"with transmit to you a copy of the order, which his "majesty in his privy council has given to this effect. "I send you a passport for yourself, and your suite: "and I shall not fail to take all the other necessary "steps in order, that you may return to France with "all the attentions, which are due to the character of "minister plenipotentiary from his most Christian ma-"jesty, which you have exercised at this court.„ — After all, should the arguments alleged in justification of the order, communicated to Mr. Chauvelin on the 24. of January, be thought unsatisfactory, and should any one be still of opinion, that the British ministry

other reason, than because the king of France had been put to death, we can deduce no other inference, than that the British government *unnecessarily* furnished its enemy with a pretext for declaring war, as on the other hand, if the validity of the above-assigned reasons for his dismission be admitted, the pretext was not unnecessarily afforded, to which the British government in other respects had no great necessity for attending, since they who are resolved on war, as it has been proved that the French rulers were long before the 24. of January, are seldom at a loss for pretences, and in the list of grievances, with which the declaration of war was accompanied, the dismission of Mr. Chauvelin really made only *one* among *eighteen*.

would have acted more prudently, if they had waited till hostilities had been formally declared, which from the reasons assigned in the fourteenth chapter it was easy to foresee would soon take place, yet the dismission of Mr. Chauvelin can in no case be numbered among the *causes* of the war, because it has been unanswerably proved, that the French rulers had determined on a war with England and Holland, *before* that event [39].

39. Yet a certain opposition writer, in defiance of all documents, has ventured to assert that, before the dismission of Mr. Chauvelin, "France was undoubtedly solicitous for peace,,, whence, in order to throw the whole blame of the war on the British ministry, he would have his readers conclude, that it was that event, which *first* excited the idea of a war with England in the minds of those *pacific* rulers of republican France. On this subject however I beg leave to refer his readers to the seventh, tenth, twelfth, and fourteenth chapters of the present work, which relate to a period *prior* to the dismission of Mr. Chauvelin. When the same writer says in another place, that Mr. Chauvelin was dismissed, because ministers were resolved to accept of no conditions of peace from France, he must have forgotten that it was the British government which *offered* conditions of peace, and that it was the *French* government, which *rejected* them. See the latter part of Ch. XIII. — It must be granted however, that the dismission of Mr. Chauvelin has found a very proper place in the pamphlet in question, because it is so far from

On the 25. of January, copies of all the Notes, which had been exchanged during the late negotiation between Lord Grenville and Mr. Chauvelin, were laid before the States General by Lord Auckland, the British ambassador at the Hague, as the issue of it affected Holland in an equal degree with Great Britain. It was necessary to inform the government of that country, which was the most exposed to an attack, that the French executive council had rejected the conditions of peace, which had been offered by the British government, that it still insisted as well on the opening of the Schelde, as on the occupying the Austrian Netherlands with a French army during its own pleasure, and that it had given, as its Ultimatum, the assurance that, if the naval preparations in the British ports were continued, which Great Britain had commenced in self-defence, and which, as the proposed conditions were rejected, could not possibly be stopped, *it would prepare for war* [40]. The copies of the papers relative to the negotiation were accompanied likewise with a Note, in which Lord Auckland arraigned the conduct of the French rulers. He complained, that,

being a view of the *causes* of the war, that it is literally a view of the *pretexts* for it.

40. See the latter part of the Note of the executive council of Jan. 7.

though they assumed the title of philosophers, they endeavoured to destroy the received notions of subordination, manners, and religion, which had hitherto founded the security, the happiness, and the consolation of the human race. He complained, that, though the British government as well as the States General, had observed the most strict neutrality, and had carefully avoided all interference in the internal affairs of France, the rulers of that country endeavoured to excite an insurrection both in England and in Holland, while they were taking every measure for an invasion with a French army. But he assured the States General that the British government was determined to support its allies, to fulfil the conditions of the treaty of 1788, and to protect, to the utmost of its power, the United Provinces from the depredations of France. He reminded them of a small squadron, which had lately sailed from the Downs to protect the coast of Zealand [41], and then, declaring the readiness of

41. This small squadron consisted of a ship of 50 guns, two frigates of 36 guns, and four vessels of inferior force, and left the Downs at the beginning of January, under the orders of Commodore Murray. That it was designed merely to act on the defensive, was admitted in the Journal de Paris 12. Jan. 1793, where, after mention had been made of some Dutch ships, which had been ordered to join it, was added, "Cette petite armée navale combinée a le double

the Britiſh cabinet to co-operate with the States General in the defence of the United Provinces, he concluded in the following words. "Your high mightineſ-

but, de garder la Zélande, et de defendre l'ouverture de l'Eſcaut. That this ſmall combined ſquadron was not deſigned to act on the offenſive, appears further from the order ſent by the States General to the Dutch Commodore, which in the words of the Moniteur 30. Jan. 1793 run thus. "Que dans le cas où des navires français armés ſe preſenteront pour *deſcendre* la riviere il les *laiſſe paſſer;* mais en proteſtant, que ſi quelque navire prétend la *monter,* il tâche d'abord de l'en diſſuader avec douceur, que cette voie ſe trouvant infructueuſe, il montre de la fermeté; qu'enfin, au beſoin, *il repouſſe la force par la force.*" It was this ſmall ſquadron, to which Dumouriez alluded in his letter to Miranda of the 10. of January, in which, ſpeaking of the French gun veſſels, which had already ſailed up the Schelde, and then lay before Antwerp, he gave Miranda the following information. "Le miniſtre de la marine donne ordre de préparer des fourneaux et des grils ſur chacune des trois chaloupes canonieres, pour pouvoir tirer à boulets rouges. Ces trois batimens tirent peu d'eau, *et chaſſeront facilement les frégattes, par la ſuperiorité de leur calibre de vingt-quatre, et par leurs boulets rouges.*" Correſpondence du Général Miranda p. 5. Miranda however replied on the 15. of January, (Ib. p. 8.) that the French gun veſſels would not be able to beat off the combined ſquadron; and the intended attack on Zealand was deferred. The aſſiſtance therefore ſent to the Dutch arrived at a very ſeaſonable juncture.

"ſes have acknowledged theſe diſpoſitions of his ma-"jeſty in what he has done already. You will not "find them abated in the preparations, that are now "making. In conſequence of which his majeſty is "perſuaded that he will continue to experience on the "part of your high mightineſſes a perfect conformity "of principles and conduct. That conformity can "alone give to the united efforts of the two countries "the neceſſary energy for their common defence, "which will alſo oppoſe a barrier to the evils, with "which Europe is threatened, and ſecure from every "attempt the ſafety, tranquillity, and independence of "a ſtate, the happineſs of which is inſured by your "high mightineſſes, through the wiſdom, and energy "of its government [42].

42. Certain oppoſition writers, who have extolled the *temperateneſs* of the language uſed by the French rulers toward the Britiſh government, have not only ſeverely cenſured ſome expreſſions in this Note of Lord Auckland, but have applied them to palliate at leaſt, if not to juſtify, the declaration of hoſtilities againſt Great Britain. More wretched ſophiſtry however cannot well be deviſed: for when the national convention declared war on the 1. of February, it had no knowledge of this Note. Conſequently, it cannot be reckoned even among the *pretexts* for war, much leſs among the cauſes of it. That the Note was unknown to the national convention, when war was declared on the 1. of February is evident from the circumſtance, that no mention

Three days, after the Britiſh ambaſſador at the Hague had delivered to the States General the papers

whatſoever was made of it, either in the debates, or in the liſt of grievances. See the Moniteur 2. and 3. Febr. 1793. Nor did it appear in the Moniteur, at that time the official paper of the French government, before the *ſixth* of February. On the other hand if a copy of it had really reached Paris before the 1. of February, the omiſſion of it in the liſt of grievances will prove that the French rulers themſelves had no objections to make it. In either caſe therefore it cannot be numbered among the pretexts for war. — That it contains ſome warm expreſſions, which it is prudent to avoid in all diplomatic communications, cannot be denied: but then it muſt not be forgotten, that it was delivered to the States General after the negotiation with France was at an end, after war was fully decided, though not openly declared, after the Britiſh government had been loaded with a ſeries of injuries and inſults, after the moſt opprobrious language had been uſed by the French rulers even while the negotiation was pending, and laſtly, that it was drawn up under the impreſſion of the intelligence juſt arrived at the Hague of the condemnation of Louis XVI. To enable the reader however to judge, whether it contains any thing, which bears the moſt diſtant reſemblance to the menacing language, which had been already repeatedly uſed by the French rulers, I will ſubjoin the *whole* Note in the French original, as printed in the Moniteur 6. Feb. 1793.

Hauts et puiſſans Seigneurs.

Le ſouſſigné ambaſſadeur extraordinaire et plénipotentiaire de S. M. Britannique, s'empreſſe en conſéquence des

relative to the late negotiation, the following message was sent from his Majesty to the House of Commons.

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ordres exprès du roi, de mettre sous les yeux de vos hautes puissances des copies de toutes les pieces qui ont été échangées depuis le 27. décembre dernier jusqu'au 20. de ce mois, entre Lord Grenville, secrétaire d'Etat de S. M. et M. Chauvelin. Le roi, hauts et puissans seigneurs, est dans la ferme persuasion que les sentimens et les principes, exprimés au nom de la Grande-Bretagne, sont parfaitement conformes à ceux qui animent votre Republique, et que vos hautes puissances sont disposées à concourir pleinement aux mesures que la crise actuelle exige, et qui sont une suite nécessaire de ces sentimens et de ces principes. Les circonstances qui nous ont menés à cette crise, sont trop récentes, et la conduite du roi est trop connue, pour que le soussigné soit dans le cas d'entrer dans de longs détails. Il n'y a pas encore quatre ans, que quelques malheureux, se qualifiant du nom de philosophes, ont eu la présomption de se croire capables d'établir un nouveau systême de societé civile. Afin de réaliser ce rêve de la vanité, il leur a fallu bouleverser et détruire toutes notions reçues de subordination, des moeurs, et de religion, qui ont fait jusqu'ici la sureté, le bonheur et la consolation du genre humain. Leurs projets de destruction n'ont que trop réussi; mais les effets du nouveau systême qu'ils ont voulu introduire, n'ont servi qu'a démontrer l'ineptie et la scélératesse de ses auteurs. Les événemens qui se sont si rapidement succédés depuis lors, surpassent en atrocité tout ce qui a jamais souillé la page de l'histoire. Les propriétés,

"His majeſty has given directions for laying be-
"fore the houſe of commons, copies of ſeveral papers

la liberté, la vie même, ont été les jouets de la rage effrénée des paſſions de l'eſprit de rapine, de la haine, de l'ambition la plus cruelle et la plus dénaturée. Les annales du genre humain ne préſentent pas d'époque, où dans un auſſi court eſpace de tems on ait commis tant de crimes, cauſé tant de malheurs, fait verſer tant de larmes: enfin, dans ce moment même, ces horreurs paraiſſent être parvenues à leur comble. Pendant tout ce tems, le roi environné de ſon peuple, qui jouiſſait par la protection divine d'une proſpérité ſans exemple, n'a pu voir les malheurs d'autrui qu'avec un preſſentiment profond de pitié, et d'indignation; mais, fidelle à ſes principes, S. M. ne s'eſt jamais permis de s'immiſcer dans les affaires intérieures d'une nation étrangere. Elle ne s'eſt jamais écartée du ſyſtême de neutralité qu'elle avait adopté. Cette conduite que le roi a vu avec plaiſir obſervée également par vos hautes puiſſances, dont toute l'Europe a reconnu la bonne foi, et qui aurait dû être reſpectée à tant d'autres titres, n'a pas réuſſi à mettre ſa majeſté, ſes peuples et cette République, à l'abri des trames les plus dangereuſes et les plus criminelles. Depuis quelques mois, des projets d'ambition et d'agrandiſſement, alarmans pour la tranquillité et la ſureté de l'Europe entiere, ont été publiquement avoués. On s'eſt efforcé de répandre dans l'intérieur de l'Angleterre, et de ce pays, des maximes ſubverſives de tout ordre ſocial, et l'on n'a pas même eu honte de donner à ces déteſtables tentatives le nom de pouvoir révolutionaire. Des traités anciens et ſolennels, garantis par le roi, ont été enfreints; et les droits et les territoires de la République ont été violés.

"which have been received from Mr. Chauvelin, late "minister plenipotentiary from the most Christian king,

Sa majesté a donc cru dans sa sagesse devoir faire des préparatifs proportionnés à la nature des circonstances. Le roi a consulté son parlement, et les mesures que sa majesté avait trouvé bon de prendre, ont été accueillies par l'assentiment vif et unanime d'un peuple qui abhorre l'anarchie et l'irréligion, qui aime son roi et qui veut sa constitution. Tels sont, hauts et puissans seigneurs, les motifs d'une conduite, dont la sagesse et l'équité ont assez prouvé jusqu'ici au roi votre concert et votre coopération. Sa majesté, dans tout ce qu'elle a fait a constamment veillé au maintien des droits et de la sûreté des Provinces Unies. La déclaration que le soussigné a eu l'honneur de remettre à vos hautes puissances, le 13. novembre dernier, et l'arrivée d'une petite escadre destinée à protéger les parages de la République, pendant que ses propres forces se rassemblaient, en fournissent la preuve. Vos hautes puissances ont reconnu ces dispositions du roi dans tout ce que sa majesté a déja fait. Elles ne les retrouveront pas moins dans les mesures qui se préparent. En conséquence, sa majesté se persuade qu'elle continuera à éprouver de la part de vos hautes puissances une parfaite conformité de principes et de conduite. Cette conformite peut seule donner aux efforts réunis des deux pays, l'énergie nécessaire pour leur commune défense, opposer une barriere aux maux dont l'Europe est menacée, et mettre à l'abri de toute atteinte, la sûreté, la tranquillité et l'indépendance d'un Etat dont vos hautes puissances assurent le bonheur par la sagesse et la fermeté de leur gouvernement.

Fait à La Haye, le 25. janvier 1793. Auckland.

"by his majeſty's ſecretary of ſtate for foreign affairs, "and of the anſwers returned thereto; and likewiſe "the copy of an order made by his majeſty in council, "and transmitted by his majeſty's commands to the "ſaid Mr. Chauvelin, in conſequence of the accounts "of the atrocious act recently perpetrated in Paris. "In the preſent ſituation of affairs, his majeſty thinks "it indiſpenſably neceſſary to make a further augmen-"tation of his forces by ſea and land; and relies on "the known affection and zeal of the houſe of com-"mons to enable his majeſty to take the moſt effectual "meaſures, in the preſent important conjuncture, for "maintaining the ſecurity and rights of his own domi-"nions; for ſupporting his allies; and for oppoſing "views of aggrandizement and ambition on the part "of France, which would be at all times dangerous to "the general intereſts of Europe, but are peculiarly "ſo, when connected with the propagation of prin-"ciples, which lead to the violation of the moſt ſacred "duties, and are utterly ſubverſive of the peace and "order of all civil ſociety„ [43].

While the Britiſh government was thus engaged in preparing new meaſures of defence, and daily ex-pected to hear of a declaration of war againſt Great

43. A ſimilar meſſage was ſent at the ſame time to the houſe of Lords.

Britain and Holland, General Dumouriez formed, or appeared to form, the resolution of attempting a new negotiation. It has been already related in the twelfth chapter, that the order of the executive council for the immediate invasion of the United Provinces was communcicated by General Dumouriez on the 10. of January to General Miranda: and it is evident from his whole letter, that the project of invasion, if not proposed by him, had at least his complete approbation [44]. We have seen likewise, that the only reason, why

44. See Ch. XII. Notes 51. 52. where two long extracts are quoted from his letter, which clearly prove his approbation of the intended attack on the United Provinces, though every one who reads the first chapter of his Memoirs, without being acquainted with his private correspondence, would suppose the contrary. In his letter to Miranda he even called the plan *his own*, and said immediately after the passage quoted in Ch. XII. Note 52.: "Je vous developperai *mon plan* de jour en jour. In the same letter he gave likewise to Miranda the following advice, in order to defray the expences of the expedition. "Faites vous donner une liste des capitalistes d'Anvers; appellez-les nominativement à l'hôtel de ville, faites-les y garder, et ne les relâchez pas, qu'ils n'aient pris une résolution et rempli l'emprunt, ou de bon gré ou forcément. Si c'est de bon gré, *touchez tout de suite deux millions de florins, pour les frais de l'expedition.* Si c'est forcément, imposez-les; l'un à cinquante mille florins,

why the project was not executed in the middle of January, was the want of magazines, which prevented Miranda from putting his troops in motion at the instant; and that the executive council, on Miranda's representations entered into a resolution on the 18. of January, by which it was not abandoned, but only deferred [45]. That *part* of it indeed, which related to Zealand, a province consisting entirely of islands, had in consequence of the seasonable arrival of a fleet of English and Dutch frigates, from which Miranda apprehended effectual resistance [46], been so far altered, that it had been determined, either to make a false attack only on that quarter, or to leave the inva-

l'autre plus, l'autre moins, selon leurs facultés; et *faites-les payer sous huitaine*, en les faisant garder à vue chez eux." An additional proof, that Dumouriez wholly approved of the invasion of Holland, is contained in his letter to Miranda of the 19. of January, which will be quoted presently.

45. See Ch. XII. Note 53.

46. In his letter to Dumouriez of the 15. of January, he said: "Si vous laissiez dehors de votre plan l'entrepise de la Zélande, il serait beaucoup plus praticable, à ce qu'il me paraît, et nous n'aurions pas à nous compromettre avec les forces maritimes de l'Angleterre et de la Hollande, qui ne laisseraient pas de nous arrêter au commencement même de notre entreprise, n'ayant pas de notre part des forces maritimes à leur opposer." Correspondence du Général Miranda, p. 8.

ſion of Zealand to the perſons, who called themſelves Dutch patriots. But this partial arrangement had not affected the general plan: for the reſolution to invade the United Provinces remained unaltered. On the 19. of January Dumouriez, who was then in Paris, had written to Miranda, "I am of opinion that, if the "war with England and Holland is determined [47], "only a falſe attack muſt be made on Zealand, that "we muſt make ourſelves maſters of Maeſtricht, Venlo, "Geldres, and Emmerick, take the route of Nimeguen "and the heights of Amersfort, turn Utrecht, gain "the ſluice of Muyden, in which Marſhal Luxembourg "failed in 1672, and thus we ſhall arrive without diffi-"culty at Amſterdam. In this campaign, which ought "to be very rapid, *and on which I have long medita-"ted* [48], we muſt conſider the patriots only as a trifling "acceſſion, and we muſt truſt to our own forces alone, "and to the means of *conqueſt* [49]. Zealand then fal-"ling of itſelf, with the isle of Walcheren, however "ſtrongly it may be fortified, becomes a poor retreat

47. Dumouriez well knew at that time, that it *was* determined, though he did not *ſay* ſo to Miranda. See the former part of Ch. XIV.

48. This paſſage deſerves particular notice.

49. Yet in the manifeſto, with which the invaſion of Holland was ſoon afterwards accompanied, it was aſſerted that the French came merely as *friends and deliverers*.

"for the houſe of Orange and the adminiſtration of the "country, becauſe we ſhall join the Dutch marine to "our own artillery, to penetrate thither, when nothing "more remains„ [50]. — On the 23. of January Dumouriez again wrote to Miranda, and likewiſe from Paris, "I have informed you, my dear Miranda, that "I have abandoned, as well as yourſelf, the project "of Zealand: but this is an additional reaſon *for "puſhing with the utmoſt vigour that of the attack on "Maeſtricht, Venlo, and Nimeguen.* I ſhall give howe-

50. "Je crois que ſi la guerre eſt decidée entre nous et la Hollande et l'Angleterre, il ne faut faire qu'une fauſſe attaque ſur la Zélande, que nous devons occuper Maëſtricht, Venlo, Gueldres, Emmerick, nous rabbattre ſur Nimègue et par les hauteurs d'Amersfort, tourner Utrecht, gagner l'ecluſe de Muyden que le maréchal Luxembourg a manqué en 1672, alors nous arrivons ſans difficulté à Amſterdam. Dans cette campagne, qui doit être très prompte, et *que j'ai long-tems méditée,* il ne faut compter les patriotes que comme un leger acceſſoire, et ne ſe fier qu'à ſes propres forces et aux moyens de conquêtes. La Zélande alors tombée d'elle même et l'iſle Walcheren, fût-elle rendue inexpugnable, devient une pauvre retraite pour la maiſon d'Orange et pour les adminiſtrations du pays, parceque nous joindrons tous les moyens de la marine Hollandaiſe à tous nos moyens d'artillerie, pour y pénetrer, lorsque nous n'aurons plus que cela à faire." Correſpondance du Général Miranda, p. 11.

"ver to Caock and Bendels [51] the small succour which "they require, in the opinion they entertain of succeed-"ing with three or four thousand men, which is all "that they have demanded of the executive council. "In a few days I myself shall examine the whole mat-"ter on the spot [52].

Such were the circumstances, under which the resolution, in other respects apparently meritorious, of commencing a new negotiation with Great Britain and Holland, was formed by General Dumouriez [53]; in

51. Is not this an erratum for Daendels?

52. "Je vous ai mandé, mon cher Miranda, que j'abandonnais, comme vous, le projet de la Zélande; mais c'est une raison de plus *pour pousser très-vigoureusement celui de l'attaque de Maestricht, Venlo et Nimégue.* Je donnerai cependant peut-être à Caock et Bendels le petit secours qu'ils réclament, dans l'opinion où ils sont de réussir avec trois ou quatre mille hommes, qui est tout ce qu'ils ont demandé au conseil exécutif. J'examinerai cela moi-même sur les lieux sous peu de jours." Ib. p. 14.

53. It was in his letter of the 23. of January, in which he so strongly recommended to Miranda, vigourously to push the sieges of the Dutch fortified towns, Maestricht, Venlo, and Nimeguen, that he gave Miranda the first intelligence of the intended negotiation, and at the same time mentioned, that he himself was the person, who was to conduct it. The circumstance, that in the same letter (Ib. p. 16.) he desired Miranda to keep the matter a profound secret, looked likewise mysterious.

which, if the national convention had permitted the execution of it, we ſhould undoubtedly have heard as many gaſconades about *pacific diſpoſitions and purity of intentions,* as in the late negotiation with Mr. Chauvelin. The whole project was evidently the work of Dumouriez alone: for the executive council took ſo little part in it, that of the five miniſters, Le Brun, Garat, Claviere, Pache, and Monge, of which it was then compoſed [54], the three laſt oppoſed it with all their force [55]; and Le Brun, though he was too fine a politician to *declare* himſelf againſt it, in which caſe, as he was miniſter for foreign affairs, it could not have been ſet on foot, took care however, as we ſhall preſently ſee, that it ſhould produce no effect. And as to Garat, who was the man that read the ſentence of death to Louis XVI, and has ſince behaved with uncommon inſolence to the ſiſter of the late queen of France, a *ſincere* deſire, to promote a work of moderation

54. Roland, the miniſter of the interior, was at that time on the point of retiring, and no longer took part in public affairs, at leaſt not in what related to foreign countries. See that chapter of the Memoires of Dumouriez, which is entitled *Retraite de Roland.*

55. Dumouriez ſpeaking of the propoſal of it, which he made to the executive council (Memoires, Tom. I. p. 130) ſays: "Claviere, Pache, et Monge s'oppoſérent de toute leur force à cette propoſition.

and peace, would have been wholly inconsistent with his character. Nor does Dumouriez himself appear to have had any other object in view, than to amuse a little longer the English and Dutch governments [56], as toward the end of January some obstacles presented themselves to the intended invasion of Holland [57].

To set however the negotiation, or rather pretended negotiation, on foot, two persons, De Maulde and Maret [58], were despatched from Paris, the one to the Hague, the other to London. "It was determined "(says Dumouriez [59]) that De Maulde, under the pre-"tence of settling his personal affairs should repair to "the Hague, that Noel should be recalled and placed "elsewhere, and that the General (Dumouriez) should "furnish De Maulde with a letter to Lord Auckland, "signifying, that he should arrive at Antwerp on the "1. of February to inspect the winter quarters of his "army, and that, as he had learnt from his friend De "Maulde, that his Lordship had spoken of him with

56. This will be rendered at least highly probable in a following note.

57. This will presently appear from his own description.

58. De Maulde had been French ambassador at the Hague, whence he was lately returned. With Mr. Maret the reader is already acquainted.

59. Memoires, Tom. I. p. 130.

"respect and confidence, it would be very agreable to "him, if an opportunity presented itself of conferring "with Lord Auckland on the frontiers, because the "conference might be beneficial to humankind in ge- "neral, and to the two nations in particular. It was "determined likewise that, if Lord Auckland, as was "expected, gave his consent, the General should hold "a conference, and that he might thence, in case it "were necessary, even go over to England. — "As "soon as De Maulde (says Dumouriez further [60]) ar- "rived at the Hague at the latter end of January, he "immediately waited on Lord Auckland, and delivered "to him the letter of General Dumouriez. *This minister "expressed great pleasure at the proposal*, and said to "De Maulde that, as the interests of England and Hol- "land were inseparable, he would communicate the "proposal to the grand pensionary, van Spiegel, and "deliberate with him on the subject. The latter like- "wise consented to take part in the conference with "Lord Auckland and General Dumouriez. His Lordship "sent three successive packet boats to England; and "De Maulde sent his secretary to Antwerp, where the "General, after having visited the coast from Dunkirk to "that place, arrived on the 2. of February. — Having "every where found the greatest disorder on his whole

60. Ib. p. 138.

"journey from Paris (as Dumouriez further relates [61]) "and perceiving that his embarrafsments were daily in- "creafing, the General greatly rejoiced at the progrefs, "which De Maulde had made in the negotiation. He "fent immediately a courier to Le Brun with the origi- "nal anfwer of Lord Auckland, who had informed "him, that the grand penfionary of Holland and him- "felf were agreed to come to the borders, in order to "hold the conference with the general; that he had "defpatched feveral packet boats to England, *to obtain* "*the confent of his court, and inftructions relative the* "*conference* [62]; that the anfwer would foon arrive,

61. Ib. 140.

62. Pour en obtenir la permiffion et des inftructions relatives à cette conference. — The circumftance that Lord Auckland, before he could hold the conference, was obliged to fend to England, not only for inftructions, but even for *permiffion* to hold it, fufficiently proves, that the Britifh minifters were not the movers of the new negotiation. It is true that, according to the account of Dumouriez (Memoires T. I. p. 128.), before De Maulde had given up his former embaffy at the Hague, he had been affured by Lord Auckland, that the Britifh cabinet would have no objection to negotiate with General Dumouriez; and it appears likewife (Ib. p. 128.) that Mr. Pitt himfelf had expreffed himfelf to the fame purpofe. On what particular occafions thefe declarations were made, or what was the converfation which gave rife to them, Dumouriez has not related: but in regard

"and that it was by no means his design to amuse the "general, or to delay his plans and preparations for "the next campaign.

to the time, they cannot have been made later than the end of December. For De Maulde, on his return from his former embassy at the Hague arrived at Paris within a few days after Dumouriez, who arrived there on the 1. of January (Ib. p. 89. 128): and the French agent, Benoit, who had brought the account, that Mr. Pitt would have no objection to negotiate with General Dumouriez, arrived there at the same time (Ib. p. 128). This precise determination is not superfluous, because after the 13. of January, the day on which the Ultimatum of the executive council was delivered, all hopes of preserving peace had vanished. *After that time* therefore it could not occur to the British ministry to *propose* another negotiation, though at the end of the month, when De Maulde himself proposed it, they very prudently consented, not only because a refusal would have exposed them to the reproach of having neglected an opportunity to prevent a rupture, but because, however well founded the expectations of a war may be, yet, till it has been actually declared, there always remains at least a *possibility* of the contrary. Mr. Pitt however declared in the house of commons on the 1. of February (see the debates of that day) that he considered it as in the highest degree improbable, that a new negotiation would produce any effect: and experience proved how rightly he judged, for it was on that very day, that the national convention, refusing to await the issue of the negotiation, declared war on Great Britain and Holland.

"The despatch of De Maulde, with which that "of Lord Auckland was accompanied, explained every

Since then the British government acted a mere *passive* part in this business, all suspicion of a design to amuse the French government by the negotiation, must fall of itself to the ground; and it is obvious that, when preparations are made for a negotiation, it is the party only, which makes those preparations, and not the party, which simply gives its assent, that can be exposed to such a suspicion. It is very extraordinary therefore that Dumouriez could venture to write (Memoires T. I. p. 137.) "on pourrait croire que le ministre Pitt n'aurait voulu qu'amuser le général Dumouriez: and his pretended proof is still more extraordinary, namely "le traité de la cour de St. James avec celle de Turin, *qui est de la même époque*, confirme cette opinion. This assertion, which other writers, British as well as French, have faithfully copied without inquiring into its truth, contains so gross an error, as is hardly to be expected from any man, who lays claim to the character of an historian. For so far was the treaty with the court of Turin from being *of the same epoch*, that not even the *preliminaries* were signed till *twelve weeks afterward*. They are dated 25. April 1793, and, as appears from Art. 5., the ratification was to take place within two months after *that* time. Further the preliminaries were signed, not at Turin, but in London, which obviates the objection, which might otherwise be made, that the order given by the British cabinet for signing them preceded, by some time, the signature itself. Lastly that hostilities had been declared against Great Britain, before the preliminary articles were even drawn up, appears from

"thing, which had passed between them. Great in-
"dignation had been expressed at the atrocious act late

the first article, which begins thus. "Leurs Majestés le Roi de la Grande Bretagne et le Roi de Sardaigne, *se trouvant engagés dans une guerre contre la France* en consequence des actes les plus injurieux de violence et d'aggression. See Martens Recueil des principaux traités. T. V. p. 144—149.

Having shewn that the charge of duplicity, which Dumouriez has very artfully laid to the British ministers, is wholly unfounded, we will next examine, whether he himself was not guilty of that very fault, which he has unjustly laid to his opponents. His letter to Miranda of the 23. of January, in which he recommended to him, vigourously to push the sieges of several *Dutch* fortified towns, is certainly not to be reconciled with the supposition, that the negotiation, which he was planning *at that very time* (see above Note 53), was seriously intended by him, as the means of *preventing* a war with England and Holland. What other object then could he have had in view but to amuse a little longer the English and Dutch governments, that they might be the less prepared for the intended attack? And this is further confirmed by the letter, which he wrote to Miranda from Antwerp on the fifth of February. On this day, strange as it may appear, Dumouriez had no knowledge of the declaration of war: for he himself relates (Memoires Tom. I. p. 142. 143) that Le Brun sent him no information of it, that he first learnt it from the public newspapers, and that not before the *seventh* of February. On the seventh, Miranda likewise had received no official intelligence of it, as appears

"ly perpetrated in Paris: but as De Maulde assured "both ministers (the English and the Dutch) that Ge-

from his letter of that day to the war minister, Pache. See Correspondance du Général Miranda, p. 20. Consequently, as Dumouriez on the second of February had received intelligence from Lord Auckland, that he had sent to London for instructions, the interval between the *second* and the *seventh* of February was to Dumouriez a state of uncertainty, in which the dictates of strict integrity certainly enjoined him, to abstain from every at least unconditional order for the invasion of Holland. Yet on the *fifth* of February he wrote from Antwerp to Miranda, and gave him the most positive and unconditional order to take Venlo immediately by surprise, and added, "je ferai l'investissement de Maestricht avec le reste de la grosse artillerie, pour brusquer cette place, comme vous brusquerez Venlo, où vous ne devez pas trouver de resistance, n'y ayant point de garnison." Correspondance du Général Miranda, p. 17. 18. — These circumstances I mention not so much with the view of accusing General Dumouriez, who well knew the resolution of his government, to attack England and Holland at all events, and therefore thought it necessary to act accordingly, as of shewing how very ill it becomes him, to transfer the charge of duplicity to those who acted with the utmost integrity. With equal injustice has he accused likewise the British government of irritating that of France by dismissing Mr. Chauvelin even after the new negotiation was begun: for the very first proposal of it was made by De Maulde at the Hague, *after* the order had been sent to Mr. Chauvelin in London. Conse-

"neral Dumouriez himſelf was penetrated with the "ſame ſentiments, and felt equal indignation, that "dreadful cataſtrophe preſented no obſtacles to the ne-"gotiation. It was decided therefore without diffi-"culty that, as ſoon as Lord Auckland received the "answer from his court, the conference ſhould be hol-"den at Moerdyk on board a yacht of the Prince of "Orange, which was ordered to be fitted up for the "reception of the general.

During the time that De Maulde was on his journey to the Hague, Mr. Maret was deſpatched to London, to propoſe the intended negotiation to the Britiſh miniſtry. The object of Mr. Maret's miſſion, as Dumouriez himſelf, who was the mover of the whole buſineſs, relates, was merely to inquire, whether Mr. Pitt was really deſirous of treating with General Dumouriez [63], and, in caſe he were, to procure for Dumouriez a paſsport, to come over to England [64]. The

quently the inference, which Dumouriez thence deduces, "on peut donc leur reprocher autant qu'aux Français," falls of itſelf to the ground.

63. "Il fut decidé que Maret, qui avait déja fait pluſieurs voyages en Angleterre, y ferait renvoyé, *pour ſavoir de Mr. Pitt, ſi réellement il ſouhaitait traiter perſonnellement avec le général Dumouriez.*" Memoires de Dumouriez, T. I. p. 131.

64. In his letter to Miranda of the 23. of January he ſaid: "On envoie demain un agent ſecret fort connu de

twenty fourth of January was the day, which had been appointed for Mr. Maret's departure from Paris [65]: but Le Brun, under the pretence of giving previous information to Mr. Pitt by means of a person, who had already acted as mediator between him and Mr.

M. Pitt et de M. Fox, pour demander aux deux partis, c'eſt à dire à la nation toute entiere, un ſauf-conduit pour moi, et l'aſſurance d'être bien venu, quelque ſuccès qu'ait la miſſion." Correſpondance de Miranda, p. 15. — Of what uſe a *ſauf-conduit* from the oppoſition party could be to a French ambaſſador, it is not eaſy to determine: but thus much is clear from the paſſage, that the French rulers never loſe ſight of their favourite maxim, and that they muſt always have *ſomething* to do with thoſe, who act in oppoſition to government. In fact, the whole conduct of the negotiation is involved in myſtery. If Dumouriez really intended to go over to England, and to negotiate with the cabinet miniſters in perſon, what neceſſity was there for a conference with the Britiſh ambaſſador at the Hague? And on the other hand, if he intended to negotiate on the frontiers of Holland with the Britiſh ambaſſador at the Hague, what neceſſity was there for ſending a perſon to pave the way for his reception in London? To negotiate in both places was uſeleſs. How then is the enigma, that a perſon was ſent to London, as well as to the Hague, to be ſolved? Perhaps by the ſuppoſition, that it was deemed expedient to amuſe *both* governments at the *ſame* time.

65. This appears from the paſſage quoted in the preceding note.

Maret [66], but in reality, as Dumouriez himſelf believes, with the view of counteracting the negotiation [67], protracted Mr. Maret's departure, and, in con-

66. Memoires de Dumouriez. T. I. p. 133. The perſon here meant is probably Mr. Miles.

67. Ib. But the *motive* which Dumouriez aſſigns for Le Brun's conduct is certainly falſe: for he ſays, "Dans le fait, le général a eu lieu de preſumer, que Le Brun, piqué de ce que la cour de St. James ne voulait pas traiter avec lui comme miniſtre des affaires étrangères de la république, ni avec la convention, n'était pas fâché de faire manquer cette negotiation ſans y paraitre." That Le Brun was reſolved to counteract the negotiation, may be readily admitted; but this reſolution muſt be aſcribed to the motives alleged in the fourteenth chapter of the preſent work, and certainly not to any ſuppoſed refuſal on the part of the Britiſh government to treat with Le Brun. On the contrary, it was Le Brun, from whom Mr. Maret, at Mr. Pitt's own requeſt, had deſired inſtructions to negotiate, and which Le Brun had refuſed: it was Le Brun, who communicated the inſtructions to Mr. Chauvelin: it was Le Brun, who had ſigned with his own hand the note of the executive council on the 7. of January. Beſides, Dumouriez himſelf, had the propoſed negotiation been carried into effect, muſt likewiſe have been firſt empowered by Le Brun, as the miniſter for foreign affairs: for, though the character of General might enable him to enter into a *military* convention with another general, yet he could not conclude a *political* treaty with an ambaſſador, till he had received full powers from his own government.

sequence, Mr. Maret did not leave Paris till the *twenty sixth* of January [68]. As soon as he had landed at Dover [69], he formed the resolution of writing to Le Brun,

The consent of the British cabinet therefore, to negotiate with Dumouriez, was again a consent to negotiate with those, in whose name, and in whose name alone, he did or could act. — Hence also another objection is removed, which, as well as the former, has been made to the British cabinet by a writer of our own country, namely, that it was absurd to think of treating with a general: as if a treaty with a general, when he assumes the character of *ambassador*, were not as much a treaty with his government, as when that character is assumed by a person in the civil line.

68. That Mr. Maret did not leave Paris till the *twenty sixth* of January appears from a comparison of the following passages in the Memoirs of Dumouriez. "Le depart de Maret fut retardé assez mal-a-propos, et n'eut lieu que *le jour meme du départ du* général. — *Le général Dumouriez partit le 26. Janvier.* Tom. I. p. 133. 134. He says the same also, p. 142. Again he says of himself p. 39. arrivé dans la capitale le *premier* Janvier: and p. 94. le général Dumouriez traita les affaires pendant les *vingt-six* jours qu'il a passés à Paris. This precise determination of the day, when Mr. Maret left Paris, is of great importance, as will appear in the sequel.

69. All that is here said of Mr. Maret, after his arrival in England, is grounded on the authentic relation of Mr. Miles, who was an intimate friend of Mr. Maret, who saw him every day during his stay in London, and at whose

Brun, to demand fresh instructions, probably (as he was now in England, and recollected his former favourable reception with Mr. Pitt) with the view of acting for himself: for we have seen that, when he left Paris, he had no other commission, than to pave the way for Dumouriez [70]. But whatever was his motive, whether he really intended to act for himself, or whether the dismission of Mr. Chauvelin, whom he met on the road, suggested to him the necessity of an alteration in his instructions relative to Dumouriez, it is certain that he *did* write, and in very pressing terms, for fresh instructions, and moreover that he declared in his letter to Le Brun, "*that he should not desire an interview with the English minister, until fresh in-*

house Mr. Maret appears to have lodged, as Mr. Miles in a letter, which he had lately written to him, had said, venez donc sans crainte, *descendez chez moi, et considerez ma maison comme la vôtre.* Authentic Correspondence, Appendix, p. 109. Mr. Miles's relation is given in the just-mentioned work p. 101—104. and contains partly facts, to which he himself was eye-witness, and partly facts, for which, as he expressly attests, he had Mr. Maret's own authority. Consequently all random reports, which agree not with Mr. Miles's relation, must be declared fabulous.

70. See Notes 62. 63. Mr. Miles likewise represents Mr. Maret's mission as only "*preparatory to the projected embassy of Dumouriez.*" Authentic Correspondence p. 102.

structions arrived" [71]. As soon as he had written to Le Brun, he went immediately from Dover to London: but having determined to demand no interview or to discuss any matters of state, till his fresh instructions should arrive, he did not make any overture to the British ministry, even in regard to the embassy of Dumouriez. It is true, that he sent a short note to Lord Grenville: but this note contained nothing more than the notification, "*that he had come over to take charge of the diplomatic papers in the house of the French envoy*" [72]. In the mean time he waited for his fresh instructions from Le Brun, which he had so pressingly solicited: yet, though he staid in London *eight days* [73], and therefore at least till the *fourth* of February [74], he not only received not the expected

71. Ib.

72. Ib.

73. Mr. Miles expressly says, p. 102. "His stay in London was *eight days*.

74. It has been already shewn that Mr. Maret left Paris on the twenty sixth of January. He could not possibly therefore have reached London before the twenty eighth. Consequently, as he staid *eight* days there, we cannot fix his departure at an earlier day than the *fourth* of February, even if we include likewise the day of his arrival. But as Mr. Miles says p. 103. that they took leave of each other at midnight, he departed, at the *soonest*, in the night between the fourth and the fifth of February.

instructions, but not even *a single line or direction* [75]. But on the fourth of February the declaration of war, which had taken place on the first, was known in London: and after that time it was useless to think of negotiations. Mr. Maret therefore sent a letter to Lord Grenville, to take leave, and returned to Paris [76]. — Thus ended the celebrated mission of Mr. Maret, which would afford an additional proof, if additional proof were necessary, that the French government was determined at all events, to avoid a reconciliation with Great Britain: for otherwise it would not have refused to grant to an agent, who was already on the spot, to an agent, with whom Mr. Pitt had already expressed a readiness to negotiate, the in-

75. This, says Mr. Miles p. 103, Mr. Maret expresly declared at the time of their taking leave.

76. This letter, and the above-mentioned note, constituted the whole of Mr. Maret's negotiation, if it can be so called. Mr. Miles's own words, p. 103. where he speaks of the above-mentioned note, are: "This was all the intercourse that passed, and all the communication, that was "made to any of his Majesty's ministers, except a letter, "which was sent by Mr. Maret at the instant of his final de- "parture from London." — Mr. Pitt likewise on the 12. of February 1793 (see the parliamentary debates) declared in the house of commons, *that Mr. Maret during his whole stay in London had proposed to his majesty's ministers no questions of state whatsoever.*

ſtructions which that agent required. A compliance however with Mr. Maret's requeſt was not to be expected, ſince among the members of the executive council, Claviere, Pache, and Monge, were from the very beginning inimical to the whole negotiation, and Le Brun, though he did not declare himſelf againſt it, ſecretly counteracted its operation [77].

77. On Mr. Maret's miſſion to England at the end of January 1793 were propagated as many falſe reports, as on the conference which he had holden with Mr. Pitt in December: and theſe falſe reports, in defiance of Mr. Pitt's declaration in the Houſe of Commons on the 12. of February 1793, have been adopted and repeated by his adverſaries, both writers and orators, as unqueſtionably true. Immediately after the paſſage, which has been quoted in Ch. XIII. Note 32. relative to the pretended inſtructions of Mr. Maret on the former occaſion, is added. "As the firſt miſſion of "Mr. Maret was however not attended with any effect, he "was ſent again from the executive council with *enlarged* "*powers*. It was aſſerted at that time, that his object was "to propoſe to the Britiſh miniſtry *the ceſſion of ſome of the* "*moſt valuable Weſt India iſlands, and the annexing of the* "*Netherlands to the Dutch republic*, provided this arrange- "ment ſhould mutually prove agreable to the States General "and the Belgic congreſs. Mr. Maret was however, we be- "lieve, *never permitted to produce his credentials*." — Now the notion, that the French government was ready to give up the Netherlands, and ſtill more ſo, that it was ready to abandon ſome of the moſt valuable of the Weſt India iſlands,

While Mr. Maret was in London, in vain expecting inſtructions from the executive council, the Bri-

is in itſelf ſo abſurd, and is ſo completely contradicted by the avowed principles of the French rulers, and by the Notes, which had been already delivered to Lord Grenville, that nothing but the height of party prejudice could have induced any man, who was the leaſt acquainted with the hiſtory of the times, to believe in it. And that Mr. Maret really had no ſuch inſtructions, is evident not only from the relation of Mr. Miles, but from the account given by Dumouriez himſelf, who repreſents Mr. Maret as a perſon ſent merely to pave the way for *his* reception. To the paſſages already quoted may be added Mr. Miles's declaration p. 103 that *Mr. Maret had very little to ſay:* and what *that little* was has been ſhewn in the Notes 63. 64. As to the aſſertion, that he never was permitted to produce his credentials, we have already ſeen, that even if he had any, he never once *offered* to produce them. To the paſſages above-quoted may be added the following declaration of Mr. Miles, p. 101. "That all intercourſe with him was refuſed by the king's "ſervants, I poſitively deny, and for the beſt of all poſſi-"ble reaſons, becauſe *it had never been ſolicited.* On the "ſame authority that I contradicted the former aſſertion, I "deny this; *the authority of Mr. Maret,* who may certainly "be allowed to know as much of the matter, as thoſe, who "on ſuch little foundation have repeatedly urged it in par-"liament etc." Even therefore if the report had been true, that Mr. Maret was authorized to make advantageous propoſals, yet as none *were* made, nor even *offered* to be made,

tish government received the intelligence from Lord Auckland, that De Maulde was arrived at the Hague, and had proposed a negotiation between his Lordship and General Dumouriez. Now though the conduct both of the national convention and of its executive

no blame could have attached to the British ministry. Lastly, as to the notion, which was likewise propagated with great assiduity, that Mr. Maret, as soon as he landed in England, received an order from government to quit the country, a notion, which even Dumouriez, (who after the 26. of January 1793 never returned to Paris, never again saw Mr. Maret, and therefore had no certain intelligence of what happened to him in England) has credulously adopted from the rumours of the day, it is confuted at once by the indisputable fact, that Mr. Maret remained eight days in London, and till after the intelligence arrived of the declaration of war. — It is true, that since the publication of the Authentic Correspondence by Mr. Miles in the year 1796, no one has ventured to say any thing more about Mr. Maret and his pretended instructions: but as, on the other hand, I know of no one, who, having related those idle reports as indisputable facts, has afterwards had the generosity to inform his readers or hearers, that those reports are the mere inventions of party malevolence, and as the Authentic Correspondence does not appear to be so generally known, as a work of such high importance deserves, the above-quoted extracts from it are not superfluous, because not every one, who had heard of those reports, has likewise heard of their confutation.

council had been uniformly ſuch, as demonſtrated the firm reſolution of the French rulers to engage in a war with Great Britain, and conſequently the improbability, if not impoſſibility, that they ſeriously intended to effect a reconciliation, yet the Britiſh government, to avoid the reproach, which would have reſulted from a refuſal, immediately conſented to the negotiation, and authorized Lord Auckland to treat with General Dumouriez [78]. On the receipt of his inſtructions, Lord Auckland deſpatched a courier to the general, who was then at Antwerp, and propoſed the tenth of February for the day of holding the firſt conference [79]. But no conference whatſoever took place: for the national convention, which, inſtead of awaiting the iſſue of the negotiation, reſolved from the very beginning to pay not the leaſt attention to it [80], had already on the firſt of February un-

78. See the Memoires de Dumouriez, Tom. I. p. 143.

79. Ib.

80. What little attention the French government paid to the negotiation even from the beginning of it, may be collected from the circumſtance, *that it was on the very day, on which the propoſal was made to the Britiſh miniſter at the Hague, that the order was iſſued to lay an embargo on all Britiſh veſſels in the French ports.* See Lord Grenville's ſpeech in the Houſe of Lords on the 12. of February 1793. What a contraſt does this conduct form with the behaviour of the

animously decreed war against Great Britain and Holland.

British government, which consented to the proposal of Dumouriez, though the intelligence of the embargo arrived in London on the very same day with the first courier from Lord Auckland! See Mr. Pitt's speech in the House of Commons on the 12. of February. — It requires therefore a more than usual want either of knowledge or of integrity, to represent, on the one hand, the French government as candid and solicitous for peace, and to accuse the British government, on the other hand, of duplicity and a desire for war. The authentic documents, which have been produced in the present work, sufficiently demonstrate that the charge must be inverted. Indeed the question may be fairly asked: Is it possible, that men of talents and reading, professed speakers or writers on political subjects, should have remained wholly ignorant of all these documents? But if they were not, how could they venture to set them at open defiance, to substitute romance for history, and calumny for justice?

CHAPTER XVI.

State of parties in France at the beginning of the year 1793. Junction of Robespierre's party with that of Briſſot, on the ſubject of the war with Great Britain.— The decree for war voted without one diſſenting voice. Eighteen pretexts alleged in juſtification of it. Confutation of thoſe pretexts. General recapitulation, and concluſion.

The two great parties, into which the national convention was divided at the beginning of the year 1793, were headed, the one by Robespierre, the other by Briſſot. The former were denominated, ſometimes by the name of Jacobins, at other times by the appellation of anarchiſts [1]: the latter, though originally only a younger branch of the Jacobin family, had aſſumed the title of Girondiſts, becauſe many of the members of it were from the department of the Gironde, and they were diſtinguiſhed likewiſe by the title of Briſſotines, from the name of their leader [2]. The prin-

1. This laſt title was uſually given them by their opponents.

2. Beſide theſe two *great* parties, there were indeed ſome inferior factions, and ſubdiviſions: but they were either of no importance, or they arranged themſelves under the ſtandards of the two principal parties.

cipal members of the Girondist party were men of talents and education, whereas the Jacobins, though many of them were not devoid of natural abilities, were for the most part unlettered enthusiasts. The one had been educated in the school of French philosophy, and in the tenets of the encyclopedists: the other had learnt no other maxims, than those which were suggested by anarchy and brutal violence. In regard to morality there was this only difference between them, that the Jacobins set all honour and religion at *open* defiance, while the Girondists, who in their hearts possessed as little of either, had acquired from their education the habit of concealing their sentiments, and of veiling their iniquity under the mask of probity. The former were the iconoclasts, the latter the jesuits of the revolution.

These two parties had divided the power of France since the deposition of the king, and had been engaged in one continual struggle for the supreme ascendency. But on the subject of the war with Great Britain and Holland they formed a perfect junction [3], and were animated with similar principles and similar

3. "Les deux factions *se reunirent*, pour prendre sans réflexion, sans deliberation, sans discussion, le parti le plus violent et le plus temeraire." Memoires de Dumouriez, Tom. I. p. 143.

desires. The motives to this war, which have been assigned in the fourteenth chapter, operated equally on every member of the convention, and the hope of ruining the ancient rival of France smothered for a while their habitual animosity. Nay, so completely unanimous were the members of the convention on this occasion, that though seven members, out of the seven hundred and fifty, had voted against the war with Austria, yet the war with Great Britain and Holland was decreed, *without one dissenting voice* [4]. Equally remarkable is it, that this union of the two parties was soon converted into the most violent enmity; for no sooner did they find themselves disappointed in their expectations of the conquest of Holland as a preparatory step to the conquest of England, no sooner had Dumouriez, instead of carrying all before him, as in the preceding campaign, been obliged by the defeat at Neerwinden, to abandon the Austrian Netherlands, than they began to make each other the most bitter reproaches. "Who "was it that provoked the war? The *Anarchists alone:* yet *they* lay the charge to *our* door," said Brissot in his address to his constituents [5]. And not only was

4. On demande de toutes parts à aller aux voix. Le décret est porté *à l'unanimité.* Moniteur, 3. Feb. 1793.

5. "Qui donc a *provoqué* cette guerre? *Les anarchistes seuls!* Et cependant ils *nous* en font un crime." Brissot à

the accuſation reciprocal, but the means, which each party adopted to render the other odious to the nation, in conſequence of the declaration of war, were equal. For Briſſot aſſerted that the Anarchiſts or Jacobins were inſtruments in the hands of foreign powers [6], while the ſame ridiculous charge was laid by the Anarchiſts to Briſſot [7]. But as the Girondiſts, through cauſes, which it would be foreign to the preſent hiſtory

ſes Commettans p. 71. — Dumouriez likewiſe, though he had left the party of the Jacobins, ſays of Briſſot and Le Brun, "Ils ont, l'un et l'autre, *provoqué* la declaration de guerre contre l'Angleterre et la Hollande." Vie de Dumouriez, Tom. III. p. 385. He does not however confine the blame to the Girondiſts alone, for he aſcribes an equal ſhare of it to the Jacobins. "Quant à Briſſot, il profitait de l'occaſion, pour inſulter, comme à ſon ordinaire, les rois et les peuples; *en quoi il était bien ſecondé par Barrere, et par le parti des Jacobins*." Memoires de Dumouriez, T. I. p. 143.

6. He calls them (A ſes Commettans, p. 58.) ces meneurs, qui ſciemment ou inſciemment étaient *les inſtrumens des puiſſances étrangeres*.

7. They gave him the title of Allié de Pitt. See what was ſaid on this ſubject, in Ch. I. Note 6. — In fact the two parties were ſo liberal in the application of theſe titles, that even the monſter Robeſpierre was called a *Royaliſt*: for a philippic publiſhed by Louvet, who was of the Gironde party, was entitled, A Maximilien Robeſpierre et à ſes *Royaliſtes*.

to inveſtigate [8], were ſoon overpowered by the oppo-

8. The author of a popular pamphlet, publiſhed in the year 1797, aſcribes, with his uſual accuracy, the fall of Briſſot, and the aſcendency of Robespierre, to the part which Briſſot took in the declaration of hoſtilities, a part, which this author himſelf cannot deny, though he endeavours to palliate it by ſaying, "the part that *even* Briſſot etc." He had probably never heard, that Robespierre voted for the war with England, as well as Briſſot, that in this reſpect therefore they were *perfectly equal*, and conſequently that the fall of the one and the aſcendency of the other muſt be owing to ſome other cauſe. He had heard probably the exclamations of the victorious party alone, which overwhelmed the exclamations of the conquered party, not becauſe they had a greater ſhare of juſtice on their ſide, but merely becauſe they were victorious. A minute inveſtigation of the cauſes, which gave the Jacobins the advantage over the Girondiſts, lies, as already obſerved, without the limits of the preſent hiſtory: but perhaps it will not be ſuperfluous, curſorily to remark, that the two following were the principal. Firſt the wavering and inconſiſtent conduct of the Girondiſts on the trial of the king: for, though the principal members of this party voted, with only one or two exceptions, for his death, they inſiſted that, before he was executed, the ſentence ſhould be confirmed by the primary aſſemblies. But in this attempt they failed, and thus they gave the advantage out of their own hands, of which the Jacobins, who were *conſiſtent* in their infamy, and expoſed therefore no weak ſide to their adverſaries, knew how to make a proper uſe: for in a ſtruggle between two unprincipled parties, that

site party, it was the natural consequence, that they alone suffered for the common crime [9]; and Brissot,

party, which goes the greatest length, will generally succeed. The other grand cause of the ascendency of the Jacobins was their almost unlimited influence at the beginning of the year 1793 over the sections of the city of Paris, which at that time were vested with so much power, that the party supported by them was certain of governing the whole nation. This influence the jacobins acquired, partly by their intrigues, which enabled them to fill the principal offices in the sections with their own creatures, and partly by the system of terrorism, in which the Federates, as they were called, rendered them essential service. Prepared in this manner, the Jacobins found no difficulty, in the spring of the year 1793, of overthrowing their adversaries, even on the most futile pretext. But cause and pretext are very frequently confounded by superficial observers, especially, if he, who uses the pretext, is successful. It is not extraordinary therefore that during the long reign of Robespierre and his associates, the notion, that they were innocent in regard to the war with England, was gradually propagated, and adopted by superficial writers, who knew not that the war was *unanimously* decreed. On the other hand it must be admitted, that opposition writers act with perfect consistency, in endeavouring to remove the blame of the war from any party in France, because, if they could succeed in the attempt, they would find it so much the more easy to transfer the blame to the British government.

9. When the Jacobins brought Brissot with his associates to the bar, one of the principal charges laid to him was,

with his aſſociates, ended his life on the ſcaffold, while Robespierre and his accomplices aſcended the throne [10]. Which of the two parties was moſt deſerving of the guillotine it is unneceſſary at preſent to examine: but thus much as leaſt is obvious, that the reciprocal accuſation of having involved France in a war with Britain, is a tacit acknowledgement from *both* parties, that not to the Britiſh, but to the French government alone its origin muſt be aſſigned.

The propoſal of it in the convention fell to the lot of Briſſot; not becauſe Briſſot was more inclined to a war with England, than Robespierre, but ſolely becauſe Briſſot happened to be at that time the orator of the diplomatic committee, and of the committee of general defence, which two united committees the national convention on the 30. of January had ordered to preſent within two days a report relative to Great Britain [11], or, as the committees well underſtood, to propoſe a declaration of war. And it cannot be de-

that he had involved France in a war with England: to which Briſſot very properly replied, *it was the aſſembly of the nation, not I, who decreed the war.* See the Moniteur Oct. 27. 1793. Supplement, 2. feuille. But this argument could not prevail againſt the jus fortioris.

10. Committunt *eadem* diverſo crimina fato;
Ille *crucem* ſceleris pretium tulit, hic *diadema*.

11. Moniteur 31. Jan. 1793.

nied, that the orator of the committees executed his commiſſion with fidelity: for his whole ſpeech contained one continued invective againſt the Britiſh government, which undoubtedly gratified the ears of the whole aſſembly [12]. As ſoon as he had ended his ſpeech, he completed the execution of his truſt by propoſing, in the name of the committees, a declaration of war againſt Great Britain and Holland. Ducos ſeconded the motion [13]; and, as no one in the whole aſſembly ſpake againſt it, the cry of *vote*, *vote*, reſounded from every quarter, and the war was immediately decreed without one diſſenting voice [14]. Further,

12. His ſpeech is printed at full length in the Moniteur 2. Febr. 1793. The following paſſage may ſerve as a ſpecimen. "La nation Anglaiſe une fois éclairée par notre exemple, ſera juſtice auſſi de ſes *conſpirateurs en place*. La comédie de l'éternel procès de Haſtings ne ſe renouvellera plus, et les échaffauds ſerviront encore une fois aux Straffords et aux Lauds du régime actuel, comme aux *ſimples brigands*." But unfortunately for this Allié de Pitt, who ſpake ſo reſpectfully of his friends, the prophecy, like moſt other prophecies of the French rulers, was fulfilled only in the prophet himſelf.

13. The ſpeech of Ducos, which was delivered in the ſame ſtrain with that of Briſſot, is printed in the Moniteur of the 3. of February.

14. See Note 4.

ther, as the favourite maxim of the French rulers, "the governed muſt be excited to rebel againſt their "governors," never forſakes them, was voted, on the propoſal of Fabre d'Eglantine, and on the recommendation of Barrere, an addreſs to the Engliſh nation, which was ordered to be drawn up by Barrere, Fabre d'Eglantine, Condorcet, and Thomas Paine [15].

But as the real cauſes of the war, which have been aſſigned in the fourteenth chapter, were not ſuch as had juſtice on their ſide, it was deemed expedient to ſeek a number of pretexts, which might palliate the aggreſſion with the unthinking populace, and furniſh their advocates with ſophiſtical arguments in their defence. Nor were their endeavours in this reſpect unſucceſsful: for they were ſo fortunate as to diſcover not leſs than *eighteen* pretexts [16], all of which however were of ſuch a nature, that no rational council of ſtate, unleſs other motives had operated, would have been induced by them to a declaration of war. The firſt article is of general import, and contains the charge, that the Britiſh government after the 10. Auguſt 1792, had given many indications of being ill-affected toward France: and in the ſeventeen following articles the particular actions are ſpecified, chiefly in

15. Moniteur 3. Feb. 1793.
16. Ib.

chronological order, in which this evil diſpoſition was ſuppoſed to have diſplayed itſelf [17]. Theſe ſeventeen articles therefore muſt be particularly examined.

The firſt of them relates to the recall of the Britiſh ambaſſador from Paris on the 17. of Auguſt: but this charge has been already repelled in the ninth chapter. — In the ſecond article is aſſerted, that the Britiſh government had ever ſince the 10. of Auguſt ſuſpended all communication with Mr. Chauvelin. Now this charge is abſolutely falſe, as is evinced by the negotiation deſcribed in the thirteenth chapter. It was only *official* communication with Mr. Chauvelin which had been ſuſpended, of which the fault had not lain with the Britiſh government: for it was the depoſition of the king of France, which rendered Mr. Chauvelin's former credentials of no value, and it was not before the 17. of January, when the queſtion of war or peace was already decided, that he had even offered to produce new credentials. — The third and fourth articles relate to the refuſal of the Britiſh government, to acknowledge the French republic in the perſon of Mr. Chauvelin, a refuſal, which has been

17. It is to be obſerved, that even the ſophiſtry of the national convention was unable to diſcover any pretext for accuſing the Britiſh government, before the 10. of Auguſt 1792, whence it appears that the advocates of the French have gone ſtill greater lengths than their clients themſelves.

already juſtified in the preceding chapter. — In the fifth, ſixth, ſeventh, and eighth articles, complaints are made about the acts of parliament, mentioned at the end of the eleventh chapter, where it has likewiſe been ſhewn that thoſe complaints are ungrounded. — In the ninth article the Britiſh government is accuſed of having given a reception to French emigrants, as if hoſpitability to perſons in diſtreſs were a crime. And this charge, in another reſpect, ill became thoſe, who had not only from the very commencement of the French revolution, uniformly encouraged, and correſponded with the disaffected party in England [18], but on the 28. of November had received, with every mark of friendſhip and every token of applauſe, the addreſſes of thoſe ſocieties, who on that day ſignified their intention of overturning the Britiſh conſtitution. Beſides, whatever might be the private views of the French emigrants, who were permitted to reſide in England, it is a known fact that they were not permitted to act an open part, or to aſſemble in a military corps, till after the declaration of war: whereas the French executive council had not only already formed the Dutch patriots, to the amount of ten thou-

18. See the documents on this ſubject in Rivington's Annual Regiſter for 1793, Part. II. p. 128—155. The firſt has ſo early a date as Nov. 4. 1789.

ſand, into a ſeparate legion, but had placed them on the frontiers of Holland, as a preparatory ſtep to its invaſion. It required therefore more than uſual audacity, to accuſe the Britiſh government of having granted an aſylum to the French emigrants. Another charge in the ninth article relates to the emigrants from the island of St. Domingo. Now it is undoubtedly true, that even before the cloſe of 1791, a great part of the French coloniſts in the island of St. Domingo, highly diſſatisfied with the conduct of the national aſſembly, to which they juſtly aſcribed the inſurrection of the negroes, ſincerely wiſhed to ſubmit the colony to the crown of Britain, and that ſeveral of the coloniſts came to London, with the view of inducing miniſters to ſend out an armament and take poſſeſſion of the country. But equally certain is it, that the Britiſh government, true to the principles of neutrality, which it had determined to maintain, rejected the offer, and that no attention was paid to the coloniſts, till after war had been declared [19]. Its upright

19. The words of Mr. Bryan Edwards, whoſe authority on this ſubject is not to be queſtioned, and who certainly cannot be accuſed of an unjuſt partiality in favour of adminiſtration, are as follows. "To theſe repreſentations *no at-* "*tention at that time was given*: but at length, *after* the na- "tional aſſembly had thought proper to declare war againſt "Great Britain, the Engliſh miniſtry *began* to liſten with

conduct therefore deserved, not the censure, but the thanks of the national convention [20]. — The three following articles relate to the naval preparations in England, the necessity of which has been so fully demonstrated in the eleventh chapter, that it would be a waste of time to say any thing further on the subject. They contain also a complaint, that certain friends in England were ill treated by the government. Now though it cannot be denied, that the measures taken by the British government, to counteract the machinations of those, who acted in concert with the national convention, necessarily gave offence to that venerable body, yet in converting those measures into a subject of complaint, it really outdid its *usual* outdoings. — In the thirteenth article a complaint was made about the English ships which had been sent to Flushing at the beginning of January: and it was made under the pretence, that those ships had been sent "to disturb the operations of France in Belgia [21]." But it has been shewn in the preceding chap-

"some degree of complacency to the overtures, which were "*again* made." Historical Survey of St. Domingo, p. 140.

20. This is not the only instance, in which the integrity of the British cabinet has been strangely abused, and that not by the French alone.

21. Pour troubler les opérations de la France dans la Belgique.

ter [22], that the object of the ſquadron was merely to act on the defenſive, and, in caſe of an attack on the part of France, to protect the coaſt of Zealand. The preſence of this ſquadron was likewiſe abſolutely neceſſary: for on the 10. of January the attack on Zealand had been already ordered by the executive council, but was abandoned in conſequence of the obſtacles, which this very ſquadron preſented to the undertaking [23]. The charge therefore brought in the thirteenth article is totally without foundation [24]. — The

22. Note 41.

23. See Miranda's letter on this ſubject quoted in Ch. XV. Note 46.

24. A celebrated oppoſition writer has objected to the aſſiſtance ſent to the Dutch, on *another* ground, namely that it was ſent without being previouſly requeſted by the Dutch government. Now whether Baron Nagel, the Dutch ambaſſador in London formally demanded of Lord Grenville the ſuccour ſtipulated by the treaty of 1788, is a queſtion which I cannot determine by official documents, as the communications, which paſſed between Lord Grenville and Baron Nagel, have never been laid before the public: though I have been informed from very good authority, that the Dutch ambaſſador really did make the demand, but requeſted that it might be kept a ſecret, leſt the bare act of concerting meaſures of defence ſhould be diſtorted by the national convention into a combination *againſt* France, and thus expoſe the Dutch to a ſtill greater danger, than that which

fourteenth article relates to the diſmiſſion of Mr. Chauvelin, a ſubject which has been fully diſcuſſed in the

they were already threatened, when the demand was made. And that the Dutch government, whoſe preſervation depended on the co-operation of England really did make the demand is ſo highly probable in itſelf, that it ſeems to be unneceſſary to attempt a proof of it. Be this however as it may, it is certain that the States General had formally declared to the Britiſh ambaſſador at the Hague on the 16. of November 1792, *that nothing could more effectually conduce to the happineſs and mutual intereſts of the two nations, than the continuance of that intimate union which had been eſtabliſhed between them:* and equally certain is it, that fourteen days afterward they formally proteſted againſt the opening of the Schelde. See Ch. XI. After theſe declarations the States General might certainly expect, that, as ſoon as the United Provinces were in real danger of an invaſion, the Britiſh government would fulfil its duty to its ally, without being further reminded of it: and no one can deny, than when the ſquadron in queſtion, which was the firſt ſuccour ſent to the Dutch, arrived off the coaſt of Zealand, that province was threatened with very imminent danger. Further that the arrival of the Britiſh ſhips was agreable to the deſire (whether formally expreſſed or not) of the States General, is evident from the circumſtance, that Dutch ſhips of war were ordered to join them. See Ch. XV. Note. 41. And this very junction was made a ſubject of complaint againſt the Stadtholder in the national convention, when war was declared againſt Great Britain and Holland. See the Moniteur 3. Feb. 1793. Laſtly, after the [illegible] was openly declared, and the

preceding chapter, where it has been proved, that though it may find a place in a view of the *pretexts*

States General had ceaſed to be under the influence of the motive alleged above, they declared to the whole world, in an official note preſented to Lord Auckland on the 20. of March, their ſincere deſire, that the Britiſh government would make *their* cauſe its own. The notion therefore, that we aſſiſted the Dutch, without being deſired to do ſo, is ungrounded.

But ſuppoſe, for the ſake of argument, it were true, that the States General had neither directly nor indirectly, neither on the 16. of November nor at any other time, ſignified a deſire of aſſiſtance, yet the protection of Holland was a duty, which Great Britain owed to itſelf, if not to its ally. When two houſes are ſo connected, that the one cannot be deſtroyed without endangering the fall of the other, and the maſter of the latter, while his neighbour is aſleep, ſees an enemy approaching to deſtroy the houſe of the former, he would certainly be conſidered as a downright idiot, if he determined to wait till his neighbour awaked and demanded aſſiſtance. Nothing therefore could be more abſurd, than the reproach made to the Britiſh government of having ſent ſuccour to the Dutch, even if the premiſes, on which the reproach is founded, were true. Beſides, what ſhews the inconſiſtency of the oppoſition party, on the 15. of March 1793, in a debate relative to the ſuccour by land, which was not ſent till *after* the declaration of war, it was objected to miniſters, that the meaſures for the defence of Holland were not taken *ſooner*. See the New Annual Regiſter for 1793, Britiſh and foreign hiſtory, p. 75.

for the war, it can have no place in a View of the *cauſes* of it. — In the fifteenth article the Britiſh government is accuſed of an attachment to the traitor, as he is there called „Louis XVI, and of having given orders, immediately after his execution, to augment the preparations both by ſea and by land. Now of the attachment to Louis XVI, it has been ſhewn in the preceding chapter that the Britiſh government remained perfectly neutral, that it did not even intercede for him, and that it took no other part, than that, which every honeſt man muſt take in the cauſe of an innocent ſufferer. And in regard to the augmentation of the military preparations, which was ordered in the latter part of January, it was the neceſſary reſult of the refuſal, which had been made by the executive council, to accept the conditions of peace propoſed by the Britiſh government. — In the ſixteenth article the Britiſh government is accuſed of having entered into a treaty of alliance with the Emperor, during the month of January which was juſt elapſed. But this charge is abſolutely falſe: for ſince the 10. of Auguſt 1790, two years and an half therefore before the declaration of war, Great Britain had made no treaty whatſoever with Auſtria: and even that treaty was nothing more than a convention, relative, not to France, but to the Auſtrian Netherlands [25]. In the

25. Martens Recueil des principaux traités, T. III. p. 342.

interval, which elapsed between the 10. of August 1790 and the 1. of February 1793, not even a forged treaty between England and Austria has ever been produced, though the history of the last ten years furnishes many examples of the kind: nor is it possible, that the genuine treaty, had any such existed, should have remained to this very hour a profound secret. But what puts the matter out of all doubt, is the positive declaration of Lord Grenville in the house of Lords, and of Mr. Pitt and Mr. Dundas in the house of Commons, on the 12. of February 1793, who in consequence of the charge brought by the national convention were called upon to explain themselves, and all three solemnly declared that no such treaty existed [26]. — The seventeenth and last article contains a falshood, which is equally gross with the preceding: for it is there said that the British government had drawn the Stadtholder into a coalition against France [27]. Now it is true that the British government acted in concert with the government of Holland: but it has been so fully demonstrated, that all its measures were

26. See the parliamentary debates of that day.

27. This charge has been echoed even in England by a well-known opposition writer, who has ventured to assert, that "*We* involved Holland in all the horrors of war." — If by *We* he means th[illegible] government, the assertion is confuted by every pag[illegible] of [illegible] present history.

purely defenſive, that it would be an affront to the reader to add another ſyllable on the ſubject.

The hiſtory of the politicks of Great Britain and France, from the time of the conference at Pillnitz to the declaration of war againſt Great Britain, is now brought to a concluſion. The principles and the conduct of the two governments, during this important and deciſive period, have been delineated with hiſtorical accuracy, the repreſentation has been every where founded on authentic documents, and every aſſertion has been ſupported by unqueſtionable teſtimony. In the narration of the manifold events, ſtrict attention has been paid to the order of time, the relation between cauſe and effect has been thus uniformly preſerved, and hence every action has been traced up to its real ſource. Nothing of the leaſt importance, whether favourable or unfavourable to either party, has been omitted: no fact, however diſadvantageous to the Britiſh cabinet it might appear, when conſidered by itſelf, has been ſuppreſſed, and on the other hand, every thing, which, under the ſame circumſtances, appears advantageous to the French rulers, has been ſcrupulouſly obſerved. Conſequently, the meaſures adopted by the two parties being completely repreſented, and placed at it were in parallel, they appear in their true light. Laſtly, the account which have [illegible] both of the actions and the declarations [illegible] the French rulers, has not

been derived from a ſecond-hand ſource, but has been *immediately* taken from their own writings, and their own official journals, from which there lies no appeal. Nothing therefore now remains, than to bring the heads of the preceding hiſtory, of which the vouchers have been already given, into one view, in order to enable the public to decide with greater facility on the grand queſtion: Who were the aggreſſors?

1. In the celebrated conference at Pillnitz in Auguſt 1791, the Britiſh government took not the moſt diſtant part: and, if any treaty was concluded there, which is itſelf a matter of great doubt, the Britiſh government not only never acceded to it, but was never appriſed even of its contents. Further, when the Britiſh government was requeſted in 1791 to join a coalition againſt France, it gave a poſitive and unequivocal refuſal [28].

2. Toward the cloſe of the ſame year the valuable colony of St. Domingo was preſerved to France by the timely aſſiſtance ſent by Lord Effingham, then governor of Jamaica: and the Britiſh cabinet ſignified through its ambaſſador at Paris to the French government, that it fully approved of Lord Effingham's conduct. At the ſame time, true to the ſtricteſt principles of honour and neutrality, it refuſed the advantageous offer made

28. Ch. I.

by the French coloniſts, who were highly diſſatified with the national aſſembly, to ſurrender the French part of St. Domingo to the crown of Britain. And theſe acts of generoſity were repaid by France with the utmoſt ingratitude [29].

3. When Louis XVI. formally accepted the new conſtitution in September 1791, and ſent circular letters to the different courts of Europe ſignifying his aſſent, the court of Great Britain, was one of the firſt which returned an anſwer; and the anſwer was couched in very reſpectful terms, whereas ſome other courts either did not anſwer at all, or in a manner diſpleaſing to the national aſſembly. Yet on the other hand an event took place about this very time, which ſhewed how very little the national aſſembly cared about the neutrality of Great Britain [30].

4. When parliament aſſembled in January 1792, the Britiſh cabinet was ſo far from diſplaying any hoſtile views, that it was propoſed in his Majeſty's ſpeech to make an immediate reduction of the forces both by ſea and by land. The number of ſeamen and marines, to be employed that year, was accordingly diminiſhed to ſixteen thouſand: it was determined that the Heſſian ſubſidy, which then expired, ſhould not

29. Ch. II.
30. Ch. III.

be renewed; the British land forces were likewise reduced: and taxes to the amount of two hundred thousand pounds were abolished. Yet at this very time the national assembly took measures for a very considerable augmentation of the French marine; measures, which had they been taken in England, would have been represented in France, as acts of hostility. But our ministers did not suffer themselves to be disturbed in their system of neutrality [31].

5. After France had declared war against Austria on the 20. of April 1792, the British government proved both by its actions and declarations, that it was determined to remain neutral in the contest between the two powers. The French minister in London, Chauvelin, sent official information on the 28. of April to his court, that the British cabinet was resolved to preserve neutrality: and on the 1. of May the king of France wrote a letter of thanks to his Britannic Majesty, and acknowledged his obligations for the refusal to join the coalition. On the 15. of May, Mr. Chauvelin delivered a Note, in which, after an attempt at a justification of the national assembly in declaring war against Austria, the British government was requested to forbid all British subjects to accept of commissions from any power, which was hostile to

31. Ch. IV.

France. This requeſt was punctually complied with, and a royal proclamation to that purpoſe was iſſued on the 25 of May. At this friendly conduct the French government again expreſſed its ſatisfaction [32].

6. The proclamation of the 21. of May was a mere matter of national police, which the machinations then at work to overturn the Britiſh conſtitution rendered abſolutely neceſſary: it contained nothing which could give the leaſt offence to the French government, which was not even named in it: it contained no indications whatſoever of a hoſtile diſpoſition to that country: nor did any ſuch thought occur to the French government, but on the contrary, not only Mr. Chauvelin, in a Note which he delivered three weeks afterward, but Le Brun himſelf, in the name even of the *new* government, in the month of Auguſt, teſtified his conviction of the friendly diſpoſition and conduct of the Britiſh cabinet toward France [33].

7. When the Britiſh cabinet on July 8. in anſwer to the propoſal to act as mediator between France and the other belligerent powers, replied, that it could not do ſo, unleſs the mediation were requeſted by *all* the parties concerned, the refuſal was ſo far from indicating a diſpoſition to hoſtilities, that it proved the

32. Ch. V.
33. Ch. VI.

very reverse: and this is confirmed by Mr. Chauvelin's acknowledgement in his letter of July 17, and by the acknowledgement of Le Brun, in his Note to Lord Gower. Besides, the mediation was requested in the name of the king of France, at a time when his authority was expiring: and though he was not *formally* deposed before the 10. of August, yet the events of the 20. of June had transferred the whole power of France, executive as well as legislative, to the national assembly: and this assembly was so far from being solicitous for peace, as certain persons have very falsely and very artfully asserted, in order to throw the blame of the war on the British government, that it was determined at all events to prosecute the war [34].

8. When an alarm was spread in France in July 1792, in consequence of the sailing of five ships of the line and a few frigates from Portsmouth, merely to perform naval evolutions in the channel, Mr. Chauvelin sent a Note to his own government, in which he testified the pacific dispositions of the British cabinet, and even complained of the false notions, which were entertained on this subject. On the 4. of August, Mr. Chauvelin's Note was read in the national assembly: and it was declared that Mr. Chauvelin's testimony to the

34. Ch. VII.

the pacific dispositions of the British cabinet was satisfactory [35].

9. The recall of the British ambassador from Paris after the king had been dethroned, was no breach of neutrality toward France, either in itself, or in the manner, in which it was conducted. As he had been accredited to the king, his letters of credence were become useless: and before a new diplomatic connexion could be formed, it was necessary first to know, who was to govern France in future. But at that time all authorities were organised only provisionally: and, during the struggle of contending parties, it was most consistent with the principles of neutrality, to await the issue of it. Besides, the letter of recall was couched in such pacific and friendly terms, that Le Brun openly testified his approbation of it, and declared in the national assembly, that the British ambassador had left a satisfactory testimony of the dispositions of his court. The pacific disposition of the British court was further evinced by the decisive rejection of the invitation, which was made at that very time, as it had been already in the preceding year, to join the coalition [36]. — But that the provisional executive council might not be wanting in etiquette; it immediately

35. Ch. VIII.
36. Ch. IX.

despatched Mr. Noel with an order to Mr. Chauvelin to return to Paris. Mr. Chauvelin however obtained a revocation of the order, in consequence of his making the following remonstrance; "that he was perfectly well with Mr. Fox and some other members of opposition, and that it would not be prudent in France, to lose the fruits of his labours with these gentlemen, and their subsequent services, for a vain form of diplomatic etiquette [37]."

10. In the month of November 1792, after the Dutchy of Savoy, the Austrian Netherlands and a part of Germany had been conquered, the French rulers threw off the mask, and declared to the whole world the revolutionizing system, which they had hitherto only followed in the dark. Not only was it decreed on the 19. of November, that all nations, which chose to rebel against their governments should receive assistance from France, but on the 28. of November, when deputies from certain British societies appeared at the bar of the national convention, and signified their intention of overturning the British constitution, they were received with applause from the whole assembly, and were assured by the President himself, that the period was not far distant, when Frenchmen would come to congratulate the national convention of Great

37. Ch. XIII. Note 34.

Britain. After this declaration it ought no longer to be a queſtion: Who were the aggreſſors? — Further toward the cloſe of the year 1792 England was overrun with French emiſſaries, who were engaged in the plot for the overthrow of the Britiſh conſtitution, and were ſupplied for that purpoſe with immenſe ſums from the French government. A conſiderable fleet alſo was fitted out in France three months before Great Britain even began to arm [38].

11. When the Britiſh Parliament aſſembled in the month of December in conſequence of the danger, with which the country was threatened from France, all the meaſures, which were taken, were purely defenſive: and a war might have eaſily been avoided, had it been the will of the national convention and of the executive council [39].

12. While meaſures were taking in Great Britain, in order to ward off the danger, with which it was already threatened, the rulers of France continued to augment that danger: and by a new ſeries of injuries and inſults proved their determination to engage in a war with Great Britain and Holland. By the decree of December 15 war was declared, not only on all kings, but on all nations, which refuſed to take up arms

38. Ch. X.
39. Ch. XI.

againſt them: and this decree, with that of November 19, was in various ways applied to Great Britain in particular. The miniſter for foreign affairs threatened in the national convention an appeal to the Britiſh nation, and the marine miniſter publickly proclaimed the deſign of a landing in Britain with fifty thouſand caps of liberty. A new and very conſiderable addition was ordered to be made to the French ſhips already in commiſſion, with the avowed view of acting againſt Great Britain: and before the middle of January the order was ſigned for the actual invaſion of Holland [40].

13. In the diplomatic communications between Great Britain and France the Britiſh miniſters diſplayed no unwillingneſs to negotiate: and, though no negotiation could be conſidered at that time as ſtrictly official, Mr. Chauvelin's credentials having been received from the depoſed king of France, yet he was aſſured by Lord Grenville, that outward forms would be no hinderance to his Britannic majeſty, whenever the queſtion related to explanations, which might be ſatisfactory and beneficial to both parties. Mr. Pitt likewiſe, in a conference which he had with Mr. Maret expreſſed his readineſs to negotiate with Mr. Maret as a confidential perſon of the French executive council; but

40. Ch. XII.

this council not only refufed to grant inftructions to Mr. Maret, but forbad him even to converfe with Mr. Pitt on political fubjects. When the negotiation was conducted between Lord Grenville and Mr. Chauvelin, the Notes which were delivered on the part of the French government were fo far from containing fatisfactory explanations, that a firm refolution was avowed in them, of continuing thofe very aggreffions, of which the Britifh government complained. And when, nothwithftanding this avowal, the executive council endeavoured, by all the arts of fophiftry, to impofe a belief of its pacific intentions, its actions uniformly contradicted its affertions. Nor was it afhamed to utter the moft folemn declarations even with the confcioufnefs of their falfhood. Its whole mode of conducting the negotiation betrayed as much infolence as hypocrify: and an appeal to the people of Great Britain was threatened in the very firft note. On the other hand the conditions of peace, propofed by the Britifh government, had no reference whatfoever to any particular form of government in France; they related only to the external power of that country; they were abfolutely neceffary for the falvation of Britain, and were fo far from being degrading to France, that they required only an adherence to that principle, which the republican rulers had repeatedly declared to be the bafis of their fyftem of politicks. Thefe conditions were

rejected: and at the same time it was announced, that, if the preparations then making in the British ports (which had been ordered merely in self defence, and which could not be possibly be stopt, after the executive council had rejected the conditions, which alone could insure safety to Great Britain) were still continued, a declaration of war would be the consequence. It was no longer in the power therefore of the British government to avoid a rupture with France [41].

14. A war with Great Britain had been resolved on in the French cabinet, not only before the negotiation was ended, but even before it commenced: and the object of the executive council was not to produce a reconciliation, but to amuse the British government, and to deceive the nation, till the plan, which had been laid for the destruction of the British empire, was fully ripe for execution. The mad ambition of the French rulers, their determination to extirpate all kingly governments and the confident expectation of insurrections in every part of Europe, aided by the necessity of finding employment for their turbulent armies, were their motives to war in general: and their firm belief, that the inhabitants of Great Britain were so disaffected to their government, that French assistance would induce them to an immediate revolt,

41. Ch. XIII.

the inconſiderable number of troops at that time in Great Britain in compariſon with thoſe which could eaſily be ſpared from France, the forward ſtate of the French navy, the perſuaſion that a landing on the Britiſh coaſt would be attended with no difficulty, and the immenſe advantages expected from the acquiſition of the Britiſh wealth, commerce and marine, in the proſecution of their conqueſts on the continent, all theſe motives added to the innate deſire of cruſhing an ancient and formidable, but at that time deſpiſed, rival, induced them to a war with Great Britain in particular [42].

15. The events of the laſt fourteen days before the declaration of war cannot poſſibly be numbered among the cauſes of it, becauſe the war was already determined. As to the negotiation attempted by General Dumouriez, it had no other object than to amuſe the Britiſh and Dutch governments a little longer: and though both governments gave their conſent to it, the national convention, refuſed to await the iſſue of it, and declared war unanimouſly on Great Britain and Holland [43].

16. The pretexts alleged by the national convention to juſtify the declaration of hoſtilities, were either

42. Ch. XIV.
43. Ch. XV.

futile, or falſe, or were events, which had not taken place, till after a war with Great Britain and Holland had been reſolved on. Laſtly, though the two great parties in France, the Girondiſts and the Jacobins, formed a junction on the queſtion of a war with Great Britain: yet as ſoon as they found, that it did not anſwer their expectations, they accuſed each other of having been the authors of it. And this mutual accuſation is a tacit acknowledgement from both parties, that the blame did not attach to the Britiſh government [44].

After a ſtatement of theſe premiſes, all of which have been proved in the preceding hiſtory by unanſwerable documents, every ſhadow of doubt muſt be removed in regard to the origin of that war, which was declared by the national convention on the 1. of February 1793. It was a war of aggreſſion, of injury and of inſult, on the part of France, as well in the motives, which gave it birth, as in the open declaration of it: and on the part of Britain it was juſt and neceſſary, as being ſtrictly a war of ſelf defence.

44. Ch. XVI.

F I N I S.

APPENDIX.

APPENDIX

CONTAINING

A NARRATIVE OF THE ATTEMPTS

MADE BY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT

TO RESTORE PEACE.

As the preceding hiſtory contains a full and unanſwerable proof that the war, which was declared againſt Great Britain in February 1793 derived its origin from the French government alone, a plain and impartial ſtatement of the attempts, which have been made to reſtore peace, will equally prove, that the continuance of the war can no more be aſcribed to the British government, than the commencement of it.

After hoſtilities had continued three years, and the arms of Britain had been crowned by ſea with as much ſucceſs, as the arms of France had been by land, the Britiſh government formed the reſolution in February 1796 of making at leaſt an attempt to reſtore that

peace, which the mad ambition of the French convention had wantonly broken [1]. The period in question

1. It cannot be ſaid, that the French, on their part, had made any attempt to reſtore peace: for the Note ſigned by Le Brun on April 2. 1793, and delivered by a notary public to Lord Grenville (New Annual Regiſter 1793, Britiſh and foreign hiſtory p. 98), was nothing more, than a new attempt to amuſe and to deceive the Britiſh government. In this note Le Brun, who in the negotiation conducted by Mr. Chauvelin had diſplayed the moſt ſhameful duplicity, who had acknowledged to Dumouriez his reſolution to pay not the leaſt regard to that negotiation, who had refuſed to await the iſſue of the conference with Lord Auckland, and had moreover twice refuſed to furniſh Mr. Maret with inſtructions, preſumed to notify to Lord Grenville an intention of ſending the ſame Mr. Maret to London as a negotiator. Now after the Britiſh miniſters had been ſo frequently and ſo ſhamefully deceived by Le Brun, they really muſt have been deficient in common ſenſe, had they liſtened to his propoſal of the 2. of April: and after the irrefragable proofs of the hoſtile diſpoſition of the national convention toward Great Britain, they muſt have been ſtruck with blindneſs, had they ſuppoſed, that the convention ſincerely wiſhed to live in peace and amity with Great Britain. But they clearly ſaw, that the only object of Le Brun's Note was to gain time, as the invaſion of Holland had already met with a conſiderable check, and to ſuſpend the operations of Great Britain, in order that its intended deſtruction might be completed at a more convenient opportunity.

was well adapted to the purpofe, if any thing fhort of irrefiftible force can induce the Directory of the *Great Nation* to make a general peace: for the armies both of General Pichegru and of General Jourdan had been lately obliged to yield to the imperial troops, at that time victorious; Manheim had been retaken, the fuppofed impregnable lines before Mayntz had been forced, the right bank of the Rhine was again free, and Marfhal Clairfayt had advanced a confiderable diftance on the other fide. The intelligence, that the Cape of Good Hope has furrendered to the Britifh arms was already known in Europe; Corfica was ftill in our poffeffion; a Britifh fleet commanded the Mediterranean; and Buonaparte did not yet ftand at the head of a victorious army in Italy. An armiftice of two months had been concluded between Auftria and France, and thus a road had been opened, which, if the French government had thought proper, might have led to a general peace.

Of thefe apparently favourable circumftances the Britifh government refolved to avail itfelf: but as it was firft neceffary to know, whether France, on her part, was equally difpofed to peace, and as no direct communication fubfifted between London and Paris, Mr. Wickham, minifter plenipotentiary to the Swifs cantons, was previoufly commiffioned to demand of Mr. Barthelemi, the French minifter in Switzerland,

an anſwer to the following queſtions, which he did in a Note dated the 8. of March [2].

1. "Is there the diſpoſition in France to open a "negotiation with his majeſty and his allies, for the "re-eſtabliſhment of a general peace upon juſt and ſuit-"able terms, by ſending, for that purpoſe, miniſters "to a congreſs, at ſuch place as may hereafter be "agreed upon?

2. "Would there be the diſpoſition to communi-"cate to the underſigned the general grounds of a pacifi-"cation, ſuch as France would be willing to propoſe; in "order that his majeſty and his allies might thereupon "examine in concert, whether they are ſuch as might "ſerve as the foundation of a negotiation for peace?

3. "Or would there be a deſire to propoſe any "other way whatever, for arriving at the ſame end, "that of a general pacification [3]?

2. Mr. Wickham's Note to Mr. Barthelemi is printed, in the French original, in the Moniteur 21. April 1796, where Mr. Barthelemi's anſwer is likewiſe printed. The Engliſh tranſlation, of which a copy is here given, is that which was publiſhed by authority together with the declaration of the Britiſh court on April 10. 1796.

3. It has been objected to this note, that the word *France* was uſed inſtead of *French government*, and that this language was adopted in order to avoid a formal acknowledgement of the French republic. Now as the republican

At the ſame time Mr. Wickham informed Mr. Barthelemi, that he was hitherto commiſſioned only to propoſe theſe previous queſtions, and that he was not authorized to diſcuſs the ſubjects of negotiation, which indeed he could not be, till it was known whether France would condeſcend to enter into a negotiation at all. — After having waited *eighteen days* Mr. Wickham at length received an anſwer to the queſtions in a note from Mr. Barthelemi, dated Baſel 26. March.

rulers of France had not only been the aggreſſors, but had uniformly acted with the utmoſt inſolence toward the Britiſh government, we were certainly not in ſo diſtreſſed a ſituation at the beginning of the year 1796, as to render it neceſſary to acknowledge formally that hoſtile republic, even before we knew whether its rulers would condeſcend to make peace with us. When it is further ſaid, that the uſe of the word *France* was an inſult, we may obſerve that nothing is more common, than to uſe the name of a country, where in ſtrictneſs the government alone can be underſtood. Mr. Chauvelin himſelf, whoſe authority will not be rejected by thoſe, who object to the Note of Mr. Wickham, uſed the word *France* in the very ſame ſenſe, in which it is here uſed. The following paſſages, taken from the French original of his Note to Lord Grenville of Dec. 27. 1792 may ſerve as examples. Si *la France* doit regarder l'Angleterre etc. — Le moindre doute ſur les diſpoſitions de *la France* à l'égard de l'Angleterre etc. — Non ſeulement *la France* doit et veut reſpecter l'indépendance de l'Angleterre etc. — La pureté des intentions de *la France* etc.

"The Directory ardently wishes to procure for the "French republic a just, honourable and solid peace. "The step taken by Mr. Wickham would have afforded "to the Directory a real satisfaction, if the declaration "itself, which that minister makes, of his not having "any order, any power to negotiate, did not give "room to doubt of the sincerity of the pacific intentions "of his court [4]. In fact if it was true, that England "began to know her real interests, that she wished to "open again for herself the sources of abundance and "prosperity; if she sought for peace with good faith [5]; "would

4. This passage very clearly proves, that the Directory was resolved to evade a negotiation: for had they been desirous of promoting it, they would not have used so wretched a pretext for throwing obstacles in the way at the very outset. That the pretext was a most wretched one is obvious. For how was it possible that the British government, which had proposed not merely to negotiate for itself, but to include its allies, should draw up instructions for its ambassador, which required a previous communication with those allies, when the place of congress had not been determined, and when it was neither known in what manner the Directory thought proper to negotiate, nor whether it chose to negotiate at all?

5. This insulting language again proved that the Directory was firmly resolved to admit no reconciliation with the British government. For when two parties are at vari-

"would ſhe propoſe a congreſs of which the neceſſary "reſult muſt be to render all negotiation endleſs [6]? "Or would ſhe confine herſelf to the aſking in a vague "manner, that the French government ſhould point

ance, and that party which had been firſt attacked, comes to the other and ſays, "let us in future be good friends," the other party certainly would not anſwer, "Sir you are a hypocrite," unleſs he were ſtill animated with the ſame hoſtile ſentiments, which he had diſplayed from the beginning. There was likewiſe great artifice in the mode of reply: it was calculated to excite diſcontents in England, by ſuggeſting the notion, that the intereſts of the country had been wantonly ſacrificed by its miniſters. Nor was the artifice, when aided by the co-operation of certain perſons at home, wholly deſtitute of ſucceſs.

6. A congreſs will never render a negotiation endleſs, when *all* parties are ſincerely deſirous of peace: and where this is not the caſe, a negotiation even between two *ſingle* powers will not advance very rapidly toward a happy concluſion. Beſides, when *ſeveral* powers are engaged in war, and it is propoſed to make a *general* peace, a congreſs, that is, a meeting of ambaſſadors from *all* the powers engaged, is the uſual, if not the only means of effecting the purpoſe. But it was not the policy of the French Directory to make peace with all the allied powers at the ſame time: and on the other hand, it was not conſiſtent with the integrity of the preſent miniſters of Great Britain, to make a ſeparate peace, and thus expoſe their allies to the mercy of the French.

"out "any other way whatever, for attaining the same "object [7].

"Is it that this step has had no other object, than "to obtain for the British government the favourable "impression, which always accompanies the first over- "tures for peace? May it not have been accompanied "with the hope, that they would produce no effect [8]?

"However that may be, the executive directory, "whose policy has no other guides than openness and "good faith [9], will follow in its explanations a conduct,

7. Here the Directory felt itself reduced to the necessity of taking refuge in nonsense. The questions, which had been proposed were simple, clear, and determinate, as it is possible for questions to be. But how could the British government determine the answers, which it left to the decision of the Directory?

8. These highly insulting questions were very artfully introduced by the French Directors, in order to transfer all blame from themselves to the British government. They were conscious of their own hypocrisy, and therefore endeavoured to obviate the charge, which might be made to them, by previously laying it at the door of their opponents. This is the usual finesse of the French rulers: and it has been hitherto attended with great success.

9. The openness and good faith of the present directory are perfectly on a parallel with the openness and good faith, which had been displayed by the executive council, the nature of which has been fully represented in the thirteenth chapter of the preceding history.

"which ſhall be wholly conformable to them. Yielding "to the ardent deſire, by which it is animated to pro-"cure peace for the French republic and for all nations, "it will not fear to declare itſelf openly. *Charged by "the conſtitution with the execution of the laws, it cannot "make or liſten to any propoſal, that would be contrary "to them: the conſtitutional act does not permit it to con-"ſent to any alienation of that which, according to the "exiſting laws, conſtitutes the territory of the republic.* "With reſpect to the countries occupied by the French "armies, and which have not been united to France, "they, as well as other intereſts, political and commer-"cial, may become the ſubject of a negotiation etc.

By this declaration all negotiation was at once precluded: for it was demanded, as a preliminary article, from which it was reſolved in no caſe to deviate, that the French ſhould retain almoſt all their conqueſts, and that the Engliſh ſhould retain *none* [10]. The expreſſion, "that which according to the exiſting laws conſtitutes the territory of the republic," comprehended: 1. France, according to its ancient limits. 2. The countries, which had been incorporated into France, namely: *a*) Avignon and the country of Venaiſſin;

10. Yet it has been ſaid that the Note of the French directory contained nothing, which could prevent a continuance of the negotiation!

b) Mombeliard and Porentru; *c*) The whole Dutchy of Savoy; *d*) Nice and Monaco; *e*) All the Auſtrian Netherlands; *f*) The principality of Liege; *g*) Dutch Flanders, Maſtricht, Venlo, in ſhort all that the Dutch had been obliged to cede to France. 3 The Spaniſh, as well as French part, of St. Domingo. 4. Guadeloupe. 5. The iſlands of Bourbon and Mauritius. 6. All the conqueſts which had been made by Great Britain, and were then in our poſſeſſion, namely; *a*) Corſica; *b*) Martinico, Tabago, with other iſlands in the Weſt-Indies; *c*) Pondicherry and Chandernagore in the Eaſt-Indies, *d*) St. Pierre and Miquelon, at the mouth of the river St. Lawrence; *e*) The iſlands of St. Marcou on the coaſt of France. — All this was to be granted to France, before the Directory would condeſcend even to enter upon the negotiation. But at the beginning of the year 1796, France was not in a ſituation, which warranted ſo enormous a demand: nor was Great Britain in ſo diſtreſſed a ſituation, as to render the acceptance of it neceſſary. The Britiſh government therefore very properly rejected it, and of courſe the attempt, which it had made to reſtore peace, failed of ſucceſs [11].

11. It is a very falſe concluſion, which has been drawn, that the Britiſh miniſters did not wiſh for peace. It follows only, that they did not wiſh for peace *on ſuch terms*: and in that wiſh, ſurely the hearts of all true Britons muſt join them.

But within ſix months after the firſt attempt had failed, the Britiſh government determined to make a ſecond, to which it was induced by the deciſive victory of the Auſtrians at Amberg in the Upper Palatinate, on the 24. of Auguſt 1796. This grand victory, which obliged the whole army of General Jourdan to retreat to the Rhine with great precipitation and diſorder was announced in the London Gazette of the ſixth of September [12]: and *on this very day* Lord Grenville took the firſt ſtep toward a new negotiation, in the hope that, as the Directory ſaw its project of ſubjugating the Emperor unſucceſsful, it would at laſt conſent to grant the bleſſings of peace to a ſuffering world. On the 6. of September, namely, Lord Grenville ſent a Note to Count Jarlsberg, the Daniſh ambaſſador in London [13], in which, as there was no direct commu-

12. They who have not acceſs to the London Gazette itſelf, need only conſult any other paper of the following day. That which I have now before me is the Sun of Sept. 7. 1796, where a copy is given of the Gazette of Sept. 6.

13. Lord Grenville's Note to Count Jarlsberg, with all the other Notes belonging to the negotiation were printed under the following title: "A correct copy of the papers relating to the negotiation between Great Britain and France. London Dec. 29. 1796. As the Notes are all numbered, I ſhall quote each by the number prefixed to it. Lord Grenville's Note to Count Jarlsberg is No. 1.

nication between the Britiſh and French governments, his Lordſhip requeſted him, to forward an incloſed Note, addreſſed to the French government, dated likewiſe Sept. 6, and ſigned by Lord Grenville himſelf [14],

14 It is printed No. 2, and is as follows. "His Britannic Majeſty, animated with the ſame deſire, which he has "already manifeſted, to terminate by juſt, honourable, and "permanent conditions of peace, a war which has extended "itſelf throughout all parts of the world, is willing to omit "nothing on his part, which may contribute to this object. "It is with this view that he has thought it proper to avail "himſelf of the confidential intervention of the miniſters of a "neutral power, to demand of the Executive Directory paſs-"ports for a perſon of confidence, whom his Majeſty would "ſend to Paris with a commiſſion to diſcuſs with the govern-"ment there all the means the moſt proper to produce ſo "deſireable an end. And his majeſty is perſuaded, that he "ſhall receive without delay, through the ſame channel, a "ſatisfactory anſwer to this demand, which cannot fail to "place in a ſtill clearer light the juſt and pacific diſpoſitions, "which he entertains in common with his allies.

Weſtminſter Sept. 6. 1796. Grenville.

In the edition, which I have now before me, this Note is without any addreſs: but that Lord Grenville's original was addreſſed to the French Directory is evident from the anſwer returned by the Daniſh ambaſſador (No. 3.), which begins thus. "I have the honour to inform your Excellency, that "the Note *addreſſed to the Executive Directory*, in date of "the 6. of the preſent month, was tranſmitted by Mr. Koe-

to the Danifh minifter in Paris, to be by him communicated, to the French minifter for foreign affairs. This inclofed Note, in which the Directory was requefted by the Britifh government to grant a pafsport for an ambaffador, who fhould come to Paris to negotiate a peace, was delivered by Mr. Koenemann, the Danifh Chargé d'affaires in that city, into the hands of Mr. Delacroix, the French minifter for foreign affairs, who promifed to lay it before the Directory and to return an immediate anfwer. But, as three days elapfed without any notice being taken of it, Mr. Koenemann again waited on the French minifter: when, inftead of receiving the requefted pafsport, or any kind of written anfwer to Lord Grenville's Note, he was informed by the French minifter in a very dry tone [15], that the executive directory had not permitted him to return an anfwer in writing, but that he was directed to exprefs himfelf verbally to this effect. "That the "executive directory of the French republic would not "for the future receive or anfwer any confidential over-"tures tranfmitted through any intermediate channel "from the enemies of the republic; but that, if they

"nemann, Chargé d'affaires of his Danifh Majefty, to Mr. "Delacroix, minifter for foreign affairs at Paris.

15. See Mr. Koenemann's Letter to Count Jarlsberg; No. 4. It is dated Paris, Sept. 19. 1796.

"would send persons furnished with full powers and "official papers, these might upon the frontiers demand "the passports necessary for proceeding to Paris."

From this answer, to say nothing of its affronting tone, which it is usual to avoid when a reconciliation is really desired, it was obvious that the French directory endeavoured to evade the proposed negotiation. The refusal of a passport, under the pretence that the request had been made through an intermediate channel, was mere chicane, since the Note, which contained that request, was signed, not by the Danish ambassador, but by the British secretary of state himself. The British government therefore applied *immediately* to the Directory: and it was surely a matter of perfect indifference to them, whether Lord Grenville's Note was delivered to the French minister for foreign affairs by a king's messenger, or by the Danish minister in Paris; or, if there was a difference, the latter mode appeared the most respectful. Besides, the reason, why Lord Grenville's Note to the French directory was transmitted, not by an English messenger, who, there was reason to apprehend, might be stopped at Calais, but by the means of a neutral ambassador, was so apparent, that nothing but the vilest sophistry could find any objection to the mode adopted by the British government. Mr. Koenemann himself likewise was so sensible of the unfriendly conduct of the Directory, and so

convinced, that they wiſhed to evade a negotiation, that he cloſed his letter to Count Jarlsberg with the following words. "Such, Sir, is the reſult of a mea-"ſure, which I have taken at your requeſt. I wiſh for "the ſake of humanity, that we may meet with better "ſucceſs at ſome future period: *but I fear, that this "period is ſtill at a great diſtance.*"

In the mean time, the intelligence arrived in England, that the Archduke Charles had gained a new victory over the army of General Jourdan in the neighbourhood of Wurzburg, that the French had evacuated Francfort and Königſtein, and that the Auſtrians were already advanced to Friedberg: and this intelligence was printed in the London Gazette of the 23. of September. On the day following therefore, the Britiſh government made another attempt at a negotiation, in the hope that the repeated ill-ſucceſs of the French arms might at length induce the Directory to liſten at leaſt to an accommodation. To avoid however, on the one hand, the inconvenience and humiliation, to which a Britiſh ambaſſador, waiting on the borders of France till the Directory ſhould think fit to furniſh him with a paſsport, would have been neceſſarily exposed, and yet to cut off, on the other hand, every pretext for chicane on the ground of an intermediate channel, it was determined, that the Note which Lord Grenville now addreſſed to the French miniſter for

foreign affairs, again containing a requeſt for a paſsport [16], ſhould be ſent with a flag of truce to Calais, to be forwarded thence by the municipality of that place to Paris [17]. Now whether the total retreat of Jourdan's army acroſs the Rhine, which had taken place before the middle of September, rendered the Directory at this time more flexible, or whether they were apprehenſive of producing diſcontents, if they repeatedly refuſed even to hear the propoſitions of the Britiſh government, they gave an order on the 30. of September to the miniſter for foreign affairs, to ſend the required paſsport, which he did within two days [18].

Lord Malmesbury was accordingly appointed by the Britiſh government to go Paris, and conduct the negotiation, where he arrived on the 22. of October [19]. On the 24. of that month Lord Malmesbury delivered to Mr. Delacroix, the French miniſter for foreign affairs, a Memorial [20], which was intended to ſerve

16. See No. 5. In the edition, which I poſſeſs, Lord Grenville's Note is dated September 27, but in the anſwer of the Directory (No. 7.) it is quoted with the date Sept. 24: and from various circumſtances this appears to be the true date.

17. See the Sun 26 and 27. September 1796.

18. No. 6 and 7.

19. See No. 8.

20. No. 14. The intermediate numbers contain either

as the general basis of negotiation. In this Memorial the principle of compensation, or mutual restitution, was proposed: that is, it was proposed, that Great Britain should restore to France certain conquests, which were afterwards to be determined, and that France, in return, should make to the allies of Great Britain certain restitutions, which were likewise to be determined in the progress of the negotiation. In this principle there was certainly nothing unreasonable, especially since Great Britain, as was expressly said in the Memorial, had no restitution to demand *for herself*, being then in possession of all her own colonies, as well as of most of the colonies of France. But the Directory, without admitting the principle, and at the same time without directly rejecting it, returned an answer [21], which contained the grossest affronts: for it was there suggested, that the real object of the British government was *not* to conclude a peace, that Lord Malmesbury had *secret* instructions, which were designed to counteract his ostensible instructions, that the proposal to include the allies of Great Britain had been made, in order to protract and render fruitless the whole nego-

copies of the powers, with which the negotiators were respectively invested, or notes of mere ceremony.

21. This answer (No. 15.) was signed by Reveillere Lépaux, at that time President, and was dated 5. Brumaire, that is, 26. October.

tiation, that the Britifh government had commenced it with no other view, than to throw the blame of hoftilities on the French government, and thus induce the people of Great Britain more readily to furnifh fupplies for the continuance of the war. To which Lord Malmesbury replied [22]: "With regard to the "offenfive and injurious infinuations, which are contai-"ned in that paper, and which are only calculated to "throw new obftacles in the way of the accommoda-"tion, which the French government profeffes to de-"fire, the King has deemed it far beneath his dignity "to permit an anfwer to be made to them, on his part, "in any manner whatfoever. The progrefs and the "refult of the negotiation will fufficiently prove the "principles, by which it will have been directed on "each fide: and it is neither by revolting reproaches "deftitute of foundation, nor by reciprocal invective, "that a fincere wifh to accomplifh the great work of "pacification can be evinced." — At the fame time Lord Malmesbury declared that his Britannic Majefty would not recede from the refolution of including his allies in the negotiation, and concluded with a preffing folicitation, that the Directory would give a determi-nate anfwer, whether it would accept, or not, the propofed principle of compenfation.

22. No. 16.

After many attempts to evade a determinate anſwer, the Directory at length on the 27. of November informed Lord Malmesbury, that they had reſolved to admit the principle; and deſired him to ſpecify the particular *objects* of reciprocal compenſation [23]. In conſequence of this information, the Britiſh ambaſſador ſent on the very day, on which he received it, the ſecretary of legation to London [24], who returned to Paris on the 15. of December with the final inſtructions of the Britiſh cabinet [25]. Theſe inſtructions were to the following purport [26]. *Great Britain will reſtore all the conqueſts which it has made from France*, under the three following conditions: 1. That France reſtore to the Emperor the Auſtrian Netherlands: 2. That France conclude a peace with the Germanic empire:

23. No. 25.

24. Compare No. 26. with the beginning of No. 23.

25. It muſt not be thought extraordinary, that eighteen days elapſed between the departure of the Britiſh ſecretary of legation from Paris and his return, and that he probably waited therefore ten or eleven days in London: for as the Britiſh government negotiated not merely for itſelf, but for its allies, it was neceſſary to await the conſent of thoſe allies to the propoſitions, which it intended to make. Between Mr. Wickham's Note of March 8, and the anſwer which was given to it, an equal number of days elapſed, though the Directory had to wait for no one.

26. No. 28.

3. That Italy be evacuated by the French troops. Such were the grand out-lines of the propofals made by the Britifh government: but Lord Malmesbury accompanied them with a Note dated the 17. of December [27], in which he declared his readinefs, in cafe objections fhould be made to them, *"to enter into the difcuffion of "any counter-project, which might be tranfmitted to him "on the part of the Executive Directory."* The fame declaration he repeated [28] on December 19: but the Executive Directory, not only rejected the conditions propofed by the Britifh government, but refufed likewife to communicate any propofals whatfoever on *their* part: and on the very day, on which Lord Malmesbury had a fecond time requefted a counter-project, fent him an order to depart from Paris within eight and forty hours [29].

It is evident therefore that the French Directory broke off the negotiation, not becaufe it difapproved the terms of peace, which were offered by the Britifh cabinet, but becaufe it was refolved to make peace with Great Britain *under no conditions whatfoever*: for otherwife it would certainly not have refufed, at the repeated requeft of the Britifh ambaffador, to deliver a coun-

27. No. 27.
28. No. 32.
29. No. 33.

ter-project. He who is disposed to peace, will undoubtedly, in case he thinks the terms proposed by his adversary unacceptable, reply, when requested to propose *his own* terms, "though not on *those* conditions, I will make peace with you on *these*." He would meet at least with civility an opponent, who though injured and attacked, was the first to offer a reconciliation; and would surely not repay the pacific conduct of the latter with insults and ungrounded accusations [30]. But

30. Beside the very gross affront, which was offered to the British government in the Note of the Directory of October 26, and which was the more remarkable, as being offered at the very commencement of the negotiation, very scandalous aspersions, during Lord's Malmesbury's stay in Paris, were cast in various numbers of the Redacteur, the official paper of the Directory, as well on the person of the British ambassador as on the embassy itself. The Directory thought indeed to evade all reproach, as in each number of the Redacteur the following notice was given: "les articles *officiels* de ce journal sont les seuls qui passent sous les yeux du Directoire exécutif ou des autorités constituées. But if the abusive remarks were not inserted immediately under the head of *Articles officiels*, if they were not inserted by the express *order* of the Directory, they were inserted at least with its *consent*, which in the present case is precisely the same thing. And even if we suppose that the *first* of those insolent remarks, which appeared in the Redacteur, was printed without the previous knowledge of any one of the Directors,

for the very reaſon, that the French government was conſcious of a determination to make peace with Great Britain on no conditions whatſoever, it endeavoured, at the very opening of the negotiation, by previouſly exciting the falſe ſuſpicion, that the Britiſh government was inſincere [31], to obviate the well-grounded ſuſpicion which, it juſtly apprehended, would reſult from its *own* conduct: and as an open refuſal, to negotiate

yet it could not have remained unknown to them. Conſequently, had they been deſirous of a reconciliation with the Britiſh government, they would without all doubt, as ſoon as they had read the firſt of the injurious articles, have forbidden the continuation of them.

31. To this calumny, becauſe it was vented by the Directory, they, who were attached to the French cauſe, gave at that time implicit credit. Mais qui ne connoit d'ailleurs la honteuſe faibleſſe de l'eſprit humain? Qui ne ſait, qu'il n'eſt point de menſonge ſi groſſier, qui affirmé avec audace, répété avec obſtination, ne trouve à la fin quelque créance? Les imaginations débiles ne reſiſtent point à cette impreſſion redoublée; les imaginations ardentes la ſaiſiſſent d'autant plus fortement, qu'elles en ſont plus vivement émues; leur ſurpriſe même devient le principe de leur illuſion. *Si l'impoſteur a vaincu ſurtout, quel argument!* Le ſort des combats n'eſt-il pas encore, pour la multitude ignorante, ce qui fut aux ſiecles de la barbarie l'épreuve déciſive de la juſtice des cauſes, et la voix de Dieu même?" Camille Jourdan à ſes Commettans ſur la révolution du 18. Fructidor, p. 4

gotiate at all, had been deemed imprudent, left the people, who were defirous of peace, fhould be irritated by the too glaring conduct of their governors, they thought it expedient to take fuch meafures, as fhould not only render the whole negotiation fruitlefs, but at the fame time remove from themfelves, in the opinion of the illiterate multitude, the blame of that ill-fuccefs, on which they had refolved even before the negotiation began.

If further proof of the pofition, that the Directory was determined under no condition to make peace with Great Britain, were neceffary, we might appeal to the well known expedition to Ireland under General Hoche. The preparations for this expedition, which Lord Edward Fitzgerald and Arthur O'Connor had already fettled with General Hoche, and of which the plan had been finally arranged with Mac Nevin, who came over to Paris, as deputy of the Irifh Union, for that very purpofe [32], were carried on with the utmoft activity during the whole time of Lord Malmesbury's embaffy in Paris. Nor was any doubt entertained by the Directory, that the expedition would be attended with fuccefs [33]:

32. See the Report of the fecret committee of the Irifh Houfe of Commons, on Auguft 20, 1798.

33. In the Redacteur Dec. 22. 1796, where the failing of the fleet from Breft is announced, is given the following account. "La totalité de l'efcadre eft compofée de 21 vaif-

And, as after the conquest of Ireland the further preservation of England appeared highly improbable, it was thought inconsistent, as well with the interest of France, as with the ambition of its governors to grant peace and independence to a country, which, it was fondly expected, would be reduced in a short time to the degraded situation of a French dependency. If it be objected that, though the *preparations* for the Irish expedition were made during Lord Malmesbury's residence in Paris, the *execution* of it was left subordinate to the issue of the negotiation, such an objection will be at once removed by the time when the execution of it took place: for it was on the *seventeenth* of December that Lord Malmesbury first delivered to the French minister the particular conditions of peace, which were offered by his court: and it was on the *fifteenth* of December, that the fleet sailed from Brest [34].

seaux de ligne, outre les fregattes, corvettes et transports. Elle porte à bord des troupes de debarquement, et est abondamment pourvue en munitions et instrumens de guerre. Le succès qu'a eu l'expedition précédente du citoyen Richery, sur la destination de laquelle un inviolable secret avait trompé toutes les conjectures des Anglais, peut faire augurer, *que celle-ci obtiendra, sur les mêmes auspices, les mêmes résultats.*"

34. This circumstance, though it does not appear to have attracted the notice, which it deserved, is proved by

So far therefore were the French Directors from making the Irish expedition subordinate to the issue of the negotiation, that the final order for the execution of it was given several days, before they even knew the terms, which the British government would give as the price of peace [35].

In the sanguine expectation however, that Ireland would fall a prey to France, which had been the grand inducement to the breaking off of the negotiation, the Directory was disappointed: General Hoche was obliged to return, without having effected a landing, two ships of the line [36] with seven frigates were lost or sunk, two other frigates, which had brought over twelve hundred convicts to the coast of Wales, were taken, and the Spanish fleet, destined to cooperate with that of France, was defeated at Cape St.

the following passage in the Redacteur 22. Dec. 1796. "*L'escadre armée à Brest a mis à la voile le 25. Frimaire.* That Frimaire 25 corresponds to December 15 is known to every one acquainted with the new French calendar.

35. In defiance of the plain and undeniable facts, which have been here recorded, Lord Malmesbury's embassy to Paris has been as shamefully perverted, as the negotiations before the declaration of war. But as the preceding narrative is sufficient to confute the various misrepresentations on this subject, it is unnecessary to examine them in detail,

36. The *Seduisant*, and the *Droits de l'homme*.

Vincent. On the other hand the French arms made a rapid progreſs at this very time on the continent: and at the end of April 1797, the Emperor was obliged by the preliminaries ſigned at Leoben to renounce his poſſeſſions in Lombardy and in the Low Countries.

As in conſequence of this formal ceſſion, the Auſtrian Netherlands, which the Britiſh cabinet for obvious reaſons had been deſirous of preſerving for the Emperor, ceaſed to be a ſubject of contention; it was hoped that a new negotiation might be opened with better ſucceſs, eſpecially ſince the expedition to Ireland, which had ſo much influence on the former negotiation, had totally failed. Accordingly on June 1. 1797. Lord Grenville ſent a Note to the French miniſter for foreign affairs in Paris, with the propoſal of a new negotiation [37]. The propoſal was likewiſe accepted [38]: and after an exchange of ſeveral notes, relative to paſsports, to the place of negotiation, and other preparatory ſteps [39], the ambaſſadors of the reſpective powers met at Liſle in the beginning of July. On the 8. of this month the Britiſh ambaſſador, Lord

37. As the papers relative to this negotiation, which were publiſhed as ſoon as it was ended, are all numbered, I ſhall quote each note, as before, by the number prefixed to it. Lord Grenville's note of the 1. of June is No. 1.

38. No. 2.

39. No. 3—11.

Malmesbury, presented a Note, in which the conditions of peace, proposed by the British cabinet, were delivered in the most precise and unequivocal terms. These conditions were nothing less than the following. *Great Britain will restore all the conquests, without exception, which have been made from France: and of the conquests, which France has made, Great Britain requires restitution of none* [40]. Further, with the allies of France, (Spain and Holland), the British cabinet offered to make peace at the same time on the condition of retaining the island of Trinidad, the Cape of Good Hope, Trincomale in the isle of Ceylon, and of exchanging Negapatnam for the town and fort of Cochin [41]. To these proposals it was answered the 15. of July, that the Directory required, as an *indispensable preliminary*, the consent of his Britannic majesty to cede *all* the conquests which Great Britain had made, as well from Spain and Holland, as from France itself [42]. To this demand, which was proposed, not as the price of peace, but as a mere preliminary article of negotiation, the British government, as might naturally be expected made various objections [43]: and the Directory itself *appeared* at least to admit the exor-

40. No. 13. 14.

41. Ib.

42. No. 20.

43. No. 21. 23.

bitance of the demand, as it remained for ſome time unreſolved, and pretended to conſult with the Spaniſh and Dutch governments, whether ſome part of it could not be remitted. In the mean time ſeveral weeks elapſed, during which the ambaſſadors had ſeveral conferences, and exchanged ſeveral notes [44], though without being able to effect any thing deciſive, till at laſt on the 28. of Auguſt Lord Malmesbury was infor- med, that the anſwer, which had been received from Holland, was *unſatisfactory*, but that a ſecond meſſage had been ſent to the Hague, and that the reply of the Batavian directory might be expected to arrive in the courſe of eight or ten days [45]. This ridiculous farce, for a ridiculous farce it certainly was, when the French directory pretended to be under the neceſſity of pre- viouſly obtaining the conſent of a government, which was abſolutely at its diſpoſal, is to be aſcribed to the circumſtance, that the Directory itſelf, as well as the two councils of France, was divided into two parties, one of which was deſirous of a peace with England, while the other perſiſted in the maxim, that *modern Carthage muſt be deſtroyed* [46]. Hence aroſe the irreſo-

44. No. 26—33.

45. No. 34.

46. On this ſubject ſee the intereſting work of Camille Jourdan, entitled: A ſes Commettans ſur la révolution du 18. Fructidor, eſpecially p. 87—90.

lution of the French government, and the delay, with which the negotiation had been hitherto conducted. But as soon as the struggle between the two parties was ended, and the pacific Barthelemi with his associates had fallen a sacrifice to the fury of Barras and his hostile accomplices, all irresolution ceased: and the eighteenth of Fructidor, or the fourth of September, decided the fate of the negotiation with England. The French ambassadors, Le Tourneur and the well-known Maret, who had hitherto negotiated with Lord Malmesbury, were instantly recalled [47], and two other negotiators, Treilhard and Bonnier, whose principles were more in unison with those of the victorious party, were appointed in their stead. It was now formally insisted on, that the British cabinet should consent to cede *all* its conquests, as a preliminary step to any negotiation whatsoever [48]: and when Lord Malmesbury replied, that nothing would then be left for a subject of negotiation, he received for answer, "*that this "would not be the case, that many articles would still "remain to be proposed, and many points for important*

47. Three persons had been appointed to negotiate on the part of France: but the third, Pleville le Pelley, had already left Lisle. Indeed we find his name affixed to none of the French notes, which bear a later date than July 15.

48. No. 42. 43.

"*discussion* [49]." A compliance therefore with the demand of the Directory would have laid Great Britain at the mercy of an unrelenting foe: it was answered, as it merited, with a formal refusal [50]: and on the very day, on which the answer was returned, the British ambassador received from the French plenipotentiaries, agreably, as they expressly declared, to their instructions, an order to depart from Lisle within four and twenty hours [51].

49. No. 42. So early as the 10. of July the former French ambassadors had demanded the restitution of as many ships of war, as had been taken or destroyed at Toulon (see No. 16.) that is fourteen ships of the line, and twenty four frigates. But among *the points for important discussion* this was undoubtedly one of the least consequence: for as the French government stood in very close connexion with the heads of the Irish Union, who had at that time in Paris a regularly accredited ambassador, and as during the course of the negotiation it had been positively and repeatedly declared, that the French Directory could in no case detach itself from the engagements made with its allies, we may be assured that one of the points for important discussion was the separation of Ireland from Great Britain, and the establishment of a republic there, under the auspices of the Great Nation.

50. No. 44.

51. No. 45. It is impossible to imagine any thing more absurd, than the conduct of the French plenipotentiaries on

Thus ended the laſt negotiation between Great Britain and France, which, if any doubt had remained, that nothing but the total overthrow of the Britiſh empire could ſatisfy the ambition of the French rulers, muſt entirely remove it. But the confident expectations of theſe political enthuſiaſts have been diſappointed in a manner, which they little imagined [52]: for from the rupture of the negotiation at Liſle to the cloſe of the year 1798, a period during which the ſingle iſland of Britain, deſerted by its former friends, had not only to combat alone with the enormous power of France and its allies, but to ſtruggle with a moſt formidable inſurrection in Ireland, the page of hiſtory preſents

this occaſion. They accompanied the order for Lord Malmesbury's departure, which completely put an end to the negotiation, with the aſſurance that it was the deſire of the French government to reſtore peace: they pretended that the order was given with no other view, than that the Britiſh ambaſſador ſhould go and perſuade his court to comply with the demand of the Directory: and, as if they ſeriouſly expected that he would return, they remained for ſome time in Liſle, that they might be able to pretend, the negotiation had not failed through *their* fault. If the miniſters of any other nation, than France, had acted in this manner, they would have become objects of ridicule and deteſtation.

52. It is well known, that they preſumed to mortgage Great Britain, as a ſecurity for the loan, which was raiſed to defray the expences of the intended conqueſt of it.

one continued ſeries of French diſaſters and of Britiſh triumphs. The indignation of Britons has been rouſed: and under the guidance of a miniſtry, whoſe talents and whoſe efforts are proportioned to the great emergency, they have ſhewn themſelves equal to the conflict, to which they have been driven, and have displayed an energy, which ſhall make the haughty rulers of republican France repent of their inſolence and their preſumption.

THE END.